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INTRODUCTION
This is a study of public interest law and its practice by a group of
inter-related legal foundations that were created, funded, and remain
largely directed by leaders of American business corporations. The ques-
tion raised is the extent to which their practice is consistent with accepted
notions of charity under federal tax laws and with the more particular
requirements for public interest law firms.
Few areas of law are more elusive than the regulation of exempt orga-
nizations under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The section
is broad and within it one finds separate provisions for, among others,
churches and hospitals, civic leagues and veterans organizations, labor un-
ions, irrigation companies, animal shelters, and benevolent life insurance
associations. In common, these are non-profit organizations: They work
for something other than their own financial gain. In return, they receive
an assortment of tax advantages, including exemption from federal income
taxes. Within this spectrum of exempt organizations, however, is a most-
advantaged class, those qualified under section 501(c)(3) as public chari-
ties, organized and operated for "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals." Contributions to these public charities are
exempt to the donor. In the eyes of the Code and of the public at large,
these organizations are the most worthy of all.
The Internal Revenue Service has long recognized the practice of law
in pursuit of charitable goals as an exempt activity. The American Civil
Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People have been so engaged beyond the lifetimes of most attor-
neys active today. By the late 1960's, however, a growing number of orga-
nizations formed exclusively to litigate issues as diverse as child care,
prison reform, and clean air forced the Service to come to grips with the
question of when such litigation was in the public interest, and thus to be
recognized as charitable under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In 1970,
after several false starts, the Service arrived at perhaps the only definition
of public interest legal practice consistent with its prior exemptions and
intellectually tenable amidst the rising clamor for recognition from organi-
zations that were fiercely ideological, at times in flat opposition to each
other, and at all times claiming to represent the best interests of the
American public. Public interest law firms were qualified not by their
particular ideology but by the service they performed, the representation
of otherwise underrepresented interests at the bar.
The years which followed have seen few refinements. The Internal
Revenue Service has issued no further regulations and only a handful of
revenue rulings on the subject. Audits have led to the disqualification of
no firm in practice. The field has risen and ebbed with dozens of firms
1419
The Yale Law Journal
established to represent one or more under-financed interests in the life of
the country, maintaining a base of about 100 organizations. The most sig-
nificant development since 1970 has been a new breed of public interest
organizations fashioned closely after the older ones but, for the first time,
founded, financed, and presided over by the chief executives and counsel
for such entities as Exxon, ARMCO, and General Motors, the chemical,
mining, and construction industries, public and private utilities, national
and international banks, the most powerful economic forces in America.
The forerunner of this breed was the Pacific Legal Foundation, estab-
lished in Sacramento, California, and qualified as a public charity in
1973. Within the next few years, under the aegis of a group of corporate
executives formed as the National Legal Center for the Public Interest,
the Pacific Legal model was adopted for the Mountain States Legal Foun-
dation (Denver), the Gulf and Great Plains Legal Foundation (Kansas
City, Missouri), the Mid-American Legal Foundation (Chicago), the
New England Legal Foundation (Boston), the Southeastern Legal Foun-
dation (Philadelphia), and the Capital Legal Foundation (Washington,
D.C.).
This new form of public charity presents, or should present, the Service
with its second major challenge in public interest law. The creation of
these firms by corporate leaders should not by itself be disqualifying, nor
should their participation in an at least limited fashion on the organiza-
tions' directing bodies. Major funding of these firms by corporations and
their foundations is likewise, within reason, no bar. What causes the most
serious difficulties, or should cause them, is the conduct of these firms, the
cases they have undertaken, a high percentage of which are indistinguish-
able from those of their business sponsors, and a smaller but still dis-
turbing percentage of which appear to be on behalf of the very corpora-
tions that are their major donors and that sit on their directing boards.
How the Service's definition of public-interest practice applies to firms
which in substantial measure support the objectives of these corporate in-
terests and, as they characterize their actions, those of the free-enterprise
economic system, is at the heart of this investigation.
Excluded from this study are the merits of the legal actions involved,
for essentially the same reasons which lead the Service to find another
means of defining public interest practice. One person's good is another's
bad, a diversity long recognized as a strength of American democracy.
Other data do emerge, however, which, while only incidental to the in-
quiry, may be of interest. At an aggregate funding of approximately $14
million over six years, the seven firms associated with the National Legal
Center for the Public Interest have involved themselves in 227 identified
legal actions. The Pacific Legal Foundation, which has received roughly
1420
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equivalent funding since 1973, adds another 167 actions." Only a handful
of cases were initiated by these PILFs directly and in less than one half
did they participate as parties; the majority were appearances as amicus
curiae. Almost two-thirds of these cases concerned resource development
and the environment. The central focus of this study, however, is the con-
formance of these actions to those standards which define public interest
law. On this measuring stick, the business-sponsored firms do not fare
well. Overall, only 102 cases (30%) were rated consistent with IRS stan-
dards; 58 cases (17%) were found questionable; 179 cases (53%) were
found invalid.'
These generalizations form a preliminary description of this study.
They will not reappear until an understanding is reached of the policies
by which the evaluations were made. The study accordingly begins with
the historic concept of charity and its development under the Code. It
proceeds next to the development of public interest law in this country,
and under the Service's rulings. It will then examine the business-
sponsored PILFs. Appendices to the study provide the methods of re-
search used to assemble data on these firms, the interpretation of the Ser-
vice's guidelines used to evaluate their cases, and a summary of results.
The final section draws conclusions on these results, and considers several
approaches for reconciling them within the field of exempt organizations.
At the risk of over simplifying these conclusions, it seems appropriate to
say that more than two years of study have persuaded this author that
public interest law practice reflects deeply-rooted traditions in Anglo-
American history and almost a century of American law. The current
practice by the business-sponsored firms is at the very least on the fringe
of these traditions. Whether it is a leading edge or a corruption will de-
pend on one's point of view. The only question capable of being resolved
in this study is whether that edge is within, or without, the law.
I. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
[A]lso we certify you, that touching any of the priests and Levites,
singers, porters, Nethinim, or Ministers of this House of God, it shall
not be lawful to impose toll, tribute, or customs upon them.'
1. These data reflect an investment of $71,000 per case, or approximately $130,000 per case with
appearances as amicus curiae excluded. Statistics such as these of course do not reveal the full extent
of legal activity, either on single, large cases or on administrative proposals and legislation.
2. As explained below, a number of the cases identified in the course of this study were not
evaluated due to insufficient information. In all, 55 cases were not rated for this reason, 35 of them
cases of the Pacific Legal Foundation. The evaluation totals are shown by firm in Appendix I.
3. Ezra 7:24 (King James) (emphasis added).
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A. An Historical Perspective
In history's long conflict between governments and taxpayers there have
always been sanctuaries, off limits to the tax collector, for private activities
considered charitable because they served a public need. Remairkably, the
sanctuaries have looked much the same: a consensus, in Anglo-American
history at least, on those public services which should be encouraged, per-
petuated, and exempt from taxation.- This consensus has formed the legal
meaning of charity. The preamble to the English Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1601 recognized the following as charitable functions:
some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for mainte-
nance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning,
free schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of bridges,
ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and highways, some for
education and preferment of orphans, some for or towards relief,
stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of
poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen,
handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or re-
demption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor
inhabitants concerning payments of fiteens, setting out of soldiers
and other taxes. 5
The controlling description in this country is now found in regulations of
the Treasury Department," which provide the following illustrations:
4. Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4. The question of charitable activities arose at com-
mon law from the area of gifts and trusts. The original question, and the one addressed in the Statute
of Uses, was whether a trust which had no specific beneficiary but was instead intended to serve the
poor, or to maintain a local roadway, should be recognized at law. See, e.g., Inland Revenue Comm'rs
v. National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, [1945] 2 All. E.R. 529 (K.B.), aff'd, [1946] 1 All E.R. 205 (C.A.
1945); G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 16-52 (1969). The 1601 Stat-
ute deemed that such a trust should be permitted, and subsequent decisions on both sides of the
Atlantic have concerned themselves with whether particular arrangements of this type fall within the
permitted class. See 4 A. ScowT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368 (3d ed. 1967). This body of law
defining charitable functions was incorporated into the tax laws of the United States, as a class of tax-
exempt activities, in 1913. See Rainey & Henshaw, Exempt Organizations: A Survey, 19 S. TEx. L.J.
205, 219 (1978); see also Simon, The Tax Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious
Schools, 36 TAx L. REv. 477, 485-89, (1981) (cited in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
2017, 2026 n.12 (1983)) ("The form and history of the charitable exemption and deduction sections of
the various income tax acts reveal that Congress was guided by the common law of charitable
trusts.").
5. 43 Eliz., ch. 4. These same activities are said to have been recognized by the codes of Rome,
Greece, early Judaism, and "other early cultures and religions." B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 46 (3d ed. 1983).
6. In the United States, the question of exempting activities from taxation-for charitable or any
other purposes-arose at the turn of this century with proposals for an across-the-board tax on in-
come in 1894. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-33, 28 Stat. 509, 553-57. Previously, with the
exception of income taxes levied during the Civil War, the United States had raised its revenue
through individual customs and excise taxes on specific commodities. Activities not specified were by
definition exempt. See McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 3, 523,
524-25 (1976). Once income was to be taxed, however, it became necessary to describe those activities
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relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advance-
ment of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of
the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by or-
ganizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i)
to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and dis-
crimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or
(iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 7
From 1601 to 1982, few changes can be observed in the concept or the
language of charity.
The rationales offered for exempting charitable activities from taxation
have been more varied. The force of history aside, it has simply seemed
immoral to tax, for example, revenue dedicated to services for the poor. In
Senate debate almost a century ago on the taxation of mutual savings
banks, a proponent declared that "argument ought not be necessary" for
their exemption: "They represent the savings of the poor; they are not
established for ordinary business purposes." 8 To tax them would be "the
crowning infamy" of the law.9 To Harvard University's President Eliot,
an 1874 proposal to revoke Massachusetts' charitable exemption laws was
both "illogical and mean": illogical because "if churches, colleges and hos-
pitals subserve the highest public ends, there is no reason for making them
contribute to the inferior public charges," and mean because "it deliber-
ately proposes to use the benevolent affections of the best part of the com-
munity as a means of getting out of them a very disproportionate share of
the taxes." 10 Courts and commentators have agreed.
Several writers stress the contributions of "volunteers and pluralism" to
American society."1 Charities work through volunteers, thousands of orga-
nizations, millions of individuals creating and maintaining schools, librar-
ies, parks, public health, clinics, integral parts of the American social sup-
port system, many of which the government cannot provide fully,12 or as
which should be excluded as, among other reasons, charitable.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (1960).
8. 26 CONG. REc. 6622 (1894).
9. id.
10. C. Eliot, The Exemption from Taxation (1894) (paper delivered to the Commissioners of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts), quoted in Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Orga-
nizations From Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 332 (1976).
11. B. HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 7; see Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C.
1971).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). ("The exemption from taxation of
money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Govern-
ment is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise
have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion
of the general welfare."); see also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1974)
("[T]he Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the absence of
charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the Government.").
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well,"3 or perhaps at all. 4 The government receives far more in the "free
services" of these organizations than it would recoup in taxing and pre-
sumably suppressing them. 5 Support for the exemption also comes from
those who have looked pragmatically at the prospect of taxing charities.
Legislators have seen "meager potential" in these organizations as revenue
sources, and a major "nuisance of recordkeeping" in attempting to collect
it."8 Tax scholars have noted that prevailing theories of income taxation
cannot be applied to the revenues of charities; there are no suitable mea-
sures for a "net income" or a tax rate for groups not organized for
profit.'
7
This brief glance at the nature of charitable exemptions reveals, then,
no random assortment of loopholes secured by special interests but rather
a judgment of considerable lineage on-to reduce it to its essence-what is
both worthy and needs help. From this same background a picture of
what qualifies as charitable activity starts to emerge. The picture is
clearer at the core than on the periphery.' 8 It has been developed in com-
13. For a statement of the charities-do-it-better perspective, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TREASURY DEPT. REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 12-13
(Comm. Print 1965) (charities more efficient than government because they operate under conditions
of greater freedom, innovation, and incentive).
14. As the Supreme Court has recently phrased it: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the
basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or community may
not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institu-
tions already supported by tax revenues." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2028
(1983).
15. "For every dollar that a man contributes to these public charities, educational, scientific or
otherwise, the public gets 100 percent." 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Hollis in
debate on tax exemptions).
16. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 10, at 304; McGovern, supra note 6, at 526. This assumption
appears questionable in light of the sizable incomes of some of today's larger operating charities; the
gross revenue of the National Wildlife Federation in 1981 exceeded $30 million. In 1981, an esti-
mated $11 billion was foregone to the Treasury from the deductions available to donors to charitable
organizations. Kaus, How is Bob Jones U. Like Ms. Magazine?, AM. LAw., Apr. 1982, at 63. One
difficulty in taxation of these organizations is drawing a line between those fewer larger operations
which might produce meaningful tax revenue and the great many from which the revenue would not
justify the paperwork at either end. A line based on the size of the income would in effect be based on
the success of the charity, penalizing those organizations that the public sees as providing the best
services and therefore attracting the most public contributions. This penalty is but one of the concep-
tual difficulties in taxing charitable income raised in Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13.
17. Id. at 307-16. These last arguments, of course, apply beyond charities to all non-profit orga-
nizations. In other words, in performing their services, the money received by charities is not received
as income but merely passed through to the beneficial end. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 15. This
being so, there has been no "taxable event"; "no income of the sort usually taxed has been generated."
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 449, 458 (D.D.C. 1972).
18. As for the difficulties in defining charitable activities on the periphery: "Probably no other
one area of the Revenue Code has been more consistently troublesome for the [Internal Revenue]
Service to administer or proportionately more demanding of the time of senior Service personnel than
that of charitable organizations." Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting Poverty
Programs: Hearings Before the Subconmn. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1970) (testimony of Mitchell Rogo-
vin) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
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mon-law fashion by individual decisions over a long period of time.19 It is
a fluid picture, and may expand and contract with the values of society.2"
These qualifications noted, charitable organizations are seen to do for peo-
ple what people cannot do individually and for themselves. They do what
is not otherwise being done in the society. Their ends are not "ordinary
business purposes";21 they are in a larger sense public, and publicly
supported.
These few generalizations form a stage. They are what we have under-
stood for centuries to be so deserving as to escape taxation. It is on this
stage that section F of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with exempt
organizations performs.
B. Public Charities and the Internal Revenue Code
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched
in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leaving in
my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but success-
fully concealed, purport .... 21
Judge Learned Hand
The Internal Revenue Code favors charitable organizations in several
important ways. Some of these tax advantages are extended to a wide
spectrum of organizations not operated for private profit. Others are re-
stricted to a smaller class.
19. Former Internal Revenue Commissioner Thrower testified:
In the general body of charity law, the characterization of objects as charitable has been
largely by judicial decision. . . . [T]he principles and the fact that its application has been
uniquely a judicial, rather than a legislative, determination is fundamental to both English and
American jurisprudence.
Id. at 57. The Supreme Court has recently reemphasized the common-law nature of the requirements
for charity, denying qualification to a private school on grounds of racial discrimination as "contrary
to public policy." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2030-31 (1983). "Underlying
all relevant parts of the Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting
certain common law standards of charity." Id. at 2026. For a criticism of the flexibility inherent in
this approach, see Yaffe, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions and Tax Deductions for Donations to
501(X3) Organizations on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REV. 156 (1983).
20. Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So. 2d 890, 894 ("the courts should be left free to apply
the standards of the times-on the theory that what is charitable in one generation may be nonchari-
table in a later age, and vice versa"), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 844 (1946); accord, A. Scorr, supra note
4, § 368.
21. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) ("Evidently the exemption is made
in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and
is intended to aid them when not conducted for private gain.") (emphasis added).
22. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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1. Income Tax Exemptions
Subchapter F of the Code, sections 501 through 527, exempts non-
profit organizations from federal income tax. Section 501(c) lists twenty-
two categories of organizations eligible for exemption, ranging from cham-
bers of commerce to farmers collectives to churches, trade unions, trusts,
credit unions and cemetery companies.23
Section 501(c)(3), a dominant category in this spectrum, exempts the
income of a class which includes charities in the following fashion:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, test-
ing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.24
From tax and other standpoints, this is the most advantageous class of
exempt organizations and, in fiscal year 1982, over 322,000 organizations
were recognized as exempt in this category.25 By comparison, 841,440 or-
ganizations were exempt in all categories of section 501(c).2 6 Even these
figures understate the relative importance of public charities qualified
under section 501(c)(3); a single exemption to the United States Catholic
Conference, for example, includes over 70,000 subordinate churches and
administrative units.27 The large number of organizations under this sub-
section reflect in part the breadth of its language. They also reflect a na-
tional instinct for "doing good."
The Code provides no definition of the "charitable purposes" exempted
by section 501(c)(3), or for that matter "religious," "educational" or other
eligible purposes. These matters are left to Treasury regulations and in-
terpretative rulings.2 Among the regulations and rulings defining "chari-
23. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)-(22) (1982).
24. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
25. I.R.S. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERVICE at 60 (table 20).
26. Id.
27. McGovern, supra note 6, at 528 n.29.
28. The question has also led to recurring litigation and commentary. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently found the Treasury definition of "educational" orga-
nizations unconstitutionally vague. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir.
1980); see Note, Tax-exempt Status for Educational Organizations-the Definition of Education Or-
ganizations in Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(3) is Unconstitutionally Vague in Viola-
tion of the First Amendment, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1981). Similar difficulties arise with the
meaning of "religious" purposes. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d
1197 (Ct. CL. 1969) ("religious" issue avoided by relying on other grounds for disqualification), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Peacock, Emerging Criteria for Tax-Exempt Classification for Reli-
gious Organizations, 60 TAXES 61 (1982); Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The
Definitional Problens, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977). Equally difficult definitional problems
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table purposes" are those providing for the eligibility of public interest
law firms.2" Section 501(c)(3) however, does impose other statutory re-
quirements on all qualified organizations which limit their conduct and to
that extent further define their nature.
Most relevant to the firms examined in this study is a prohibition on
private inurement: "[N]o part of the net earnings" of a qualified organi-
zation may inure "to the benefit of any private individual or shareholder."
The trigger for this prohibition is an "insider," one who by virtue of his
position can control or influence an organization's action.30 Where pro-
ceeds from a charity's activity are diverted to such an individual, the dis-
qualification is obvious.31 Where the services of a charity are involved, as
opposed to its proceeds, the prohibition becomes more ambiguous. The
Service has ruled against a manufacturers organization which tested
drugs, 2 and an association of nurses which maintained a nurses registry,
as serving the private interests of their members. 3  Yet the Service has
qualified a public park which carried the name of its corporate donor,
finding the corporate (public relations) benefit "incidental" to the public
use. However the line is drawn in a given instance, two points emerge
with clarity. The first is that the IRS will include in its "insider" class
arise in the concept of "charity" itself. As defined in the Treasury Regulations, charitable purposes
include, for example, "advancement of religion" and "advancement of education or science." Treas.
Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (1960). These are, of course, the same activities which the Internal Revenue
Code itself exempts in addition to charitable purposes. Is then "charitable" a general class which
includes all of the others in § 501(c)(3)? If so, are "educational" organizations, for example, discrimi-
nated against by the imposition of separate, additional regulatory requirements? See Comment, Tax
Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimination, 128 U, PA. L. REv. 849
(1980). The Treasury regulations and the IRS Exempt Organizations Handbook take the position
that "charity" does not swallow the class, and that activities separately enumerated in the Code, as is,
for example, "education," are properly subject to further requirements. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (1960) ("the term "charitable" is . . . not to be construed as limited by the sepa-
rate enumeration in Section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes"); I.R.S., Exr'MT ORGANIZA-
TIONS HANDBOOK § 342(4) (1983). Under this rationale, the Treasury Department retains the flexi-
bility to specify separate qualifications for "educational," "religious," and other § 501(c)(3)-listed
purposes, and for purposes beyond these which it perceives as "charitable"-including public interest
law firms.
29. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-13. See infra §§ II B., II. C.
30. See, e.g., Rev. Rul 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113; B. HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 160. A charity of
course confers benefits on private individuals every day. Only when the benefactor is in a position to
influence the decision does a private inurement question arise. This prohibition is also reflected in the
Service's more general regulations on permissible exempt purposes: An organization must show that it
is not benefiting its creators, shareholders, or "persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such pri-
vate interests." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(ii) (1960). The possible overlap between non-ex-
empt purposes and private inurement has caused some to question whether the latter has any separate
meaning. See Note, The "Inurement of Earnings to Private Benefit" Clause of Section 501(c): A
Standard Without Meaning?, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1964). In the context of a public interest law
firm, however, private inurement does seem to have separate significance. Litigation otherwise "pub-
lic" in nature may be tainted by the private benefit of a firm's director or major donor.
31. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (founder of
church and family received substantial monies characterized as fees, commissions, rent, and unex-
plained payment), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
32. Rev. Rul. 68-373, 1968-2 C.B. 206.
33. Rev. Rul. 61-170, 1961-2 C.B. 112.
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individuals such as donors and directors who may influence a charity's
decisions. Secondly, if a private benefit to such a person is found, it will
be examined closely. The statute states that "no part" may inure. There is
no modifier. 4
2. Contributions and Deductions
Section 501(c)(3) organizations operate largely on contributions from
the general public. While the larger churches, educational institutions,
hospitals, and charities may also receive considerable revenue from en-
dowments, service fees, and membership dues, it is safe to say that without
public donations their activities would be severely curtailed and the more
numerous, smaller groups would simply disappear.8 5 The sum of these
contributions to public charities is impressive, and was estimated almost
ten years ago at $26 billion a year. 8 Contributors are moved to such gen-
erosity, in part, by the fact that they may deduct their donations from
their personal income taxes.37 For the majority of public charities, the
exemptions from income tax afforded under section 501(c)(3) are not
nearly so important as these deductions available under section 170 to
their donors.38
34. The Code imposes other restrictions on charities, with varying degrees of flexibility. A quali-
fied organization may not devote a "substantial" part of its activities to lobbying, § 501(c)(3), §
501(h), nor may it "participate in, or intervene in (including publicity or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office," § 501(c)(3). It may conduct
"substantial" business activities only if they are "in furtherance of the organization's exempt pur-
pose," Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(C)(3)-1(e)(1) (1983). It must receive a minimum level of support from
the general public, § 504(a)(2), interpreted as at least one-third of the total received, Treas. Reg. §
170A-9(e)(2) (1973). The application of these restrictions to charities has been questioned, see Troyer,
Charities, Law-Making and the Constitution: The Validity of the Restrictions on Influencing Legisla-
tion, 31 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1415 (1973), but upheld, at least with respect to lobbying,
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
35. Caplin & Trimbie, Legislative Activities of Public Charities, 39 LAW & CoNTrMP. PROBS.
183, 195 (1975) (loss of deductible contributions is "tantamount to a death sentence"); B. HoPxiNS,
supra note 5, at 30.
36. Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Public Needs, Giving in America - Toward a Stronger
Voluntary Section 34 (1975) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Giving in America]. This
figure does not include corporate gifts, foundation support, endowment, service fees, or dues.
37. Tax deductions for contributions to charities appeared early in the Code, see Tax Revenue
Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (now codified at I.R.C. § 170 (1982)), only four years after the
Tariff Act of 1913, and have since remained. I.R.C. § 170(a) allows deductions for "any charitable
contribution," and § 170(c) defines these contributions as ones to organizations with "religious, chari-
table, scientific, literary, or educational purposes," the promotion of amateur sports, and prevention of
cruelty to children and animals. I.R.C. § 701(a)-(c) (1982). With minor exceptions these are the same
purposes found in § 501(c)(3), and § 170(c) imposes the same limitations on private inurement, lobby-
ing, and political activity. Analogous Code provisions exempt these donations from gift and estate
taxes. Id. §§ 2522, 2055. Contributions are limited in amount to a percentage of the donor's adjusted
gross income, fifty percent for gifts to qualified charities. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). Contributions by corpo-
rations may not exceed five percent of their adjusted taxable income. Id. § 170(b)(2).
38. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 729-30 (1974) (contributors "simply will
not make donations" to non-qualifying organizations); Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A
Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. Rav. 439, 445-6 (1960) (since income of these
groups tends to be totally consumed in their operations, it is, in practice, deductibility of contributions,
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The Internal Revenue Service publishes and regularly updates a list of
all organizations qualified under section 170." Inclusion on this list is not
only the primary benefit for public charities but also one which is reserved
for them exclusively, a major advantage in the competition for the public
dollar.
3. Fringe Benefits and White Hats
Beyond the income tax exemption and deductions for contributors, sec-
tion 501(c)(3) status confers other benefits which, in the aggregate, can be
substantial. Services performed for these organizations may be exempt
from federal social security taxes40 and federal unemployment taxes.41
Foundation grants to these organizations are encouraged through provi-
sions which hold private foundations responsible for the activities of each
of their donees, except for those of section 501(c)(3) charities.42 Similarly,
federal agencies will make grants only to these tax-exempt organizations.
Advantages beyond the Code itself may be equally important. Charities
are frequently exempted from state and local income, property, sales, and
use taxation.'3 Qualified organizations are also eligible to participate in,
and receive substantial funding from, the Combined Federal Campaign."
The United States Postal Service is inclined to equate section 501(c)(3)
status with eligibility for its preferred (lower) second and third class mail-
ing rates.45 For those charities engaged in education and the distribution
of publications, and for the increasing number of charities relying on di-
rect-mail fundraising, these postal rates may constitute as important a sav-
ings as their income tax exemptions.
From all of these benefits, and perhaps underlying them all, comes yet
a final one which, while difficult to quantify, is very much at work in the
public arena in which these organizations operate. A qualified charity is
placed on a pedestal above all other exempt organizations and above the
many more non-exempt corporations in this country. The Code declares
in effect, and history concurs, that these organizations do good works.
not income tax exemption, that is controlling).
39. IRS, IRS PUBLICATION No. 78: CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED IN SEC-
TION 170(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954.
40. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1982).
41. Id. § 3306. Employees are also eligible for special taxation of annuity provisions of the Code.
Id. § 403(b). Lotteries and bingo operations, no small considerations for some churches and other
charities, are exempt from federal gambling laws. Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955(e)
(1982).
42. I.R.C. § 4945(d) (1982).
43. McGovern, supra note 6, at 528. Of these, state income tax exemption appears to be the one
most automatically granted. Property, sales, and use taxes may be more selective.
44. See NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
45. 39 C.F.R. §§ 111.1, 111.5 (1983). For a case challenging the Postal Service requirement for §
501(c)(3) status for its preferred rates, see Sierra Club v. United States Postal Serv., 549 F.2d 1199
(9th Cir. 1977); see also infra pp. 1448-49.
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They wear white hats. In the marketplace for giving-public, corporate
and foundation-this imprimatur goes a long way, even among those who
for whatever reason do not seek personal tax deductions under section
170.
There is, moreover, an even larger marketplace for many public chari-
ties: the market of public opinion and public opinion-making. Churches
promote religion, their religion, and increasingly their views on abortion,
human and civil rights, arms control, and on political candidates who are
sympathetic to their beliefs.46 Hospitals and educational institutions com-
pete with each other and with a variety of alternative health-care opportu-
nities. Consumer leagues, environmental protection groups and dozens of
other organized and concerned elements of our society promote-indeed
have as their primary reason for being-their points of view. Charities are
selling and the public is buying. The public-public schools, legislatures,
courts and the news media included-is more likely to buy from the ones
wearing the white hats.
C. Civic Leagues and Business Leagues
Public charities are but one of twenty-two categories of exempt organi-
zations listed in section 501(c). Among the others are two which are often
confused with the section 501(c)(3) public charities and with each other:
civic leagues described under section 501(c)(4), and business leagues
under section 501(c)(6). Each provides an alternative form of exemption
which will become important for the PILFs studied here.
1. Civic Leagues and Social Welfare Organizations
Section 501(c)(4) exempts "civic leagues" and "organizations not or-
ganized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel-
fare."' 47 The primary difference between section 501(c)(3) and (c)(4)
groups is that, while (c)(3)'s may not engage in a "substantial" amount of
lobbying, (c)(4)'s may lobby without limits. For this freedom the
501(c)(4)'s pay a price: They are not eligible under section 170 to receive
tax-deductible contributions. This trade-off may give an action-oriented
charity serious pause in deciding under which of these two Code provi-
sions to operate.48
46. See, e.g., Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
47. Section 501(c)(4) was established as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, §
II(g)(a), 38 Stat. 172, and its origins have been traced to contemporaneous testimony of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce pressing for recognition of "civic or commercial" organizations. Hearings on
Tariff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Finance, 63d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2001 (1913); see McGovern, supra note 6, at 530. A provision exempting employee
associations was added in 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 231(8), 43 Stat. 282.
48. Service regulations also require that § 501(c)(4) activities, like those of a 501(c)(3) group, do
not constitute "primarily" the conduct of "a business with the general public in a manner similar to
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The Service has supplemented the Code with additional requirements
for section 501(c)(4) organizations from the Code. "Social welfare," not
defined by statute, is said to be promoting the "common good" through
"civic betterments and social improvements,"4 9 as opposed to operations
"for the benefit of members." In practice, promoting the "common good"
means little more than not promoting something aggressively bad.50 Fur-
ther, although social benefit is defined in contrast to the private benefit of
an organization's members, section 501(c)(4)'s appear to have greater li-
cense than (c)(3)'s to benefit their members so long as a "community"
rationale is also present.51
organizations operated for profit." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1960). This requirement,
when combined with the "social welfare" requirement, leads to other rulings which in effect prohibit
private inurement similar to the explicit Code requirement in § 501(c)(3). E.g., Rev. Rul. 73-349,
1973-2 C.B. 179 (co-op grocery not qualified); Rev. Rul. 69-385, 1969-2 C.B. 123 (real estate enter-
prise with proceeds to members not qualified). Although the Code also makes no mention of political
activity under § 501(c)(4), the Service has sought to prohibit it. Treas. Reg. 1.504(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii)
(1960) ("The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or interven-
tion in political campaigns. . . . "). The Service has attempted to deny § 501(c)(4) qualification to
organizations which rate candidates on the basis of their social welfare objectives. Rev. Rul. 67-71,
1967-1 C.B. 125. These rulings have been modified more recently to allow a § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion-and therefore by implication a § 501()(4)-to disseminate the voting records on candidates,
without editorial comment, and to publish candidate responses to questionnaires in an unbiased fash-
ion. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. The Service went further in 1980 to allow a § 501(c)(3)
organization, the United Churches of Christ, to issue a non-partisan score card rating candidates on
issues of importance to the organization. See Mintz, IRS Reverses Itself, Will Allow Groups' 'Report
Cards' on Legislators, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1980, at A7, col. 1. This decision took the form of a private
letter ruling, however, providing little value as precedent. More to the point, this letter ruling does
nothing at all to resolve the more fundamental question of the Service's statutory authority to restrict
the political activities of (c)(4) organizations.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1960). In practice, the goal need not be quite so lofty.
The line begins to blur where member benefits arguably serve a broader community as well, as for
example in the treatment of homeowner associations formed to improve their common streets and
neighborhoods and on which the Service has ruled both for and against § 501(c)(4) qualifications. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-102, 1972-1 C.B. 149 (neighborhood association held exempt); Rev. Rul. 74-99,
1974-1 C.B. 132 ("clarifying ruling" holding such associations were prima fade not exempt); B.
HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 245-49. The rulings swing predictably, on the degree of outside benefit the
Service chooses to find from what is primarily a neighborhood activity; the improvement of neighbor-
hoods is almost always related to the improvement of towns and cities generally. There is a similar
split in rulings on the eligibility of non-profit community bus services, depending on whether they are
viewed as serving the members' personal interests or the larger community's interest in improved
transportation. Compare Rev. Rul. 55-311, 1955-1 C.B. 72 (bus group ineligible under § 501(c)(4))
with Rev. Rul. 78-69, 1978-1 C.B. 156 (eligible under § 501(c)(4)).
50. On this basis, § 501(c)(4) qualification was denied to an anti-war protest organization which
advocated civil disobedience in its operations. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.
51. Rev. Rul. 54-394, 1954-2 C.B. 131. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) provides separately for non-profit
social clubs which operate for the recreation and pleasure of their members. The distinction IRS is
called upon to draw here between activities that are "public" and those that are "private" arises with
some frequency in another context, government eminent domain actions, where it has been resolved
with no great certainty. Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (condemnation of "blighted"
urban area and its resale to private owners sufficiently "public") and Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1972 (Sup..Ct. Mich. 1981) (condemnation of residen-
tial area for an automobile assembly plant sufficiently "public") with Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341
P.2d 171, 193 (Wash. 1959) (condemnation of private levels by port districts for industrial develop-
ment essentially "private"). See Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REv. 203 (1978); Comment, The Public Use Limitations on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem,
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The section 501(c)(4) category is then a broad one, "limited" in the
words of one analyst "only by the imagination of the attorney."' 2 Perhaps
for this reason it is also a popular one; 131,578 organizations were ex-
empt under (c)(4) in 1982.1" For a group not primarily concerned with
financing itself through tax-deductible contributions (and the derivative
benefits of section 501(c)(3) status), section 501(c)(4) would seem to have
its attractions.
2. Business Leagues and Chambers of Commerce
The earliest income tax legislation in this country applied only to cor-
porations "doing business for profit."' 5" The subsequent Tariff Act of
1913 was not so limited, a point not missed by the Chamber of Com-
merce, which urged the exemption of non-profit business leagues on the
ground of public service.55 This rationale underlies Code section
501(c)(6), which currently exempts, inter alia, "business leagues" and
"chambers of commerce." 58 In 1982, the Service recognized 51,065 orga-
nizations in this category.57
The earmarks of business leagues under section 501(c)(6) are provided
in Treasury regulations which require a "common business interest." 8
Their activities should promote "the improvement of business conditions
of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of
particular services for individual persons."59 As with section 501(c)(4)
rulings, the distinction clouds in practice; considerable private benefit is
58 YALE L. J. 599 (1949). Each of these cases involves a mix of private and public beneficiaries. The
particular alchemy by which some activities are characterized as "public," and others "private," is
difficult to master. Fortunately, as will be seen, the distinction between private and public interest law
practice under the Internal Revenue Code does not hinge on so subjective a call.
52. McGovern, supra note 6, at 530. This category has been less flatteringly described: "Indeed,
in practical application it [§ 501(c)(4)] has largely become a dumping ground for organizations which
failed to qualify under § 501(c)(3), but were sufficiently acceptable as engaged in "social welfare".
Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 172 (statement of Arnold & Porter).
53. IRS 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF CouNsEL 60 (table 20).
54. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. This same legislation also specifically
exempted charitable organizations.
55. See McGovern, supra note 6, at 531. The Chamber's testimony has thus been found behind
two exempt categories established in 1913, §§ 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6). Id. at 530-32.
56. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1982). Real estate boards were added to § 501(c)(6) by the Revenue Act
of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(7), 48 Stat. 680, 700, and football leagues in 1966, Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-800, § 6, 80 Stat. 1515, 15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1982).
57. See supra note 53.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958).
59. Id. This distinction, while similar to that applied in § 501(c)(4) to civic leagues and social
welfare organizations, does not require the promotion of a generalized commercial welfare. Rev. Rul.
391, 1959-2 C.B. 151. Indeed, the requirement of a mutually-held business interest has disqualified
an association formed to exchange business information among several different trades and profes-
sions. Id. The Service has stretched this "common line of business" requirement on occasion, to in-
clude, for example, an organization formed to promote the acceptance of women in business. Rev.
Rul. 76-400, 1976-2 C.B. 153.
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tolerated, so long as a more general rationale is also available.60 Business
leagues are distinguished from section 501(c)(3) charities on a similar
principle. Where a professional trade association primarily conducts edu-
cational activities-publications, libraries and speakers programs, for ex-
ample-it may qualify under section 501(c)(3).61 Where it undertakes an
action program designed to benefit the profession as a whole, the appro-
priate category is section 501(c)(6).
Chambers of commerce, a separate class of organizations within the sec-
tion 501(c)(6) category, enjoy the same latitude as business leagues but
differ from them in one significant respect. For a chamber, the "common
interest" is not the economic welfare of a trade but rather that of a geo-
graphic area. While neither Code nor regulation defines a chamber of
commerce, service rulings impose two requirements: Businesses within the
given area must be free to join (or not to join) the organization,6 2 and the
community served must have some recognizable composition as a "city" or
"a locality, a county, or the like."63 A qualifying organization's efforts
must be directed at promoting the common economic interest of commer-
cial enterprises in this community.6 If this shoe fits, however, there ap-
pears to be no requirement that an organization be named a "chamber of
commerce" to qualify and enjoy the benefits of section 501(c)(6)
exemption.
65
Section 501(c)(6) organizations face fewer restrictions than their
501(c)(3) and (c)(4) counterparts.66 The Code itself prohibits private in-
urement.67 Service regulations add an injunction on engaging "in business
60. See American Plywood Ass'n v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Wash. 1967). This
case involved an association providing quality control and commercial advertising for the plywood
trade; the general benefit of this service to the trade was found to outweigh the obvious individual
benefits to members of the association. Similarly, the IRS has found an organization of contractors
which established a central repository for bids, bid results, and similar information for its members
qualified under § 501(c)(6). Rev. Rul. 211, 1972-1 C.B. 150.
61. See Rev. Rul. 506, 1971-2 C.B. 233.
62. Rev. Rul. 411, 1973-2 C.B. 180 (§ 501(c)(6) status denied shopping center organization
where membership was compulsory, and limited only to center occupants).
63. See Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir. 1929). The national
and local chambers of commerce are familiar examples of organizations serving the general business
interests of a community.
64. Retailers' Credit Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 47, 51 (9th Cir. 1937).
65. See Rev. Rul. 76-297, 1976-1 C.B. 158 (§ 501(c)(6) status granted under this rationale to
organization designed to attract conventions as means of improving business throughout community).
66. See supra pp. 1428, 1430.
67. Exempted organizations must be those "[no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder." IRC § 501(c)(6) (1982). It should be noted here the "private
inurement" requirement for § 501(c)(6) organizations is logically more permissive than that under §
501(c)(3). The (c)(6) groups are established in order to promote lines of trade which will.obviously
benefit the groups members in those trades. The (c)(6) members will always have a financial stake in
these activities; the pivotal question seems to be whether the benefits extend beyond the individual
members' interests. Because the § 501(c)(3) organization exists to promote a public purpose rather
than a line of trade, the existence of any financial benefits flowing back to influential members of the
organization should raise private inurement questions.
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of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.""8 Beyond this, no constraints
are imposed on lobbying, litigation," or even participation in political
campaigns.70 In sum, given common economic interests in a line of trade
or geographic area, (c)(6) groups enjoy an exempt status with the freedom
to promote these interests to the hilt.
D. The Requirements for Public Charities in Practice: The "Organiza-
tional" and "Operational" Tests
The Code requires that public charities be "organized and operated ex-
clusively" for their exempt purposes.7 Treasury regulations develop sepa-
rate tests for "organized" and "operated." Failure to meet either one is
said to defeat the exemption.7 2 These requirements take on a certain flexi-
bility, however, in ligltt of the Service's interpretation of the term "exclu-
sively."173 While seeming to admit of no exception, "exclusively" turns out
to be a less stringent and more opaque standard.
The "organizational" test focuses on the organization's articles of incor-
poration or charter.74 The statements of purpose may be as broad as those
of the statute, i.e., that a group is organized for "charitable purposes., 75
Beyond these declarations, the charity must avoid authorizing activities
substantially beyond the scope of its exempt purposes,7 6 or activities such
as political involvement or substantial lobbying which are prohibited to
section 501(c)(3) organizations as a class.7 7 With a final provision for the
distribution of its assets upon dissolution to other exempt purposes, 8 the
charter passes muster. The "organizational" test is, then, essentially a pa-
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1, 1978-1 C.B. 159.
69. Litigation has been specifically approved as a § 501(c)(6) activity. E.g., Rev. Rul. 67-175,
1967-1 C.B. 139.
70. Legislative activities for § 501(c)(6) groups are indirectly curtailed, however, by the applica-
tion of § 601(e), which places limits on deductions for lobbying expenses by businesses. Two types of
deductions are allowed. The first is direct lobbying of legislative bodies. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(A) (1982).
The lobbying must be on a subject of "direct interest" to the taxpayer. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
20(c)(2)(ii)(b) (1965). The second is direct communications between a trade organization and its
members on pending or proposed legislation. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (1982). No deductions are availa-
ble for campaigns on legislation (or candidates or referenda) designed for the general public, i.e.,
"grass-roots" lobbying. Id. § 162(e)(2)(B). This distinction between "direct" and "grass-roots" lobby-
ing is also made applicable to § 501(c)(3) charities which elect to comply with § 501(h). Since §
501(c)(6) organizations are primarily supported by business members, their "grass roots" lobbying
activities may be limited as a practical matter by the fact that this part of their operations cannot be
written off by contributors as a business deduction. No such limitation applies, however, to their
litigation programs.
71. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (1960).
73. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
74. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2).
75. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(ii).
76. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(b).
77. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3).
78. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(4).
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per exercise. Unless an applicant goes out of its way to flag conduct ap-
proaching subterfuge, its exemption should be assured.
The Service's "operational" test looks to the activities of public charities
to ensure that they are within the charter: i.e., that they are not straying
into a prohibited area of private inurement, unrelated business, politics, or
substantial lobbying.79 The test adds no new requirements; it is the en-
forcement mechanism for the other requirements of section 501(c)(3). Its
inherent difficulty derives from the leeway necessarily afforded to charities
for "insubstantial" departures from the section 501(c)(3) rules. The con-
trolling guidance is that an organization will be viewed as operating "ex-
clusively" for exempt purposes "if it engages primarily in activities which
accomplish these purposes."80 If "exclusively" means "primarily," then
what does "primarily" mean?81
The answer begins with a recognition that the Code's charitable ex-
emption provisions are to be interpreted liberally, in favor of the taxpayer,
because of the unique benefits provided to the public by charitable ser-
vices.8  A strict "all or nothing" reading of "exclusively" might defeat the
purpose of the exemption. Any large-scale charitable organization func-
tioning in a modern economy may have some aspects of a private business,
such as merchandise sales or service fees, which would seem to be non-
charitable. For this reason, courts will overlook (accept as "charitable")
activities normally considered non-charitable if, while "substantial," they
are an integral part of accomplishing the organization's exempt purposes
(e.g., the sale of educational materials by an educational charity). 83 Courts
will also overlook activities which, although unrelated, are less than sub-
stantial, "only incidental," or a "slight and comparatively unimportant
deviation."8 4 As a corollary to these principles, however, exemption will
be denied by the "presence of a single . . .[non-exempt] purpose, if sub-
stantial in nature . . .regardless of the number or importance of truly
. . .[exempt] purposes."85
79. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. The Service would like to answer this question, as would any agency, by reserving to itself the
broadest possible discretion. Its Exempt Organizations Handbook recognizes "difficult conceptual
problems" in the terms "primarily" and "insubstantial," and declares that "[q]uestions involving the
application of these terms can more readily be resolved on the basis of the facts of a particular case."
IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK § 332 (1983). We are led, then, to particular cases for
the policies and factors controlling this determination.
82. See, e.g., Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934). This "liberal construction" ap-
proach is an exception to a general rule of strict construction of the Code.
83. See B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356 (1978).
84. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
85. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1967) (quoting
Better Business v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)). The strength of this sanction-similar to
the general-versus-private benefit requirements under § 501(c)(4) and § 501(c)(6)-may lie largely in
the eye of the beholder. Thus, the Service's refusal to qualify a commercial parking facility under §
501(c)(3), rationalized by the applicant as improving public access to local businesses, was reversed in
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The quest for certainty in the term "primarily" is not significantly
aided by resort to a fixed percentage of non-charitable activity, although
percentages can be an influential factor."6 A more typical approach is that
taken by the Service in revoking the Sierra Club's section 501(c)(3) ex-
emption in 1966, following its militant (and successful) grassroots lobby-
ing campaign against a hydro-electric power project in the Grand Can-
yon.8 7 Without an attempt at quantification, the Service found that in
retaining a Washington lobbyist and buying newspaper and magazine ad-
vertisements, these activities of the Club were "regularly carried on" and
not "casual," "incidental," or "sporadic." 88
Monterey Public Parking, which found the activity "not carried on in the same manner" as a com-
mercial lot and "carried on only because it is necessary for the attainment of an undeniably public
end." Monterey Public Parking Corp. v. United States 321 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973). Monterey Public Parking may represent a high-water mark in the
leeway afforded to public charities under the operational test. The Service has announced that it will
not follow the decision, and has since denied exemption in similar cases. Rev. Rul. 86, 1978-1 C.B.
151.
86. In Seasongood v. Commissioner, the court allowed exemption of a good government league
which devoted less than five percent of its efforts to political action, finding the activities not "substan-
tial." 227 F.2d at 907. This case was decided before the 1954 amendments barring political activity
without qualification. A subsequent case, however, has rejected the "five percent" approach with the
following explanation:
[Tihe suggestion in Seasongood that five percent of the organization's activity must be deemed
insubstantial for purposes of the statute introduces a questionable approach to the problem.
The apparent certainty of a percent test obscures the basic difficulties of balancing activities in
the context of organizational objectives and circumstances. For example, the amount of non-
public activity arguably "substantial" may well vary between religious groups and labor
organizations.
Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 347-48 (D. Colo. 1965). A middle ground was offered by
the Third Circuit in Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, remanding the related/unrelated ques-
tion to the trial court with the requirement that it balance factors comparing the totals in each cate-
gory, but fixing no percentage. 536 F.2d 572, 574-76 (3d Cir. 1976). On remand, however, the
District Court allowed the exemption through a finding that the unrelated business was only about
two to four percent of the total, and therefore insubstantial. 426 F. Supp. 553 (W.D.Pa. 1977). Deci-
sions such as this perpetuate the "five percent" rule-of-thumb which, official or not, still permeates
tax advice on this question.
87. See Note, The Sierra Club, Political Activity and Tax Exempt Charitable Status, 55 GEO.
L.J. 1128 (1967).
88. Letter from District Director to Sierra Club, Dec. 16, 1966, reprinted in 6 FED. TAXES (P-
H) 1 54,664 (1966), cited in Note, supra note 87, at 1128 n.6. So ruling, the Service claimed to have
factored out of its decision any expression on the merits of the Club's campaign. It is perhaps only a
coincidence that the U.S. Postal Service subsequently revoked the Sierra Club's preferred mailing
rates, see supra note 45, and the Internal Revenue Service has since thoroughly audited the Sierra
Club's § 501(c)(3) public interest law firm, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. Coincidence or no,
the potential in such discretionary rulings for abuse based on the perceived ideology of the charity is
strong. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 76 (comments of Senator Mondale). As Thomas
C. Huston, White House Counsel in the Nixon Adminstration, wrote to H.R. Haldeman:
What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to curtail the activities of some of
these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. Moreover, valuable intelligence-type in-
formation could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits.
Letter from T.C. Huston to H.R. Haldeman (Sept. 21, 1970), as quoted in H. THOMPSON, THE
GREAT SHARK HuNT 283 (1979); see London, IRS Hassles Idaho Environmentalists, REsOuRCES,
Spring 1983, at 14; Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions and Deductions for Donations to
501(cX3) Organizations on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REv. 156, 172-74
(1982). IRS investigations, prior to revocation, appear to be even more difficult to curtail. See High
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In the end, the search for the meaning of "primarily" ends in a zone of
considerable discretion. It would seem, however, that this discretion would
be at least influenced by the nature of the prohibition involved. The Code
itself bars private inurement and political activity without qualification.
Accepting this language at face value, it should not take much non-exempt
behavior to disqualify an otherwise eligible charity on either of these
grounds.89 The prohibition on "substantial" lobbying has been largely re-
solved through section 501(h).90 The question of unrelated business in-
come remains difficult, but not relevant to those charities such as PILFs,
that do not charge for services. This narrows the problem to the last, ill-
defined prohibition under section 501(c)(3), when a "more than insub-
stantial part" of an organization's activities "is not in furtherance of an
exempt purpose."9 1 For guidance here we can draw on the structure of
the Code itself, which distinguishes non-profit organizations from all
other profit-making concerns, and on the above discussion, to identify sev-
eral influential factors:
1. The quantum of exempt activities;
2. The quantum of non-exempt activities;
3. The nexus between the non-exempt activities and the organi-
zation's exempt purposes (the closer the nexus, the more likely the
exemption);
4. The nexus between the non-exempt activities and traditional,
commercial activity (the more commercial in appearance, the less
likely the exemption).
These factors and their refinements will become useful in examining the
activities of the business-sponsored PILFs.
Adventure Ministries, Inc. v. Commissioner 726 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984) (courts lack jurisdiction
under declaratory judgment provisions of the Code to review an investigation alleged to be politically
motivated and without reasonable cause.)
89. The private inurement requirement will become an important one for the business-sponsored
public interest law firms. The firms appear to have avoided all connections with political activity with
one exception: an alliance with the College Republican National Committee to oppose Public Interest
Research Groups on college campuses. A memorandum outlining purposes of the alliance explains:
"[lit will mean that the organized left will not have students' money to lobby against President Rea-
gan." Memorandum of Steve Baldwin, National Projects Director, College Republican Committee, to
College Republican State Chairmen (undated) (with enclosures) (on file with author). "If need be, the
CNRC will assist you in undertaking legal action. We are in contact with several conservative legal
foundations that are interested in fighting PIRG in court. All you need to do is provide a plaintiff."
Id. While this initiative does not seem to violate directly the prohibition of § 501(c)(3), the connection
to a larger political strategy cannot be ignored. Asked to comment on this program, the Republican
National Committee's communications director is quoted as saying: "To the extent that they are try-
ing to diminish the strength of groups opposed to the President, especially when those groups receive
obligatory funds, that is something we generally support." College Republicans Open a Drive Against
Public Interest Research Groups, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, at A28, col. 1.
90. It would seem logical for the Service to use the percentage limitations of § 501(h) as a mea-
suring stick even for those organizations which do not elect to come under its provisions.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
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II. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
The Internal Revenue Service frequently finds itself at the leading
edge of the movement of charity into new and unexplored fields.
IRS Commissioner Thrower, 1970
This is our answer to the hedonists and nihilists who say there is no
other way to get justice except to dismantle everything and knock it
down and then see what we can do about it.
Senator Javits, 197092
In the fall of 1970, the Internal Revenue Service came to grips with the
concept of public interest law.93 After a flurry of controversy, the practice
was recognized as charitable under section 501(c)(3)." By 1976, a survey
of PILFs identified almost 600 attorneys in over 90 tax-exempt organiza-
tions across the country, operating on a total budget of approximately $40
million. 5 In 1980, 117 firms with 711 staff lawyers were reported, in-
cluding those of the business PILFs.9"
If the timing and motives of the Service's sudden examination of public
interest law in- October 1970 were questionable,9 7 its difficulty in defining
92. Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 58 (statement of Comm'r Thrower); id. at 61 (statement
of Sen. Javits).
93. IRS News Release No. 1069, Oct. 9, 1970, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 5.
94. For contemporaneous discussion, criticism and defense of public interest law, see, e.g., Cahn
& Cohn, Power to the People or the Profession? The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1005, 1007 (1970) ("The current crop of public interest law firms are essentially hot-house
flowers. They are the product of limited, short-term foundation largess."); Halpern & Cunningham,
Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social
Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095 (1971); Note, The Practice of Law in the Public Interest 13 ARIz. L. REv.
797 (1971); Note, The Tax-Exempt Status of Public Interest Law Firms, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 228
(1972); Riley, The Challenge of the New Lawyer: Public Interest and Private Clients, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 547 (1970); Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970).
Discussion of the practice, hot and heavy at that time, has since abated. More recent articles focus
largely on the recovery of attorney's fees and other funding problems. See Heineman, In Pursuit of
the Public Interest (Book Review), 84 YALE L.J. 182 (1974) (discussing difficulties of financing pub-
lic interest law).
95. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 2, 5 (1976).
The same study reported, by way of contrast, approximately 400,000 attorneys in practice in the
United States. Id. at 165. Although dated, this is the most comprehensive report available on public
interest law practice; the Council prepared an update on selected aspects of the practice in 1980,
entitled Survey of Public Interest Law Centers. As the Council was established to address problems of
funding public interest practice, its analysis did not include the government-funded legal aid societies
and legal services programs, or those lawyers who serve the public on a pro bono basis ancillary to
and funded by their commercial practice. Id. at 3, 7. The interest of the Internal Revenue Service also
focuses on the funding of PILFs-as income and as deductions by private donors. The Service's guide-
lines and rulings for public interest law, therefore, address approximately the same universe of orga-
nizations which was included by the Council in its report.
96. SURVEY OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTERS, supra note 95, at 2.
97. The Service's motives in questioning the charitability of public interest litigation were widely
suspected of being political. E.g., IRS to the Rescue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1970, at 40, col. 2 (edito-
rial) ("Now the I.R.S. is extending its intimidation and harassment to a much wider range of organi-
zations."); Tax-Exempt Litigation: IRS Curbs Draw Widespread Opposition, SCIENCE, No. 13, 1970,
at 716 ("[O]pponents of the IRS action see the investigation as an attempt by the Nixon Administra-
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the area was genuine. The concept of "public interest" practice seemed at
first every bit as elusive as that of "charity," with less precedent to be
found in history and law. The Service had long recognized law practice on
behalf of certain disadvantaged minorities-in areas of poverty, racial dis-
crimination, and civil liberties-as charitable. The question became
whether and in what way it would recognize a broader spectrum of advo-
cates for environmental protection, consumer rights, and other interests of
the general public. The Service's answer to the question would determine
its treatment of and requirements for the exemption of public interest law
firms under section 501(c)(3). To understand the answer, we must begin
with the development of this form of practice, and the Service's response
to it fourteen years ago.
A. The Roots of Public Interest Law.
The concept of providing disadvantaged people with legal representa-
tion-as opposed to hot meals, hospital care, and a variety of other chari-
table services-arose in this country at least as early as 1876, when the
German Society of New York established a legal aid office in New York
City to assist newly arrived immigrants.9" By 1917, forty-one cities had
established legal aid programs for the poor, and the numbers have risen
and fallen since then with the revenue available from local governments,
community drives, and the private bar. In the early 1960's, the Federal
Office of Economic Opportunity began funding independent legal services;
the funding grew to over $71 million in the next five years, and in 1974,
Congress created the independent Legal Services Corporation.99 The orig-
tion to curtail lawsuits that protect the environment or the consumer at the expense of private busi-
ness."). The remarks of Senator Mondale at the subsequent Senate hearings on this issue illustrate
the same suspicions:
From the beginning, I have viewed these attacks on the legal services program and public
interest law firms as part of the same pattern, a desire by some members of this administration
to deny legal redress for the grievances of the poor and those plagued by consumer abuses and
a deteriorating environment. . . . I could not help question and wonder why the IRS singled
out public interest law firms-those trying to protect the poor and those trying to protect the
environment from polluters-for a special study;. .. At the same time, IRS apparently is not
carrying on any studies about whether we should deny to commercial firms the right to deduct
their costs in polluting as ordinary and necessary business expenses.". . . . Who wanted this
proposed regulation? What sources came to you and urged that the law firms protecting the
public interest be denied tax exemption? .... What sources for example set such a regula-
tion in motion? How is that done? Who does it?
Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 74-77.
98. This synopsis of the legal aid programs is drawn largely from Rabin, Lawyers for Social
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. Rv. 207, 207-31 (1976), which provides
particularly detailed references for the early history of the ACLU and NAACP, and from COUNCIL
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 95, at 21-57.
99. The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976). The future of the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, rosy at the time of the Councils report ("a firmly institutionalized part of the
universe of public interest law," COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 95, at 51), has
become cloudy in recent years. Program funding has been reduced, and some of the Corporation's
most outspoken critics have been appointed to its Board of Directors. See An Organization at War
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inal legal aid programs dealt with arbitrary landlords, impounded prop-
erty, and the day-to-day problems of the poor, as they walked in the door,
in the after-the-injury manner of a traditional law practice. The legal ser-
vices programs, representing these same poverty-level clients, began to
draw some conclusions about the causes of these problems from their re-
curring problems and began to seek larger remedies: They not only asked
for the apartment back, they wanted to change the rules for eviction. In
arriving at this law reform approach, which came to be known as "impact
litigation," they were not alone.
A second root of public interest practice grew from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), created in 1916 as the American Union Against
Militarism to protect the rights of pacifists when much of America was
calling for war. Led from this beginning into the defense of labor or-
ganizers and deportees, the organization broadened its name and scope to
include the rights of agnostics, Nazis, and an almost unlimited spectrum
of political and social minorities. With this growth came a change in style.
A handful of prestigious, volunteer attorneys in the early years, filing se-
lective briefs of amicus curiae, became by 1974 an organization of 275,000
members with- 34 full-time lawyers in local offices and another 18 staff
attorneys at national headquarters. These numbers were multiplied
through volunteer counsel in every state, enlisted for specific cases on a
low-fee and even no-fee basis. With this growth came a shift in tactics,
from amicus to direct representation, and to the offense. Of the eighteen
attorneys at ACLU headquarters in 1974, fourteen were addressing not
the problems of individual clients but rather, in more general actions, the
rights of juveniles, treatment of prisoners, and military justice. The
ACLU was catching the same "impact litigation" breeze.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), founded in 1909, entered litigation on behalf of black Ameri-
cans as early as 1914 and has been involved in suits against individual
acts of discrimination ever since. In 1930, however, having received a ma-
jor foundation grant, the NAACP launched a long-term litigation strategy
to eliminate discrimination in housing, education, and employment. Its
1934 Annual Report described the strategy as follows: "It should be made
clear that the campaign is a carefully planned one to secure decisions,
With Itself- Legal Services Rifles its Files and Ruffles Some Feathers, TIME, Oct. 3, 1983, at 83.
Indeed, the Reagan Administration's first candidate for President of the Legal Services Board was
Ronald Zumbrun, the President of the Pacific Legal Foundation. The legal aid model has had to deal
not only with the hand-to-mouth proceeds of annual community fund drives, but also the local politi-
cal pressures which come from that same community. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw,
supra note 95, at 23-25. Legal Services has faced the same problems with annual appropriations and
political reaction at the national level. See, e.g., Heineman, supra note 94, at 189 ("The problem with
using public subsidies, through government programs, to support independent public interest law is, of
course, expressed in a single word: politics."), Comment, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing
Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231 (1971).
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rulings, and public opinion on the broad principle instead of being de-
voted to merely miscellaneous cases." In 1939, this campaign was assumed
by the newly-created NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(NAACP/LDF) which ran a string of successes through Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954. By 1975, NAACP/LDF maintained a staff of
twenty-five attorneys and a network of volunteer cooperating lawyers in
every state. The caseload was enormous, and bottomed heavily on the de-
fense of individuals as demonstrators, draft resistors, freedom riders, and a
dozen similar postures, defending the accused. Concurrently, however, the
NAACP/LDF was mounting initiatives to eliminate the death penalty, de
facto segregation, voting inequalities, and discrimination in the real estate
market. It, too, was in the business of law reform.
These three large movements in poverty, civil liberties, and civil rights
practice changed more than the law of the their respective fields. As they
evolved, particularly into the 1960's, these organizations changed the way
lawyers approached the law. Their lawyers had clients and the clients
were injured, but so also was a larger sense of justice which is as difficult
to define precisely as it would be to deny. Most importantly, they did not
simply seek compensation for their clients; increasingly they sought to
change the law.
There are no "three sources" of anything, neither the Fall of the Ro-
man Empire nor the rise of public interest law.100 The strategy and suc-
cess of these three organizations were propelled by other movements of the
times, each contributing to the character of public interest law. Prominent
among them was the attitude of the organized bar. As recently as 1951,
the President of the American Bar Association was writing that the great-
est threat to America, apart from Communism, was "the propaganda
campaign for a federal subsidy to finance a nation-wide plan for legal aid
and low-cost legal service."10 1 Within the next twenty years, the Bar had
come to full support not only of federal assistance to legal aid programs,
but also to Bar involvement in a far broader range of unrepresented or
underrepresented interests. 0 2 The Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights
100. A considerable part of education is spent, at least in this author's experience, learning the
"three causes" of historical events.
101. Storey, The Legal Profession Versus Regimentation: A Program to Counter Socialization, 37
A.B.A. J. 100, 101 (1951).
102. An ABA President subsequently wrote:
While activity on behalf of the indigent is laudable and must continue, it is now apparent that
this concern is only one part of the total obligation of the legal profession to ensure that each
and every segment of society is adequately represented . . . There are both individuals and
groups who, for practical purposes, are barred from the courts and from legal process gener-
ally because they lack sufficient commitment and resources to support litigation on the same
scale as their adversaries. Environmental and consumer concerns are two immediate and obvi-
ous examples.
Smith, President's Page, 60 A.B.A. J. 641 (1974).
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Under Law was formed,' 03 and sent hundreds of lawyers into the South
to come up against "the system" and to come away dedicated to changing
the system through the use of law.
At the same time, thousands of middle-class urban residents, solid citi-
zens who led lives no closer to protest than the headlines of their evening
newspapers, were suddenly confronting intractable government programs
like the federal Interstate Highway System and the destruction, as they
saw it, of downtown Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, New York, Atlanta, San
Francisco, San Antonio, New Orleans, Nashville, Memphis, Washington
. . . and were taking their cases to court.10 4 Moreover, for the first time,
under the impetus of the Administrative Procedure Act, 0 5 the courts were
overcoming their traditional difficulties with sovereign immunity, stand-
ing, law to apply, ripeness, mootness and private rights of action . . . and
listening. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
Federal Communications Commission opened FCC proceedings to public
intervention. 08 The Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. Federal Power Commission opened access to the FPC, and
when that failed, to the courts.10 7 The United States Supreme Court was
finding that such litigation was indispensable to the exercise of First
Amendment rights, 08 and was viewing the denial of tax exemption to
citizen groups as an action with First Amendment limitations.?1 Scientist
Rachel Carson published Silent Spring."0 Consumer advocate Ralph Na-
der published Unsafe at any Speed."' Americans read them. Foundations
103. See 10 Year Report of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (1973), cited in
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 95, at 75 n.64.
104. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); DC Feder-
ation of Civil Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972);
Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967); Road Review League
v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); R. BAUMBACH & W. BORAH, THE SECOND BATTLE OF
NEW ORLEANS: A HISTORY OF THE VIEUX CARRE RIVERFRONT EXPRESS CONTROVERSY (1981).
Many of these highway controversies arose and first landed in the courts prior to the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) and the Internal Revenue Service's considera-
tion of public interest law in 1970. See R. LIOFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
NEPA AND ITS AFFIRMATION, 33-35 (1976).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1982).
106. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
107. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The court dismissed the
FPO's argument that citizens groups lacked standing because of insufficient economic interest in the
controversy, and went on to state that "the right of the public must receive active and affirmative
protection at the hands of the Commission." Id. at 620.
108. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
109. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (denial of tax exemption for engaging in
certain speech necessarily will have effect of coercing claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech);
accord, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
110. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Originally published in the New Yorker magazine, this
book is generally credited with bringing the problems of pesticide pollution to the attention of the
American public, and with it a concern for environmental protection.
111. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1966). This book and the attendent publicity became
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read them, and increased their funding not only for the ACLU and
NAACP's law programs but for new ones directed to consumer protection
and the environment.' 1 2 The Environmental Defense Fund was formed in
1968. The Center for Law and Social Policy, a catalyst for public interest
law in Washington, D.C., began in 1969.
The idea of using law in a less reactive way was spreading to even the
most conservative corners of the profession. Federal prosecutors, who had
historically viewed their role as handling cases which law enforcement
officers brought in the door, were now creating strike forces on organized
crime, targeting major criminals and bringing whatever charge could
stick."' They, too, were using law more affirmatively for a social end.
For those members of the profession who opposed these developments,
there was a visible alternative in the streets, in the riots following the
murder of Martin Luther King and those continuing over the Vietnam
War, predicated on a growing feeling, justified or not, that "the system"
did not work and that there was no justice for the blacks, or the poor, or
the young."
4
B. The Internal Revenue Service Response to Public Interest Law: The
1970 Guidelines
If one may resort to Biblical imagery, the public interest law firms
represent a small but dangerous David going forth to do battle
against a huge, powerful armored Goliath. The Internal Revenue
Service is like a referee who rushes in to check the weapons. While
Goliath hefts his sword and spear and battle-axe unhindered, the
referee threatens to disqualify David for putting too-large pebbles in
his sling!""'
Legal services programs, the NAACP, the ACLU and a rising tide of
legal activism were all influences behind the applications that arrived at
the Internal Revenue Service in 1969 and 1970 seeking qualification as
public interest law firms."" For the Service, the range of these firms was
intimidating, as then-Commissioner Thrower described:
moving forces for consumer protection.
112. The Law-Reform programs of the ACLU and the NAACP/LDF and the newer programs
of the Environmental Defense Fund and the Center for Law and Social Policy were created and
originally supported through foundation grants. Rabin, supra note 98, at 210-29.
113. Department of Justice strike forces were established in 1962. Gen'l Orders 672-76 (1962).
114. See The IRS and the Public Interest, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1970, at A16, col. 1. ("The
nation-including even the corporations and government agencies which are sued-should be glad
there are so many young professionals who would rather do battle in the courts rather [sic] than in the
streets.").
115. Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 263 (statement of the National Council of Churches of
Christ).
116. Id. at 15, 28 (press conference of IRS Commissioner R. Thrower, Nov. 12, 1970).
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They include organizations opposed to specific industrial undertak-
ings which may adversely affect the environment as well as organiza-
tions which propose to litigate any matter which affects the environ-
ment. They include organizations which will litigate on behalf of
consumers generally to protect consumers' interests and organiza-
tions which will litigate on any matter they conceive to be in the
public interest. " 7
The Service stalled, granted several applications out of hand, and rejected
others.118 The extent of its confusion is reflected in a ruling issued to one
applicant for litigation in the environmental field which recognized the
law firm as charitable but then required it to submit any proposal for
litigation to the Treasury Department for prior approval.119
Finally, on October 9, 1970, the Service tried to bar the door with a
press release announcing that it had "temporarily suspended the issuance
of rulings for public interest law firms" which litigate "for what they
determine to be the public good in some chosen area of national inter-
est."120 Excluded from the suspension were "the familiar legal aid groups
which provide representation for specifically identified groups, such as
poor or underprivileged people that are traditionally recognized as objects
of charity." As for donations to public interest law firms, the Service was
"in no position at this stage to make any judgment about the deductibility
of contributions . .. to currently tax exempt firms of the type being
studied."
With this press release, tax exemptions for public interest law practice
were placed in jeopardy. Funding sources even for firms which had al-
ready received exemptions were threatened. 21 Although the Service's re-
lease expressed "concern about the lack of standards" for these new firms,
it offered no indication of the problems it saw as controlling or its think-
ing on how to address them. 2 " Whatever the Service's intentions, it is not
117. Id. at 15, 16.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 93 (statement of Mortimer Caplin, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,
concerning the application of Natural Resources Defense Council).
120. IRS News Release No. 1069, supra note 93. The Service "expected to announce" its new
position within 60 days. Id. Given the potential for delays in such an inquiry and the informal nature
of the commitment-an expectation, communicated by a press release-few at the time could have
placed confidence in an early decision.
121. The Service muddied the water six days later with a second press release which announced
that while foundations and other donors to PILFs that had already received exemption rulings would
be "fully protected," the IRS hoped that "major commitments for long-range funding for such organi-
zations would not be undertaken." IRS News Release IR 1072, Oct. 15, 1970 reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 18, at 7.
122. The absence of identified problem areas put the commenting Senators and law firms at a
serious disadvantage. See Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 144-45 (memorandum from Arnold &
Porter to the Senate Subcommittee) ("the exact nature of the Service's expressed concern regarding so-
called public interest litigation conducted or supported by charitable organizations has not been specif-
ically delineated"). In their absence, commentators looked to contemporaneous speeches and writings,
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surprising that proponents of public interest law saw them and reacted to
them as hostile.
The roof fell in. Within four days, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare and its Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and
Poverty had written the Service in protest, scheduled oversight hearings,
and asked the Commissioner to attend.123 The Commissioner requested a
delay. The Senators insisted. The Commissioner again requested a delay.
The Senate again insisted. Senator Sam Ervin, chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary's Committee on Constitutional Rights, pro-
pounded questions to the Service challenging both the substance of its pro-
posal and its procedure.12 Senators issued angry press releases. 2 ' The
national press printed them; editorials and opinion pieces critical of the
Service appeared in dozens of metropolitan newspapers, most frequently
in the Washington Post and New York Times.126 Letters from the public to
editors, to the Senate Subcommittee, and to the Service were more critical
still.1 17 Nineteen former federal cabinet members and agency heads signed
a joint letter urging the Service to resume its qualification of public inter-
est firms. 12 18 Law schools, in a rare sortie from academia, voiced their crit-
icisms to the Senate and the IRS.129 Several of Washington's most prestig-
ious law firms-Arnold and Porter, Caplin and Drysdale, and Wilmer,
Cutler and Pickering among them-which exchanged personnel regularly
with the Service and did business with it on a daily basis for commercial
clients, weighed in outspokenly on the side of public interest law. 30
By the time of the scheduled hearings, five weeks after the October 9th
in addition doubtless to their own contacts within the IRS, in an attempt to read the Service's mind.
Id. at 168-71.
123. For the several exchanges between the Subcommittee and the Commissioner, see Senate
Hearings, supra note 18, at 36-45.
124. Letter of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., to the Hon. Randolph W. Thrower (Oct. 29, 1970), re-
printed in Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 47. The Service's process-in essence, rulemaking by
press release-came under heavy fire at the subsequent hearings:
Mr. Chairman, the Revenue Service has in the past conducted studies. The practice had been
to quietly bring in the affected industry groups. . . . If industry were involved, rather than
charitable organizations, one might assume that the industry representatives would have been
quietly called into Washington, and all the information necessary for Revenue to rule-one
way or the other-would have then been obtained. A good example of such an industry type
study took place a few years back when the tax treatment of treble damage payments was
under study by IRS. But that type approach did not take place in this instance.
Id. at 136 (testimony of Mitchell Rogovin, counsel to the Center for Law & Social Policy).
125. Id. at 445-56.
126. Id. at 405-44.
127. Id. at 489-516. See id. at 513 (Letter of Robert P. Cort to Sen. Nelson, Nov. 5, 1970) ("Of
course the commercial lobbyists are tickled pink to have a gag placed on such public-spirited organiza-
tions as the Sierra Club . . .
128. Id. at 496-97 (letter to David Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, Nov. 11, 1970) (signed
by nineteen former Chairmen and Secretaries of SEC, FPC, DOD, FCC, FTC, DOT, and EEOC).
129. Id. at 477-489.
130. Mortimer M. Caplin, of Caplin & Drysdale, and Sheldon S. Cohen, of Cohen and Uretz,
for example, were both former Commissioners of the Internal Revenue Service. Each submitted de-
tailed memoranda to the IRS and testified personally at the Subcommittee hearings. Id. at 107, 90.
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release, Commissioner Thrower had agreed to testify, as had thirty-six
other witnesses opposed to the suspension of the IRS exemption rulings,
ranging from the national Council of Churches of Christ and the Union of
American Hebrew Congregations to the United Automobile Workers and
a panel of former presidents of the American Bar Association.131 In a
press release of November 12, 1970, however, four days before the hear-
ings were scheduled to begin, the Service announced that it has "com-
pleted its study" and would resume issuing rulings to public interest law
firms under a newly developed set of guidelines.1 32 For the PILFs, the
crisis was over. The record of the ensuing hearings, however, provides the
only legislative history for the Service's initial guidelines, which have be-
come its baseline for the treatment of PILFs as charitable organizations.
If it is easy to appreciate the reaction of that impressive chorus which
rose in support of public interest law, the Service's initial problem (if not
its approach) is also understandable. It saw itself on new and unmapped
ground.138 The traditional practice in this field had been conducted by
established charities, the NAACP and ACLU, or legal aid societies with
purposes and beneficiaries long recognized as charitable-unpopular or
disenfranchised minorities. As the Service saw it, these groups were not
exempt by virtue of the fact that they litigated but rather by the nature of
their charitable interests themselves.'" The newer organizations were be-
ing established in order to litigate, and for clients not restricted to recog-
nized minorities. In fact, they often intended to deal with the interests of
"diffuse majorities,"13 5 the popular movements for environmental and
131. Id. at iii-iv.
132. Id. at 9 (IRS News Release IR-1078 (Nov. 12, 1970)).
133. "As we indicated we were faced with a relatively new phenomenon .... Because this
presented new, serious and unresolved legal questions with little or no judicial precedence, we invited
the presentation of views. . . ... Id. at 15 (transcript of press conference of Richard Thrower, IRS
Commissioner (Nov. 12, 1970)). The PILF question "involves new areas raising new questions and
there rests somewhere the responsibility of determining to what extent these efforts meet the tests of
being charitable." Id. (statement of Richard Thrower, IRS Commissioner).
134. "The IRS has never questioned the status of these traditional charitable organizations. There
has never been any doubt that the typical legal aid or civil rights organizations qualified as charita-
ble." Id. at 54-55. Similarly, the Commissioner attempted to exclude "many organizations, such as
conservation groups, which were held exempt because they engaged in educational activities, and as an
incident to those activities, engaged in litigation in furtherance of their charitable purpose. The IRS
never questioned the charitable status of these organizations." Id. at 55. On the basis of these state-
ments and the subsequent Revenue Rulings which implement them, some of the major litigating pub-
lic interest organizations-including the NAACP/LDF, ACLU, and National Wildlife Federa-
tion-have never applied for exemption as public interest law firms but rely instead on their
recognition as educational charities under § 501(c)(3).
135. This phrase is adopted from a book review by Benjamin Heineman which perceives the
essential problem of public interest law as its funding, and upbraids Simon Lazarus, The Genteel
Populists for the failure to address it more comprehensively. Heineman, In Pursuit of the Public
Interest, (Book Review) 84 YALE L.J. 182 (1974). Heineman's well-taken criticism notwithstanding,
The Genteel Populists is a substantial history of the rising public interest movement in America; it
also is a strong argument in its defense. See S. LAZARus, THE GENTEEl Popt'LSTs (1974).
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consumer protection most prominent among them.1" 6 Was the defense of
these newer interests in the public interest? Were they also "charitable"?
The IRS also gave indications of concern about the internal control of
the newer firms.137 Who was making their decisions on what was the
public interest? What accountability did they have to their organizations,
to the general public, indeed to anyone? The Service was concerned as
well about potential abuses. Was a program of litigation itself a "charita-
ble activity"? Was not such litigation "coercive"? Did it not penalize non-
exempt law practices, and place them at a competitive disadvantage to
firms subsidized by tax exemption?
The Service's difficulty in raising these questions and in relying on
them as a basis for denying exemptions was that, as pointed out in the
statements of Senate members and the several commenting Washington
law firms, the Service had long-accepted answers to some of them and
long-accepted means of answering the rest. Through charitable exemp-
tions to a number of non-litigating organizations-environmental and con-
sumer organizations among them-it had already recognized at least some
"diffuse majority" interests as charitable. At this point, to "unring the
bell" and return the scope of charities to a narrow class of minori-
ties-assuming such a distinction could be drawn1 3 -would be an even
more drastic and unpopular proposal than the one it was now making.
Further, the Service had never undertaken to control decisionmaking of
charitable organizations internally. Its control was exercised through its
"operational test"-what the organization actually undertook to do. As for
the "coercive" effect of litigation, this was a form of coercion fundamental
to the Constitution of the United States, long recognized by the IRS as
proper when conducted by the ACLU and the NAACP/LDF,1 39 among
others, and recently emphasized by courts as critical to effective public
participation.1 40 Undue "harassment" through litigation, were it to take
136. Environmental litigation was a major purpose of the new public interest law firms, and at
the heart of the Service's concerns. "[M]ost of the presentations that were made to use were with
respect to the environment," Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 14, 17 (press conference of Richard
Thrower, IRS Commissioner (Nov. 12, 1970)). It was also an important concern of Senators Javits,
Nelson, Mondale, and Yarborough. Id. at 53, 70-71, 76, 81.
137. This and the following concerns of the Service, never stated explicitly at the time, are taken
from the comments of the Washington law firms. See supra p. 1446; Senate Hearings, supra note 18,
at 62, 107.
138. How for example, would the majority and minority interest be defined? Less than fifty per-
cent? Of whom? Civil rights may be popular nationally; would that make civil rights litigation a
majority interest? Are Latin-Americans a minority in Miami? Are American women a minority?
American poor, in Appalachia? Environmental protection may be unpopular in Casper, Wyoming;
would an environmental lawsuit there be "charitable"? With the concept of "indigency," agencies can
at least measure income against an objective, if arbitrary, standard. With the concept of "minorities,"
the standard shifts with the populations chosen, the definition of the class, and the definition of the
issue in the first place.
139. NAACP/LDF had, by this time, been recognized for thirty years as a separate charity estab-
lished to undertake litigation.
140. See supra p. 1439, see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) ("litigation may
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place, could be dealt with in audits under the Service's operational test, as
could the threat of private inurement. Finally, with respect to the per-
ceived "competitive disadvantage" problem, it was inescapable that gov-
ernment participation in this type of litigation was fully funded by the
taxpayer, and the participation of business interests was written off as a
business expense."" Indeed, in a consumer or environmental lawsuit, the
public interest in consumer or environmental protection was usually the
only interest not subsidized. The exemptions did not unbalance the scales
of justice; they were a partial means of balancing them.
Given the logic of this response, the Service was going to be compelled
to recognize the public interest law practice. In retrospect, it seems to have
had at least two options. The first, which was apparently the way it en-
tered the proceedings, would have been to limit PILFs to a practice which
was for otherwise "charitable" purposes."42 This approach would proba-
bly have admitted organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense
Council (whose application was hanging in the balance) with such cir-
cumscribed goals as environmental protection. It would have been more
difficult to apply to an organization such as the Center for Law and So-
cial Policy, which directed an assortment of law reform projects and
which was not limited by charter to any particular one. Indeed, were the
concept of "charitable purposes" reducible to a definitive list of acceptable
goals, then this approach would have made sense. In fact, however, the
Service had no such list, nor could one be drawn. Its initial approach to
exempting public interest law firms as charities could not succeed.1 43
The Service's second option then, and the one it chose, was to focus not
on the goals of a public interest law firm but on the practice of litigation
itself. As the Commissioner explained:
Under these guidelines an applicant can receive from the Service rec-
ognition of its charitable status not primarily because of the merit of
designated social goals which it may seek to achieve through litiga-
tion but, rather, because in this way legal representation will be
made available where it has been determined that there is a public,
well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.").
141. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). American corporations write off an estimated $3.7 billion annually
in this fashion. See Business Taxes: Public Interest Groups Call for Abolition of Litigation Dedica-
tions, TAX'N & AccTG. (BNA) G-5 (Oct. 14, 1982).
142. As the IRS Commissioner subsequently explained, "I think we were somewhat diverted ini-
tially by looking at causes but we did conclude that we could not pick and choose between causes and
say litigation on behalf of this cause is good but litigation on behalf of that cause is bad." Senate
Hearings, supra note 18, at 18 (press conference of Richard Thrower, I.R.S. Commissioner (Nov. 12,
1970)).
143. The Service admitted as much at the time, indicating that its guidelines for PILFs were an
interim measure until it could revise its regulations for charitable organizations. Id. at 66, 73-74.
Regulations defining more precisely what is "charitable" and what is not for purposes of § 501(c)(3)
have not since been proposed. Given the difficulties such regulations would present, none seem likely.
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rather than a private interest to be served through litigation. . it is
the availability of this type of representation that is being deemed
charitable rather than the particular cause being serviced, provided,
of course, that the cause is wholly a public one, not tainted by any
substantial private interest . . .
To restate the rationale: Public interest law provides access for unrepre-
sented issues to the judicial system.1 " This statement has become the pri-
mary justification for public interest law practice, and in large part its
definition. The Service's guidelines, issued as the culmination of its in-
quiry, addressed the operation of a firm which would provide this kind of
access.14" Two provisions required "representation of a broad public in-
terest rather than a private interest," and direction of the PILF by a
"board or committee representative of the public interest."
At the same time the Service issued its decision, the Commissioner held
a press conference which quickly narrowed to these two features of the
guidelines. The Commissioner explained that the purpose of the "inde-
pendent board" requirement was to involve "a board or committee of in-
dependent citizens representative of the community which is responsible
for the policies and programs of the organization.' 47 While the selection
144. Id. at 66-67 (testimony of Richard Thrower, IRS Commissioner) (emphasis added).
145. The Service's rationale is fully consistent with that of the members of Washington law firms
who commented during its "study" of the PILF question. See, e.g. id., at 63 (letter of Louis
Oberdorfer, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (Nov. 3, 1970)):
The service of the public interest is not the particular position advocated by the public interest
law firm. The service to the public interest is the provision of an opportunity which would not
otherwise exist for the duly constituted public authorities finally to identify and vindicate the
public interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. The guidelines provided, in pertinent provisions:
.01. The engagement of the organization in litigation can reasonably be said to be in repre-
sentation of a broad public interest rather than a private interest. The litigation is designed to
present a position on behalf of the public at large on matters of public interest. Typical of such
litigation may be class actions in the public interest, suits for injunction against action by
government or private interests broadly affecting the public, similar representation before ad-
ministrative boards and agencies, test suits where the private interest is small, and the like.
The activity would not normally extend to direct representation of litigants in actions between
private persons where their financial interests at stake would warrant representation from
private legal sources. In such cases, however, the organization may serve in the nature of a
friend of the court ...... .05. The policies and programs of the organization are the re-
sponsibility of a board or committee representative of the public interest, which is not con-
trolled by employees or persons who litigate on behalf of the organization nor by any organiza-
tion that is not itself an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code. ..... .07. There is no arrangement to provide, directly or indirectly, a deduction for
the cost of litigation which is for the private benefit of the donor. ..... .08. The organiza-
tion must otherwise comply with the provisions of § 501(c)(3) of the Code, that is, it may not
participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office, no part of its net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual, and no substantial part of its activities may consist of "carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."
Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576.
147. Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 19 (press conference of I.R.S. Commissioner Thrower
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of the Board would be up to the organization, its existence would help
ensure that the firm "is not a satellite or a captive of a group" not recog-
nized under section 501(c)(3).148 One question at the conference pointed
out that "it would not be unusual for such groups to be the front for
corporations, sometimes inspired by them."149 The Commissioner re-
sponded: "If the applicant is a captive of or controlled by another non-
exempt organization, it would not qualify."15
Beyond the question of outside "control," the primary distinction was
the public rather than the private nature of the litigation itself. All litiga-
tion could be characterized as in the "public interest." There was consid-
erable "private litigation with substantial financial interest on both sides
in which the public has a great interest" in the outcome. 5 The Service
was here recognizing that "there are many instances where the private
interest is not such that there can be represented through normal commer-
cial sources a public voice."1 52 "This is what we are talking about," the
Commissioner went on to explain; "the representation of a public voice
that has no substantial private interest."1 53
The questions pursued this distinction. What differentiated "public"
from "private"? The Commissioner replied that if, for example, the cir-
cumstances of parties affected by river pollution "normally warranted em-
ployment of counsel in commercial circles, we would think that would be
the appropriate outlet."'" On the other hand, "if you are dealing with
something that affects people so widely that no single or small group of
financial interest predominate[s], then I think you have another situa-
tion.""55 Suppose a corporation construed that "the building of a plant for
example" was in the public interest? The Commissioner replied, "we
would recognize it as private."' 5" In sum, the Service was looking not at
the merits of the viewpoint but rather-consistent with its rationale of
access to the judicial process-at the ability to pay for it.
The Commissioner and the guidelines did leave one opening in the
"private/public" test. Recognizing that lawsuits between purely private
interests could raise a public interest as well, the guidelines allowed entry
of a PILF in these cases, "in the nature of a friend of the court. 157 These
amicus appearances, however, would also have to reflect a separate, public
(Nov. 12, 1970)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 28.
150. Id. at 28-29.
151. Id. at 19.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Id. at 25-26.
154. Id. at 31.
155. Id. at 32.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 26.
1450
Vol. 93: 1415, 1984
Public Interest Law Firms
interest. As the Commissioner explained, in a case involving "big corpo-
rate interests," "governments at several levels," and "other interests who
may be financially interested," all presenting positions to the court, "it
would be appropriate to have a public voice that was from the public
sector that does not spring from a financial interest, but concerns about
the public large."1 8
The Commissioner's testimony four days later before the Senate Sub-
committee repeated these themes:
[I]t is a rare litigant who does not feel that there is a great public
interest involved in his particular case. Thus it is not enough to say
that the bringing of an action in court is 'exclusively charitable'
merely because there is a public interest in the outcome.1"9
More was required to qualify. The Commissioner again stressed the con-
trolling distinction he saw in the Service's adopted guidelines for public
interest law: "I think that is the basis, the availability of the representa-
tion, rather than evaluation of the cause that we have recognized here."' 0
From this history, it is clear that from the time the Service formed its
position on public interest law firms, their essential requirement was that
the issue not be available for representation in the lawyers' marketplace.
It was not an incidental requirement. This was their definition and their
bottom line.
It is equally clear that such a requirement could not be applied pro-
spectively, as when the Service is looking at a corporate charter under its
"organizational test." It is a definition that would only work in retrospect,
by seeing what interests these firms actually represented.
C. Subsequent IRS Guidance on the Public Interest Law: Is There
"Law to Apply"?
Following the excitement of 1970, the Service issued its guidelines as a
formal revenue procedure," 1 and there matters rested for several years.
158. Id. at 27.
159. Id. (statement of Richard Thrower IRS Commissioner).
160. Id. at 82.
161. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575. Revenue rulings and procedures provide both the most
relevant and the least reliable guidance on the federal tax requirements for public interest law. The
most relevant, because it is only at this level that the Service has applied the Code to the practice; they
constitute the only law in view. Unreliable nonetheless, because the Service does not acknowledge in
them the force of law. A revenue ruling is the Service's conclusion based on a particular set of facts.
Although the rulings are published in order to "promote uniform application of the tax laws" for IRS
personnel and taxpayer alike, the Service cautions against concluding that rulings are applicable in
other cases unless the facts are "substantially the same". Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693, 694-95.
Revenue procedures enjoy a slightly elevated status as generalizations of the law in the form of regula-
tion. Published primarily to assist taxpayers in interpreting the Code, they are still considered non-
binding "guidelines" by the Service. Id. at 695.
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No regulations appeared. In 1975, responding to the application of the
Mountain States Legal Foundation for exemption as a PILF and to the
emerging question of accepting fees for public interest litigation, the Ser-
vice began to address the field in more detail through additional rulings
and procedures.
162
Revenue Ruling 75-74, in response to the application of the Mountain
States Legal Foundation, contains the most direct and detailed statement
of the Service's philosophy on public interest law. The ruling lays an
elaborate factual predicate including the following statements about the
applicant:
The organization has engaged in "public interest" litigation in ar-
eas such as environmental protection, urban renewal, prison reform,
freedom of information, injunction suits challenging governmental
and private action or inaction, and "test" cases of significance to the
public.
The members of the board are prominent attorneys, law professors
and leaders of public interest organizations.
The criteria of the litigation committee include: whether the case
involves a matter of public important interest: whether the individu-
als or groups involved cannot afford competent private legal counsel.
The organization does not accept cases in which private persons
162. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662; Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Ru. 75-75,
1975-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 76-5, 1976-1 C.B. 146. During the
hiatus between 1970 and the more recent guidance on public interest law, the Service was involved in
one reported law suit concerning the qualification of a public interest law firm. Center for Corp.
Responsibility v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973). The organization in question declared
among its charitable purposes the promotion of corporate awareness for the needs of minorities and
environmental protection. These purposes were to be effected by, among other means, proxy contests
and litigation. When the Service objected to proxy contests as a charitable activity, the applicant
reorganized itself into two entities, one for proxy contests and one for litigation and other activities,
the latter entity established under the criteria of Revenue Ruling 71-39. The Service continued to
oppose exemption of the litigation group, in part because it viewed the group's litigation as not suffi-
ciently "objective." Heavily influenced by evidence that the Service's anti-exemption position was
directed by White House opposition to the organization for political reasons, the opinion centers on
the White House intrusion and the plaintiff's attempts to identify it through discovery. Among the
facts in the record were memoranda on the subject by White House counsel John Dean, and the fact
that the organization had been awaiting Service action on its application for almost three years. The
court overruled the Service and found the group qualified as a charitable organization. On the public
interest law question, the Court found:
The three requirements which the Defendants now say the Plaintiff's public interest litigation
failed to meet, appear to have been created for this case. Nowhere does Revenue Procedure 71-
39 require: "objectivity" in suit selection, a separate "independent" board to govern policies
and programs, or that the subject matter of the suit involve charitable activities.
Id. at 876. The Service's more recent revenue rulings, Ruling 75-74 in particular, however, do em-
phasize the importance to the Service of a board or committee, "representative of the public interest,"
which supervises the firm and selects its cases. Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153.
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have a sufficient economic interest in the outcome of the litigation to
justify the retention of private counsel.
The organization's financial support is derived from grants and
contributions.
Accepting these statements as accurate, as it must in the "organizational
test," the Service found exemption appropriate under the following ration-
ale. Firms of this type provide legal representation in issues of significant
public interest, "where such representation is not ordinarily provided by
traditional private law firms." In this way courts and administrators will
review issues they would not otherwise receive. "A board or committee
representative of the public interest" selects the cases in which representa-
tion is warranted. Beyond the board's decisions, however, the ruling em-
phasizes that "charitability is also dependent upon the fact that the service
provided by public interest law firms is distinguishable from that which is
commercially available." Commercial service to members of a community,
even if done on a not-for-profit basis, is not charitable. In the typical pub-
lic interest case, "no individual plaintiff has a sufficient economic interest
to warrant his bearing the cost of retaining private counsel." This lack of
economic feasibility in public interest cases "is an essential characteristic"
distinguishing PILFs from private firms, and "is a prerequisite of charita-
ble recognition." In its most relevant aspect, then, Rev. Rul. 74-74 ex-
pands on Rev. Proc. 71-39 to establish the absence of commercial feasibil-
ity as the baseline criterion for a PILF.
Subsequent rulings continue the IRS's emphasis on commercial feasibil-
ity. Ruling 75-75, for example, interprets Ruling 75-74 as granting ex-
emption "only as long" as the representation is not feasible for private
firms. Ruling 75-75 denies exemption to a firm which accepts fees from
its clients, no matter how minimal, because the mere expectation of com-
pensation might be a "motivating factor" in taking the case."' 3 The ra-
tionale is stated in the negative: it could not be said that the anticipation
of fees would not affect case selection-emphasizing the importance of
"untainted" case selection to the operation of a PILF as a charity. Simi-
larly, the decision in 75-76 turns on whether a case involves "a sufficient
economic interest to warrant the utilization of private counsel." Under the
facts of this Ruling, receipt by a PILF of an after-the-fact award of attor-
163. This ruling and its contemporaries on the receipt of attorneys fees, Rev. Proc. 75-13 1975-1
C.B. 662 (imposing, among other things, a ceiling on attorney's fees not to exceed 50% of a PILF's
budget); Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154 and Rev. Rul. 76-5, 1976-1 C.B. 146, have been strongly
criticized as unnecessarily restrictive and crippling to the practice of public interest law. E.g., J.
Phillips, Advocacy Via the Judicial Process: Problems of Operating a Public Interest Law Firm
Under Present Restrictions Imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, presented at the Practicing Law
Institute's Seventh Biennial Conference, Tax Planning for Foundations, Tax Exempt Status and Con-
tributions (1978) (cited in S. Weithorn, 1 Tax Techniques for Foundations and Other Exempt Orga-
nizations 5-86 (1979)); COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 95, 161 at 306-311.
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neys' fees is found not to affect the "economic feasibility of litigation to the
client," and is therefore appropriate and consistent with the charitable
exemption.
Revenue Ruling 76-5 puts even stronger language into the. "economi-
cally feasible" test. In describing its precedent rulings, the Service here
states that "the key factor" distinguishing PILFs from private firms is
that PILF cases would not be commercially feasible for the private bar.'"
In short, from the interpretative rulings of the IRS comes an affirma-
tion of those principles underlying the recognition of all charities, and
required in the 1970 guidelines for the recognition of public interest law.
The Service will rarely gainsay, and even more rarely gainsay success-
fully, a charitable organization's objectives so long as they are supported
by an identifiable public benefit. The Service will look closely, however, at
the means by which these objectives are accomplished, and watch that a
charity's activities are not substantially directed to insiders. Of additional
and specific application to public interest law firms, the Service has in-
creasingly emphasized-from consideration as a "factor," to "an essential
characteristic," to a "prerequisite," and most recently "the key fac-
tor"-the requirement that the cases undertaken by PILFs not be "eco-
nomically feasible" for the private bar. These two requirements become
the principal standards for examining the activities of the business-
sponsored interest law firms.
III. THE BUSINESS PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMS
Because of our special position, and because many of you often
prefer to maintain a low profile where direct confrontation with gov-
164. A more recent Revenue Ruling in this field addressed the qualification of environmental
litigation as an exempt activity-in some respects a broader, and in some a more narrow, question
than the qualification of a public interest law firm. Rev. Rul 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175. Ruling 80-278
declared that an otherwise qualifying organization formed to protect and restore environmental quali-
ty may have as its "principle activity" instituting litigation "as a party plaintiff" to enforce environ-
mental legislation, and obtain an exemption under § 501(c)(3). The Service justified its ruling on two
grounds: a recognition that "efforts to preserve and protect the natural environment for the benefit of
the public constitute a charitable purpose" within § 501(c)(3); and "Congressional approval of private
litigation as a desirable and appropriate means of enforcing environmental statutes." This begs the
question whether the Service's concept of charity includes opposing the enforcement of these same
federal environmental laws. A quite different basis for exemption would have to be found, the inher-
ent charitability of the litigation itself, returning us once again to the essential credential of public
interest law-access to the legal system for the otherwise unrepresented public. Whether the exempt
"pro-environment" organization could operate through its own staff counsel is not addressed in the
Ruling. No logical distinction comes to mind, however, between out-of-house and in-house counsel;
the environmental goals and congressional sanctions-the two bases of the Service's Ruling-remain
unchanged. If this is so, a categorical exemption from the requirements of Rev. Proc. 71-39 1971-2
C.B. 575 and its progeny is available to all environmental PILFs. Such an exemption could make a
major difference in their operations relating to fee-sharing and attorney's fee recoveries. Whether an
environmental PILF could rely on Revenue Ruling 80-278 to avoid the fee restrictions has yet to be
tested.
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ernment agencies is concerned, we are the logical spearhead to do thejob.
-Joseph J. Burris, Chairman,
Pacific Legal Foundation,
to a gathering of corporate
counsel in New York City, 197965
The business-sponsored public interest law firms arose in the 1970's
along with a variety of institutes, foundations, think-tanks, research cen-
ters, and committees promoting a philosophy which has come to be known
as the "New Right." To a degree, these firms simply reflect New Right
values in the judicial system. On closer examination, however, they partic-
ularly reflect the values of American business and its efforts to affect deci-
sionmaking through judicial action. This overlay of conservative philoso-
phy on an enterprise largely created, funded, and directed by profit-
making corporations is the earmark of the business PILFs. It is also the
problem they raise under the Internal Revenue Code's concepts of charity
and public interest law.
Into the 1970's, public interest groups were concerned with causes pri-
marily, if simplistically, perceived as liberal."' 6 Their initial ventures into
litigation and lobbying were funded by private foundations such as Ford
or Rockefeller, and later supplemented by contributions from individual
members and small donors.167 The organizations often supported the exer-
cise of government authority to achieve their goals in such areas as inte-
gration, employment rights and consumer safety.'" Their efforts also
165. Visitors from California, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at D4.
166. The "liberal" label for public interest law can be misleading. Environmental protection, for
example, one of the leading PILF issues of the 1970's, has been strongly backed by political conserva-
tives. Senate majority leader Howard Baker was sponsor and floor leader for the far-reaching Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). Repre-
sentative Butler Derrick of South Carolina has received high marks from the Congress-Watching
League of Conservation Voters (LCV), League of Conservation Voters, How the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Voted on Energy and the Environment (1984) (on file with author). Some of the most
outspoken conservative columnists are outspoken as well on the need to protect natural resources. See
J. Kilpatrick, Species Doubly Endangered (1982) (on file with author) (advocating reauthorization of
the Endangered Species Act). On the other hand, the "liberal" attitudes of most public interest law-
yers are undeniable: a recent poll of the leaders of 74 public interest groups shows, for example,
greater approval for Gloria Steinem and the Sandinistas than for Ronald Reagan and the Moral
Majority. See Very Interesting, Wall St. J., June 13, 1983, at 22.
167. See supra p. 1443. Additional funding has also been provided by government agencies by
grant or contract, and by private corporations. This funding has never been a major part of PILF
budgets, because, among other reasons, it is often restricted to education programs and not available
for lobbying or litigation.
168. The word "often" is used advisedly, as it was not unusual for the early PILFS to oppose the
exercise of government authority. Much of the litigation of the Environmental Defense Fund for
example, was in opposition to government proposals that affected scenic rivers, wetlands, and other
natural systems. It would be likewise difficult to characterize any of the ACLU's litigation as promot-
ing expanded government authority. Increased government promotion of nuclear energy, on the other
hand, has no more active supporters than General Electric, Westinghouse, and the other major con-
tractors in the field, many of whom contribute to the business PILFs. One's perspective on "big
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tended to embarrass private corporations as major as General Motors that
resisted these goals."69 Through their success in the courtroom, they set
the stage for a backlash. They also set the example.
Conservative institutions are not new to American life. The American
Enterprise Institute and Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies have been prominent centers of conservative thought
since World War II. In the mid-1970's, however, with rising anxieties
over the state of the economy, government, and national defense, more
activist organizations promoting conservative causes in labor, economics,
civil liberties, and the media bloomed.17 0 As it had with their liberal coun-
terparts, start-up funding came from a handful of foundations, ones for
the most part established by major corporations.1 71 Unlike their predeces-
sors, substantial funding also came directly from American businesses as
large and diverse as Weyerhauser, Ford, Reader's Digest, Coca-Cola, Ex-
xon, and IBM. Their tax-exempt status was a significant draw. Tax-
exempt charities are safe: In the words of a former member of the IRS's
exempt organization division, "Nobody goes to jail for violating the law
on gifts to tax-exempt organizations."
17 2
Within this spectrum, more than a dozen new tax-exempt public inter-
est law firms emerged. Some of these firms-the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation and the Moral Majority Legal Defense Foun-
dation, for example-concentrate on a single issue. Others, modeled after
the Pacific Legal Foundation of Sacramento, California, pursue a broader
agenda and include the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the Mid-
America Legal Foundation, the Gulf and Great Plains Legal Foundation,
the Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, the Southeastern Legal Foundation,
the New England Legal Foundation, and the Capital Legal Foundation.
It is this group that-because of their similarities to one another and their
government" will depend largely on whether one stands to make a profit from it. This is of course a
perfectly proper motivation for the marketplace. Whether it is one that should also be subsidized as
charitable is another question.
169. General Motors was of course the target of Ralph Nader's first book, Unsafe at Any Speed,
R. NADER, supra note 111.
170. See generally Hearts and Minds: the Conservative Network, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1981, at Al
col. 1. The Post article identifies over seventy currently operating conservative organizations, grouped
under the following headings: General Public Policy; National Security/Foreign Policy; Anti-regula-
tion and Big Government; Law and Justice; Economics; Legislation; Conservative Values; Legal Ac-
tivism (the business PILFs); Media; Campus Outreach; Blacks/Minorities; Individual Liberty; Edu-
cation; Labor; Magazines; and Others.
171. These foundations include the John M. Olin Foundation (agricultural chemicals, arms, and
ammunition), the Bechtel Foundation (construction), the Adolph Coors Foundation (brewing), the
Smith Richardson Foundation (Vicks Vaporub), and the Lilly Foundation (pharmaceuticals). See M.
Colwell, The Role of Conservative Foundations in Developing Nonprofit Law Firms Which Serve
the Interests of Business (1982) (attempting to piece together corporate funding for the Pacific Legal
Foundation and other business PILFs from corporate foundation reports) (unpublished paper,
presented to Am. Soc. Ass'n, 1982, cited with permission of the author) [hereinafter cited as Colwell
Report].
172. Hearts and Minds: The Conservative Network, supra note 170, at A14, col. 6.
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ties to an umbrella organization called the National Legal Center for the
Public Interest-is the subject of this study.178 The genesis of this group
lay with the United States Chamber of Commerce.
A. The Powell Memorandum
In 1971, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce contacted Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., then an attorney in private practice, 17' and asked his views on
problems facing the American business community. Mr. Powell fashioned
his recommendations in a confidential memorandum to the Chamber, en-
titled "Attack on American Free Enterprise System," shortly before he
was appointed an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court.1
75
The Powell memorandum is a valuable historical document, capturing
the mood of the American business community only thirteen years ago
through one of its most widely respected spokesmen at the bar. It opens:
"No thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is
under broad attack. '176 Leading the attack were the "single most effective
antagonist of American business," Ralph Nader, and the author Charles
Reich, whose book, The Greening of America, Powell characterized as a
"frontal assault" on "our government, our system of justice, and the free
enterprise system.' 7 7 Businessmen were ill-equipped to combat those
who "propagandize against the system, seeking insidiously and constantly
to sabotage it.' 7 8 The time was long overdue for the resources of Ameri-
can business to be "marshalled against those who would destroy it.'
' 7 9
The counter-offensive proposed by Powell was ambitious.
"[I]ndependent and uncoordinate activity by individual corporations"
would not suffice. Moreover, "there is the quite understandable reluctance
173. Other firms of the same genre but which do not have the National Legal Center ties include
the Atlantic Legal Foundation (Delray Beach, Fla.), Connecticut Legal Foundation, (Fairfield,
Conn.), Florida Legal Foundation (Ft. Meyers, Fla.), Great Basin Legal Foundation (Provo, Utah),
North Star Legal Foundation (Minneapolis, Minn.), Texas Legal Foundation (San Antonio, Texas),
and the Washington Legal Foundation (Washington, D.C.).
174. Powell was a partner in Hunton and Williams, one of the largest corporate fims in Virginia
and one of the most influential firms outside of Washington, D.C., on national policy. He was also a
past President of the American Bar Association and a member of numerous national boards and
committees.
175. Soon thereafter, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson obtained copies of the confidential
memorandum and began publishing exerpts for his readers. The Chamber of Commerce then pub-
lished the Powell memorandum in full. The Powell Memorandum, WASmNGTON REPORT, Supp.
No. 2900, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1971).
176. Id. at 2. A footnote to this statement adds that "[t]he American political system of democracy
under the rule of law is also under attack, often by the same individuals and organizations who seek
to undermine the enterprise system." Id. at 2 n.1.
177. Id. The Nader and Reich themes, consumerism and environmentalism, surface repeatedly as
the bate-noirs of the business community, and a major focus of the business PILFs.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 4.
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on the part of any one corporation to get too far out in front and to make
itself too visible a target." ' This is where the Chamber came in. It
should launch scholars and speakers, an "evaluation of textbooks" to ad-
dress problems in schools, "constant surveillance" of the media and, "in
the final analysis," the "pay-off" area: action in politics and the courts.181
The judiciary "may be the most important instrument of social, economic
and political change."18 Public interest law firms were particularly active
in this area, and their impact has "not been inconsequential." 8 " The
memo noted:
This is a vast area of opportunity for the Chamber, if it is willing to
undertake the role of spokesman for American business and if, in
turn, business is willing to provide the funds.
As with respect to scholars and speakers, the Chamber would need
a highly competent staff of lawyers. In special situations it should be
authorized to engage, to appear as amicus counsel in the Supreme
Court, lawyers of national standing and reputation. The greatest
care should be exercised in selecting cases in which to participate, or
the suits to institute. But the opportunity merits the necessary
effort.'"
Thus the concept for a business-interest litigation center was born. It is
worthy of note that, in Powell's mind, the proposal was frankly and flatly
a business operation, corporate-supported and Chamber-run. The idea
that such legal action would itself qualify as a public interest law firm
either did not cross his mind or, if it did, was apparently rejected.
B. From Powell to Pacific
Powell's memorandum was widely disseminated by the Chamber of
Commerce. On the Pacific coast, industrialists were smarting from a spate
of publicity and lawsuits over, among other controversies, the Santa Bar-
bara oil spill, the Alaska pipeline, the Mineral King development, and a
new California state court opinion requiring environmental impact assess-
ments for major private construction projects. 85 The Union Oil Company
180. Id. The "taking the heat" function of the Chamber, and of the business PILFs, is one of
their strongest selling points to the business community. See supra note 165.
181. Id. at 5-7.
There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others who openly seek
destruction of the system. There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all
political areas for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize
politically those who oppose it.
Id. at 8.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr.
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was involved in both the pipeline and the spill; Union Oil's president,
Fred Hartley, was also President of the California Chamber of Com-
merce. Hartley contacted James Archer, President of the California Bar,
to explore the prospect of a business-interest law firm.18 Archer, whose
private firm had represented the losing side in the California impact as-
sessment case, contacted attorney William French Smith. Prominent
among Smith's clients, in addition to then-Governor Reagan, was J. Si-
mon Fluor of the Fluor Corporation. Environmental litigation had caused
significant delays on the construction of the Alaskan pipeline, for which
Fluor's company was a major contractor. Similar challenges threatened
off-shore drilling and the Mineral King development.' 87 Fluor was ready
to help.
Meanwhile, Powell's memorandum stimulated developments inside the
California Chamber. Roy Green, the director of the California Chamber's
Department of Manpower and Human Relations, proposed that the
Chamber start a non-profit law firm. 88 A study of the proposal ensued
and, in an unpublished memorandum dated September 28, 1972, recom-
mended the creation of a public interest legal foundation. Its orientation
towards the Chamber's business members was unequivocal:
The purpose of the proposed privately-funded legal foundation is to
meet the challenge of those who have gone to the courts to seek
change in public policy in areas which vitally affect private, indus-
trial, business and agricultural interests, and to successfully deter
government agencies from the disruption of their daily functions.189
The Chamber also recognized, however, that qualification under section
501(c)(3) was desirable: "[C]ontributions [to the law foundation] which
761 (1972).
186. Weinstein, Defending What? The Corporations' Public Interest, Jutss DR., June 1975, at
39, 40. The information on the founders of the Pacific Legal Foundation is taken largely from this
interview.
187. An early Chairman of Pacific Legal Foundation Board of Trustees is quoted as stating that,
frustrated by litigation such as that over the Alaska Pipeline, Fluor wanted to "figure out what kinds
of things to create to fight back in that arena." J. Wheaton, Pacific Legal Foundation, at 9 (1983)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Wheaton's research of PLF was similar to that
conducted in this study, with the addition of interviews with PLF's President and an examination of
its success rate in court. In contrast to PLF's frequently-asserted success in "over seventy percent" of
its cases, see letter from N. Rousselot, chairman, board of directors, National Wool Growers Associa-
tion, Inc. (Feb. 20, 1984), Wheaton, examining 125 PLF cases, found PLF's position (as amicus,
intervenor or party) prevailing 41 percent of the time, failing 53 percent of the time, and indetermi-
nate the remaining six percent. J. Wheaton, Pacific Legal Foundation Won-Loss Record (july, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Much of this research has subsequently been pub-
lished in Wheaton, The Pacific Legal Foundation, Public Interest for Profit, The Truth, May 9,
1983, at 1, col. 1.
188. Berthelsen, Big Business, Ecologists Clash Nears, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 4, 1973, at. 1, coI 1.
The information following concerning the California Chamber of Commerce's initial involvement is
taken largely from this article.
189. Id.
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are made to legal services projects are tax deductible, a factor which as-
suredly would increase the interest of the private sector in the
foundation.'" 0
In this fashion, in early 1973, the Pacific Legal Foundation was born.
Its offices were located on the fourth floor of the Chamber of Commerce
building in Sacramento.191 Its rent was paid initially by Sacramento de-
veloper George McKeon.' 9 Roy Green, formerly deputy director of the
Chamber, became its executive vice president and administrator. With
backing from other Chamber members, and from J. Simon Fluor in par-
ticular, Pacific Legal's financing was assured. In the words of J. Robert
Fluor, who since inherited J. Simon Fluor's position in the Fluor
Corporation:
Si [Fluor], working closely with Fred Hartley, Chairman of the
Union Oil Company and then President of the California Chamber
of Commerce, and with the Chamber's leadership, literally pioneered
the public interest law concept . . . .Si saw dearly that there was
an imbalance-a vacuum in the courts-which was hurting private
enterprise.193
Phrased less elegantly by PLF's president, Fluor "almost single-handedly
raised the seed money to get us launched. He got his ten buddies, or
whatever it was, to return favors and give some money to open the
doors."'" J. Simon Fluor became Pacific Legal Foundation's first Chair-
man of the Board.
C. Pacific Legal Foundation
The Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF") was the first business PILF
entry into the field. Its initial staff had in effect already been on the job.
In 1971, California made major cutbacks in its welfare system. Anticipat-
ing a reaction in the legislature and in the courts, the Reagan Administra-
tion established a special task force of attorneys to defend the reductions.
The task force succeeded, and from this experience emerged a nucleus of




193. Presentation by J. Robert Fluor at the Second Annual J. Simon Fluor Memorial Award,
Honoring the Associated General Contractors of American for Outstanding Contributions to Public
Interest Law, Dec. 8, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Fluor Memorial].
194. J. Wheaton, supra note 87, at 9.
195. The early members of the Pacific Legal Foundations staff included the assistant director of
the California Welfare Department, the deputy director of the Department of Social Welfare, the
deputy state welfare director for legal affairs, and a senior attorney from the state attorney general's
office; all were involved in the welfare reform project. Barnes, Pacific Legal Foundation Redefines
'Public Interest' Law, TRIAL MAG., May, 1977, at 61.
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Their readiness coincided with the awakening of business leaders in Cali-
fornia that they were losing in the courtroom and that they had better do
something about it.
The emphasis of the new organization reflected the priorities of its
sponsors. Number one on the list were the constraints of environmental
laws. California had been on the leading crest of environmentalism in the
early 1970's, and for some California business leaders the word alone was
provocation:
I loathe environmentalists . . . .I say we should preserve the red-
woods, sure, maybe 100 acres of them to show the kids. Those envi-
ronmentalists who talk about preserving wilderness in Alaska-how
many goddamned bloody people will end up going there in the next
hundred years to suck their thumbs and write poetry? . . .This
country needs the oil. If my country doesn't come ahead of my view,
then I don't think much of my country.19 '
The Pacific Legal Foundation got the message. Asked his opinion of the
"most critical" area of public interest law, the firm's then executive legal
director replied, "environmental law."19 By way of illustration, he de-
scribed the firm's early actions supporting the use of DDT, the construc-
tion of a dam and reservoir project, the use of herbicides in national for-
ests, and the use of public grazing lands without environmental impact
review. 9 Whatever the legal merits of these cases, they established a pat-
tern at an early date for the activities of this firm and its progeny. Envi-
ronmental laws hurt business. Environmental cases would be the priority.
PLF's positions would be those of the business interests in the case. These
same interests would support and direct the Foundation.
While business support for the PLF has been considerable, it is not
easy to particularize. Annual federal tax returns for public charities dis-
close gifts, grants, and contributions only as a lump sum. 99 The PLF
reported receiving $250,510 in 1973. The next year, revenue doubled to
$564,910. Foundations aside, the firm relied on the direct promotion of
individual business interests from the outset. In August, 1973, Agrichemi-
196. Justin Dart, quoted in Williams, Farewell to a Forest, BoSTON MAG., Nov. 1982, at 133.
Dart, of the Dart drugstore chain, was also an active fund raiser for the Republican Party and a dose
friend of then Governor Reagan. Id. See also the remarks of Union Oil President Fred Hartley, a
Pacific Legal Foundation founder and financier. "What stands in the way of that pipeline [the Alaska
Pipeline] now is unemployed lawyers making a living off misled people who supply dues and fees to
environmental groups that are perhaps led by men of ill will." Weinstein, supra note 186, at 39, 40.
Another founder of the Pacific Legal Foundation was Edwin Meese, currently President Reagan's
White House advisor. Blodgett, The Ralph Naders of the Right, A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 70, 74.
197. Pacific Legal Foundation: Establishnent's Answer to the Storefront Lawyers, PACIFIc Bus.,
July-Aug. 1975, at 9, 10.
198. Id. at 10-11.
199. Pacific Legal Foundation Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, pt. V, line 11.
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cal Age told its readers that "we are really sold on this one, and we hope
to sell you. . . .[T]he [Pacific Legal] Foundation has already discovered
that agriculture will be one of its largest areas of work."200 Three years
later, the California Chamber of Commerce was still sending its members
PLF brochures with cover letters from its president stating: "For too
many years the opposition, which has been well financed in their efforts,
has been the only voice in court. That's why I'm writing you now for
your support. 20 1 In October 1980, PLF itself sent promotions to "Dear
Business Leader," explaining that "Pacific Legal Foundation is challeng-
ing government growth and government controls that are detrimental to
our free enterprise system. ' 2 2 The letter continued with the following
declaration: "PLF believes it is imperative that business once again be
allowed to concentrate on its primary purpose-production of needed
goods and services.'0. A more recent PLF promotion, sent to the sub-
scribers of business magazines, requests the donor to list not his or her
name, but rather the "name of firm" and the "executive contact. ' 2 04 Busi-
ness interests were being served. Business interests were going to finance
the service. 05
By 1981, the firm's annual budget had grown to over $2,000,000, more
than eighty-seven percent of which came in major contributions from
among others, Southern Pacific (one of the largest land-holding and devel-
opment corporations in California), San Diego Federal Savings and Loan,
Safeco Insurance, Title Insurance Corporation, Knudsen Corporation,
Santa Fe Railway Company, Fluor Corporation, Arthur Young and
Company, several corporate foundations (e.g., Weyerhauser, Bank
America, Gulf Oil, Monsanto, Coors, Alcoa, Ford, ARCO, Venus Oil,
Superior Oil), and various farm, cattlemen's, labor, construction, and real
estate associations.2 06 These contributions have been of sufficient size and
200. Defending your Rights, AGRiC. AGE, Aug. 1973 (editorial). Indeed, in its first year the firm
had already entered three proceedings to support the use of chemicals on U.S. Forest Service lands.
Jordahl, Legal Foundation Gains Momentum, Sacramento Press-Journal, Nov. 23, 1973, at 1.
201. Letter from President, California State Chamber of Commerce, (received Feb. 10, 1976) (on
file with author) (emphasis in original).
202. Letter from Thomas M. Hamilton, Chairman of the Board, Pacific Legal Foundation (Oct.
10, 1980).
203. Id.
204. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 17.
205. A contemporary example of this quid pro quo is provided by a solicitation from the National
Wool Growers Association dated February 20, 1984, and captioned "Woolgrowers mean business."
The letter urges recipients to contribute to PLF, a voice that "represents our interests" in the courts.
The letter lists "many battles" PLF has "fought with and for us," including actions to register Com-
pound 1080 for predator control, to "keep grazing fees low," and to permit the use of Diethylstiltes-
trol (DES), a feedlot chemical. The letter concludes: "Let's help them help us in our struggle to keep
American agriculture the world's best!" Letter from N. Rousselot, supra note 187.
206. Pacific Legal Foundation Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, pt. V, line 11. Other
reports add direct gifts from Pacific Gas and Electric, San Diego Gas and Electric, Pacific Power and
Light, Southern California Gas, Southern California Edison, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, Stan-
dard Oil of California, Union Oil, Texaco, Atlantic Richfield, and a number of executives of these
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regularity to enable PLF to set aside a considerable endowment: $392,729
in 1981 and $696,529 in 1982.207 PLF's audited financial statement of
February 28, 1982, showed total revenue at over $2.7 million. 08 The sal-
ary of its chief executive was over $90,000 in 1981,209 and over $100,000
in 1982.10
PLF's trustees are its only members. It has no other members.2 1 They
elect new trustees annually in a process that is largely self-perpetuating;
more than half of PLF's trustees in 1983 were on its board at the start,
ten years before.212 In 1982, there were nineteen trustees: ten corporate
executives, seven partners of private law firms in major corporate practice,
one professor of law, and the firm's staff director. The executives on the
board alone, excluding attorney members with corporate clients, were of-
ficers and/or directors of at least twenty-five separate business corpora-
tions involved in, inter alia, construction, nuclear power, agriculture, oil
production, timber production, and real estate.213 Among other responsi-
and other corporations and of private law firms. Gerber, The Pacific Legal Foundation: Its Goal is
Deregulation CAL LAW., Nov. 1981, at 26, 28. The firm's IRS Form 990's for recent years indicate
that this percentage has remained fairly stable, with over 40% of revenue coming from corporate and
private foundations and another 40% plus from large private donors (corporations, private law firms,
and individual businessmen).
207. Coopers & Lybrand Report on Examinations of Financial Statements of Pacific Legal Foun-
dation for the years ended Feb. 28, 1982, and 1981, at 2.
208. Id.
209. Pacific Legal Foundation Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, at 4.
210. Pacific Legal Foundation Income Tax Return to the State of California for the year Mar. 1,
1981, to Feb. 28, 1982, Form CT-2.
211. Bylaws, Pacific Legal Foundation, § 11 (1973) ("The by-laws of this corporation shall not
provide for members of the corporations as such, and all the persons for the time being constituting
the Board of Trustees shall be . . . the members.").
212. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 22.
213. PLF's 1981 board, excluding the interests of its private attorney members, included the vice-
president of the Borg-Warner Corporation, the president of Southern Pacific, the chairman of Kilroy
Industries, the president of John F. Otto, Inc., the executive vice president of Great American Federal
Savings and Loan, the president of Brock Plant Genetics, and the chairman of U.S. Leasing Interna-
tional. PLF Income Tax Return for 1971, State of California, Form CT-2, Feb. 28, 1982, at state-
ment 1. The interests of some corporations are more apparent than others. Borg-Warner, for example,
manufactures systems used in the nuclear power industry; Southern Pacific, with 450,000 acres of
timber, 160,000 acres of farmland, 30,000 acres of industrial real estate, and 1.5 million acres of
mineral rights, is one of the largest landowners in the West. R. Zeidner, The Right Takes on the
Public Interest: The New Public Interest Law Movement (1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). These PLF board member interests also spread laterally with additional corporate posi-
tions held by the same members. The president of the Southern Pacific Company, for example, is also
deputy chairman and director of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, a director of Industrial
Indemnity Co., Southern Pacific Land, Southern Pacific Transportation, Ticor (an insurance subsidi-
ary of Southern Pacific), STANDARD & PooRs DIRE TORY OF CORPORATIONS 2465-66 (1984), and
Chairman and chief executive officer of Southern Pacific Communications. STANDARD & POORS,
REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES 449 (1984). The Chairman of U.S.
Leasing International is, by way of another example, a director of the Bank of California, a director
of Pope & Talbot (lumber, veneer, pulp and tissue paper), id. at 2020, a director of Gapstores, Inc.
(chainstores), id. at 1056, a director of DiGiorgio Corp. (wholesale food and drug products, real
estate), id. at 762, managing general partner of Ala Moana Hawaii Properties (real estate), and
director of Bancal Tri-State Corp. (a bank holding company), 2 id. at 1374. Throughout this study,
reference was made to PILF literature for board and other committee memberships, and to the Stan-
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bilities, the trustees approve litigation, which is carried out by a staff of
twenty-two attorneys (sixteen in Sacramento and six in Washington,
D.C.) and cooperating attorneys with offices in Seattle, Anchorage, Wash-
ington, D.C., and Santa Monica.1
Pacific Legal Foundation's Santa Monica office was opened in 1981. In
its annual report for that year, PLF provided the following rationale for
this separate venture within its home state: "Responding to calls for legal
support from Santa Monica homeowners, small businesses and taxpayers,
the Foundation is monitoring developments there and preparing to legally
challenge local government actions that interfere with the rights of private
citizens.215" Listed among those rights which called for PLF action were a
"challenge to the city's rent control ordinance," "attempts at unlawful
land use control," "improper public contracting procedures," and "dis-
mantling the Santa Monica airport to make room for private housing.
2 1 6
Even disregarding the several major real estate investment and develop-
ment corporations on the PLF's board that might have an interest in these
issues, one of the first questions that comes to mind is why the affected
Santa Monica landlords, developers, contractors, and private aircraft own-
ers could not obtain representation in a traditional fashion from the pri-
vate bar. This is the paramount question in examining the actual dockets
of this PILF and its progeny.
The summary which follows reflects the evaluation of each PLF action
identified in this study against the IRS's primary requirements for public
interest law: the absence both of private inurement and of an economic
interest sufficient to enlist the private bar. An explanation of the analysis
used in this evaluation is provided in Appendix II, as is a description of
the methods of research used. Application of the public interest law crite-
ria to PLF's cases was less ambiguous than initially feared. Where the
call was difficult, the proceedings were rated questionable; in most in-
stances, however, the judgment appeared dearly one way or the other.
The results are as follows:
dard & Poors and Martindale-Hubbell (legal directory) services to identify the corporate interests
which they represent. The references are shown here by way of example; for the sake of brevity, they
are not annotated through the study. The use of this information, and its limitations, in evaluating
PILF cases is discussed infra, Appendix II. Every effort has been made here to avoid identifying
individual directors, committee members and law firms by name: there is no suggestion of impropriety
on their parts. The question is simply whether a tax-exempt PILF may pursue and support the same
commercial interests as those which have been identified on its controlling boards.
214. Wheaton, The Pacific Legal Foundation, Public Interest for Profit, The Truth, May 9,
1983, at 6, col. 3.
215. PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, A NEw TIME FOR AMERIcA 2 (1981).
216. Id.
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Numbers such as these, of course, fail to tell a full story. For this rea-
son, PLF's litigation is described below in several subject areas, in suffi-
cient detail to indicate the kinds of problems this litigation presents for the
practice of public interest law. Included are PLF's actions in energy and
utilities regulation, in the regulation of chemicals and toxic substances, in
land use and related air quality controls, and in minority rights.
1. Utilities and Energy Development
PLF's energy docket is substantial. The firm has joined with some of
the largest energy corporations in America to challenge requirements for
restoration of strip-mined lands,217 to contest the need for an environmen-
tal impact statement on federal coal leasing,218 to oppose water pollution
control requirements for existing coal-fired generating facilities,219 to open
federal wilderness areas to oil and gas exploration, 220 to assist the develop-
ment of hydroelectric power,221 to oppose funding for citizen intervenors
in Federal Power Commission proceedings, 22 to restrict the same Com-
mission's review of transmission siting,223 and to oppose air quality re-
strictions on energy development. 2 4 In each of these cases, PLF advocated
the development position. Its legal arguments were made more directly by
the affected industries involved. Furthermore, in questions bearing upon
217. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
218. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
219. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 13 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289 (4th Cir. 1979).
220. PLF v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981), modified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont.
1982). The nominal confrontation between PLF and its former colleague, James Watt (who had
directed the Mountain States Legal Foundation) produced evidence of at least an attempt at collusion
in this case. In a "confidential" letter to the Justice Department, PLF's chief executive expressed
concern that the courts might "question the existence of a true case or controversy," and complained
that the Interior Department had not cooperated with Pacific's effort to "build a record" in the case.
Students in Law School Raise Collusion Issue in Watt Wilderness Decision, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1981, at A22, col. 1.
221. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
222. Id.
223. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
224. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. California State Air Resources Bd., 129 Cal. App. 3d 682, 181
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1982).
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nuclear power and the regulation of utilities, PLF's ties to the benefited
corporations were remarkably dose.
PLF has entered at least seven lawsuits involving nuclear energy devel-
opment.21 5 PLF's co-plaintiffs and anicii in these actions have included
the American Public Power Association, the Atomic Industrial Forum, the
nuclear power plant construction firms of Babcock and Wilcox and Con-
struction Engineering, the Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Associa-
tion, Commonwealth Edison, Baltimore Gas and Electric, Duke Power
Co., the National Rural Electric-Cooperative Association, the Allegheny,
Northern Michigan, and Seminole Electrical Cooperatives and a number
of construction and trade organizations. Two of these cases suggest that
PLF's interest in nuclear energy development is more than philosophical.
In 1974, California enacted legislation that placed a moratorium on the
licensing of new facilities until federal authorities had located a safe re-
pository for nuclear wastes.226 Affected by the moratorium was the Sun-
desert nuclear plant project, then under construction by the San Diego
Gas and Electric Company. It was Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern
California Edison, however, that filed suit contesting the moratorium's
constitutionality.227 San Diego Gas and Electric reportedly wished to
bring the action itself, but decided otherwise because its Sundesert Plant,
if completed, would have been subject to regulation by the State defen-
dants.2 8 On the day of the Pacific Gas and Electric lawsuit, in a separate
federal district, PLF filed suit along with such San Diego-oriented entities
as the San Diego Coalition, the San Diego Section of the American Nu-
clear Society, and the San Diego Building and Construction Trade Coun-
cil, challenging the constitutionality of the same California moratorium
law.2 "9 Although the suits raised essentially the same issue-federal pre-
emption of the regulation of nuclear power-PLF's president explained
that the suits were intentionally filed separately and "on the same day so
that no one would end up being the lead case."'2 30 The tactical advantages
of bringing the cases separately were two-fold. As the president elabo-
rated, "[Ylou have to realize the difference between PLF filing its lawsuit
and PG&E filing its lawsuit. We're in much different positions. PG&E is
regulated by the defendant, we aren't. That automatically makes a differ-
225. E.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Envfl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); NRDC v. NRC, 17 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1457 (D.C. Cir. 1982); PLF v. State Energy Conservation & Dcv. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); Consumer Alert v. Abalone Alliance (citation unavailable,
case listed on PLF Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, at 5).
226. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Act, CAL. PUB. REs.
CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
227. Wheaton, supra note 214, at 11.
228. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 30a.
229. PLF v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
230. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 29.
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ent setting. '' M The difference was in more than atmosphere. "We had
narrow issues, and our case was designed for a summary judgment, while
they had broader issues and their case was designed for trial. We got the
summary judgment that established the law. They went to trial and the
trial court followed our case."
'23 2
The utilities' benefit from PLF's litigation might on this evidence be
dismissed as coincidental, but for other coincidences surrounding the case.
First, PLF clearly coordinated its plans with attorneys for both Pacific
Gas and Electric and San Diego Gas and Electric. 2 3 The consultations,
furthermore, involved parties whose identities overlapped considerably.
One PLF trustee, a board member since its founding, was also a senior
partner in the private firm that represented San Diego Gas and Electric
generally, and was in fact performing the utility's legal work on the can-
celled Sundesert Plant.2 4 This trustee is reported even to have partici-
pated in the board vote authorizing PLF's suit against the California mor-
atorium, explaining later that his vote was not a conflict of interest
because San Diego Gas and Electric had just cancelled construction of the
plant.2 3 5 PLF made its standing claim in the lawsuit, however, by arguing
that, were the law invalidated, its clients could resume work at
Sundesert.23 6
To compound these connections, another PLF trustee was then a senior
member of the law firm that represented Pacific and San Diego Gas and
Electric in their separate-but-coordinated action.237 Were further connec-
tions necessary, PLF's board of trustees included attorneys who repre-
sented still other electric utilities, the vice-president of a firm that manu-
factured equipment for nuclear power plants, the executive of a firm
engaged in the construction of nuclear plants, and the executive vice presi-
dent and general counsel of the Great American Federal Savings and
Loan Association, formerly the San Diego Federal Savings and Loan
Association.238
The utility connections are also financial. Pacific Gas and Electric was
one of the PLF's founding supporters: It contributed $5000 in 1973 and
231. Id. at 30a.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 11.
234. The firm is Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, of San Diego, California.
235. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 30, 31.
236. Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for Leave to Participate as Arnicus Curiae and Brief of
Ainicus Curiae in Support of Federal Power Commission, Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 559
F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1977). J. Wheaton supra note 187, at 30a. For PLF's position in the case, see
PLF v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
237. The firm is Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher of San Diego, California.
238. The corporations referred to are the Borg-Warner Corporation and the Knudsen Corpora-
tion. The names of individuals and law firms are, unless unavoidable, intentionally omitted from this
study to avoid undue emphasis on personalities as opposed to the problem of institutional conflicts
raised by this genre of public interest law firm. See supra note 213.
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regularly thereafter, for a total of at least $73,500 to date.23 9 Southern
California Edison has contributed $40,000 to date, Southern California
Gas another $52,000, San Diego Gas and Electric another $7500, and
Pacific Power and Light approximately $4000.240 These contributions, as
sizeable as they may be in the aggregate, do not suggest that PLF is
owned by these utilities. What they do show is that the utilities have ex-
erted strong influence on the firm through financing and leadership on its
board of trustees, and that PLF responds to this influence by undertaking
lawsuits which materially further utility interests. Whatever other ratio-
nales for PLF's involvement might be supplied-employee, employer, or
consumer interests among them-these facts do not go away.
The Sundesert case is not an action out of context. PLF entered another
lawsuit with the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to oppose restrictions
on corporate expenditures in municipal elections. 241 It entered yet another
to assist San Diego Gas and Electric recover damages for the effects of
local zoning.242 PLF recently brought still another suit against demonstra-
tors at Pacific Gas and Electric's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant.248
Although it would appear to have been the damaged party, the utility is
not named as a party in the action. Instead, PLF is representing entities
entitled The Pacific Gas and Electric Consumer Alert, the California As-
sociation of Utility Shareholders, and Santa Barbarans for a Rational En-
ergy Policy, Inc. All three organizations reportedly receive financing from
Pacific Gas and Electric and other utilities.244 Suits such as these have led
one California state attorney to characterize PLF as "a stalking horse for
the utilities. '2 45 The statement is not without substance.
2. The Regulation of Chemicals and Toxic Substances
PLF's venture into chemicals litigation raises similar questions. One of
its earliest initiatives was a suit on behalf of a private landowners associa-
tion to allow the use of the prohibited pesticide DDT in forests of the
Pacific Northwest.24 PLF likewise intervened in Dow Chemical Corp. v.
239. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 27.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 28.
242. Id. at 27-28.
243. Consumer Alert v. Abalone Alliance, (citation unavailable, case listed on PLF Income Tax
Return for 1981, Form 990, at 5).
244. J. Wheaton, supra note 187, at 32.
245. Id. at 30a.
246. PLF v. Train was settled and therefore unreported. For a report of its filing, see PLF
Report, May 1, 1974, at 2; for its dismissal as moot, see PLF Report, June 21, 1974, at 2. PLF
represented an organization of private land and woodlot owners entitled the Tussok Moth Association,
a group that is reported to have contributed funds to PLF during that same period of time, Letter
from Ronald Zumbrun, Pacific Legal Foundation, to Henry Weinstein, Esq. (Aug. 9, 1974), at 2, and
which, contributions aside, would appear to have been sufficiently pecunious and sufficiently inter-
ested in the outcome to retain private counsel.
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Blum2 47 where some of America's largest corporations including Dow,
U.S. Steel, and Chevron, several timber and construction associations, and
four statewide electrical cooperatives sued EPA to reverse its ban on the
herbicides 2-4-5-T and silvex s4s The arguments in the cases-that the
EPA's suspension action was arbitrary and capricious-were common to
all litigants. Chevron is a major contributor to PLF, and is represented by
two major private law firms with partners on PLF's board of trustees.
The American Farm Bureau Federation and several cattlemen's associa-
tions, additional co-plaintiffs with Dow Chemical, were also PLF
donors.249
PLF's intervention in Monsanto v. Kennedy2 50 repeats the pattern.
Here, Monsanto, the Continental Corp., the Society of Plastics Industries,
Vistron, and the American Can Company appealed a federal regulation
that characterized substances leached from plastic beverage containers as
food additives. PLF argued, as did the plaintiff corporations, that particles
unintentionally diffused from containers were not additives within the
meaning of federal food and drug laws. The Monsanto Fund, the corpo-
rate foundation of Monsanto, contributed $11,000 to PLF from 1979 to
1981 . 251 The Lilly Endowment gave over $30,000 to Pacific Legal Foun-
dation in 1978, and again in 1980.2"2 The Olin Corporation, another ma-
jor chemical manufacturer and user, has been a consistent PLF funding
source as well.
PLF also entered an action brought by the Shell Chemical Company
and others for the registration of a chemical under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; PLF represented a number of agricultural
associations, several of which were PLF contributors. 5 3 It entered an-
other proceeding to oppose restrictions on use of chemical herbicides by
the U.S. Forest Service. 2
Two last cases of this nature demonstrate the interconnections involved.
In National Agricultural Chemicals Association v. Romiger, 55 fifteen
separate chemical manufacturers, represented by the largest law firm in
247. 469 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
248. PLF intervened on behalf of two organizations-the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance and
the Oregon Women for Timber. Id. at 894.
249. See PLF, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT.
250. 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
251. Colwell Report, supra note 171, at Table I. Monsanto also contributed $30,000 to the Great
Plains firm in that same period, and another $12,500 to the National Legal Center for the Public
Interest. Id. A Monsanto executive is a member of the Board of Directors of the Great Plains Legal
Foundation and a client of a private law firm represented on the Mountain States Legal Foundation
Litigation Committee.
252. Id.
253. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Reg-
istrants on Behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation, Agricultural Council of Cal., Cal. Grain and Feed
Ass'n, Cal. Cattlemen's Ass'n, and League of Cal. Milk Producers (EPA, filed Sept. 16, 1974).
254. People for Envti. Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
255. 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1039 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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San Francisco, sued to contest regulations imposed by the California De-
partment of Food and Agriculture. PLF appeared in their support. A for-
mer PLF trustee is a leading partner of the San Francisco firm. PLF and
the firm joined forces again when the Natural Resources Defense Council
brought suit against three private lumber companies on the grounds that
their harvest practices were damaging Redwoods National Park.2" The
California Department of Forestry intervened as co-defendant, repre-
sented by PLF.257 One of the three private parties on PLF's side in this
case was the Simpson Timber Company, whose manager was then a PLF
trustee. Defending Simpson in the lawsuit, in tandem with PLF, was the
same San Francisco law firm, also represented at that time by a partner
serving as trustee, vice chairman, and assistant secretary on PLF's board.
3. Land Use and Clean Air Legislation
The California Coastal Commission was established in 1976 under the
California Coastal Act,258 the culmination of a five-year planning process
for the development of the California coastline.259 PLF has since appeared
in at least seven lawsuits to challenge the Commission's requirements as
unauthorized or unconstitutional, usually on behalf of private landown-
ers.260 The most recent case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Coastal Commission,61  illustrates the nature of the issues and
representation.
The case presented a consolidated appeal of two cases to the California
Supreme Court: one "filed by [PLF] and a group of coastal property own-
ers" to invalidate Commission guidelines requiring easements for public
access in connection with certain development, and the second filed by two
property owners to invalidate a specific access requirement for their
lands.2 62 PLF undertook to represent all parties on appeal.263 By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the Commission had abandoned its
position on the substantive issues, and the only issue remaining from the
specific-access action was eligibility for attorneys fees. Applying the Cali-
256. NRDC v. Moran (unreported) (discussed in Pacific Legal Foundation, Supplement to First
Annual Report 4 (Aug. 28, 1974)) (on file with author).
257. The California Attorney General's Office, interpreting the law differently from the State
forestry agency, declined to represent the agency. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 42.
258. CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977).
259. The 1972 California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, CAL. PUB. RPs. CODE §§
27000-27650 (West 1977), created a predecessor Commission to develop a coastal plan that was
subsequently adopted in the current law.
260. Coastal Commission cases identified include Randall v. CCC, CCC v. Trindle, Coastal Lu-
theran Church v. CCC, Consiglio v. CCC, Plechner v. CCC, City of Chula Vista v. CCC, and PLF
v. CCC. These cases are described in PLF, NiNTH ANN. REP. 1981-1982, at 3; PLF, The Reporter,
Sept. 1982, at 2.
261. 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1856 (Cal. 1982).
262. Id. at 1858.
263. Id. at 1859.
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fornia Civil Code to the fees question, the Court found it "plain that the
grant of administrative mandamus under the limited factual circumstances
shown here did not result in conferring a 'significant benefit' on a 'large
class of persons.' The decision vindicated only the rights of the owners of
a single parcel of property. '264 On the guidelines suit, the Court similarly
noted: "Here also, plaintiffs' claim of injury depends for its urgency on
the supposition that some of them will in the future desire to make im-
provements on their land requiring a permit from the Commission
,,285
The merits of these claims are of course not relevant this study. What is
relevant is that, as the Court found, the claims were those of property
owners in coastal California, not a notably impecunious class of individu-
als. Their injury related to restrictions on the further development of their
properties, which would assume the financial means to undertake this ad-
ditional development, and both the means and the incentive to seek private
counsel.
In a similar case, PLF undertook the representation of the Matin Coa-
lition, which sought the conversion of an abandoned federal air base to a
private airport, as opposed to a public recreation area.288 The Coalition
was comprised largely of the private owners of small aircraft. This is,
again, a class of persons who could reasonably be presumed to have suffi-
cient resources to retain counsel from the private bar.
Closer questions arise from PLF's involvement in more than a dozen
land use cases contesting the legality of local zoning ordinances and build-
ing permit requirements. 267 The issues, sometimes constitutional, were al-
most identically presented by all parties opposing these measures. In Con-
struction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma, 8 PLF sided with
developer plaintiffs in challenging a municipality's attempt to control its
growth through local zoning authority. As the PLF argument in this case
264. Id. at 1860.
265. Id. at 1865. The Court went on to conclude that the guidelines were sufficiently flexible so
that no prediction of injury could be made. Id.
266. Matin Coalition v. Freeman, Civ. No. C-80-3133 (N.D. Cal. filed July 31, 1980).
267. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904,
(1980); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1482 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S.
490 (1981); Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 26 Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164
Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980); Trent Meredith v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685
(1981); Groch v. City of Berkeley, 178 Cal. App. 3d 518, 173 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1981); Mills v. City of
Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1980); Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975); Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, (Fla. App.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); City of Boca Raton v. Arvida Corp., 371 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
268. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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stressed the constitutional right to travel, a right not necessarily repre-
sented by its building trades allies, the entry, although debatable, was
rated as valid.
For the great majority of these cases, however, PLF's interests and ar-
guments focused simply on the additional burdens which the zoning re-
strictions and permit requirements would place on development. Thus in
Agins v. City of Tiberon,"9 a case involving the constitutionality of a local
"open space ordinance," PLF's arguments against an "unconstitutional
taking" were those of the plaintiff and of the Federal Savings and Loan
Association, Half Moon Bay Property, Inc., and the National Association
of Home Builders. These same commercial interests appeared in the City
of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp. 27' and City of Boca Raton v. Arvida
Corp.,271 where, PLF's views were also presented by not only defendant
corporations, but also the Florida Home Builder's Association and the
National Association of Home Builders. In Burger v. County of
Mendocino,2 7 2 PLF intervened with the Pacific Holiday Lodge Co. to
protect the rights of private property owners against the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act. In Stoxa v. Santa Monica,27 3 PLF was joined by
the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and the Building Industry As-
sociation of California in opposing local requirements for low and moder-
ate income housing. In Graham v. Estuary Property Inc.,274 arguing that
the government should have the burden of proving a proposed wetland
development harmful, 5 PLF joined a galaxy of state and national
developers.276
A related line of cases finds PLF supporting land development interests
against federal and state clean air requirements. The firm has brought or
entered at least eight lawsuits in California alone challenging the state's
clean air program. In each case, PLF and associated municipalities,
trade associations, and industries opposed regulation on the basis, inter
alia, of their alleged impact on the State and local economy. In one such
case, Brown v. EPA,278 the PLF argument against EPA requirements
269. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
270. 371 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
271. 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. 1979).
272. 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975).
273. 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975).
274. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Dist. 1981).
275. The opinion of the District Court begins: "Estuary Properties, Inc., owns almost 6,500 acres
of land in Lee County on the Southwest Coast of Florida near Fort Meyers." Id. at 1376.
276. These interests included the plaintiff corporation, the Greater Miami Chamber of Com-
merce, the National Association of Manufacturers, Deltona Corp., the Florida Association of Real-
tors, the Florida Association of Home Builders, the National Association of Home Builders, the Flor-
ida Chamber of Commerce, and the Florida Phosphate Council.
277. E.g., PLF v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980); City of Santa Rosa v. EPA, 534 F.2d
150 (9th Cir. 1976); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
California State Air Resources Board, 129 Cal. App. 3d , 181 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1982).
278. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
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that states adopt certain clean air programs was at least facially indepen-
dent of private interests in that suit and for this reason was rated valid. In
another, a challenge to EPA regulations designed to discourage automo-
bile use in non-attainment areas, PLF presented a constitutional argu-
ment based on the right to travel which, however strained, was sufficiently
distinct from those of other parties to enable a valid rating. Two other
cases279 raised the constitutionality of restrictions on new construction
under the federal Clean Air Act; one was rated valid and the other ques-
tionable, as PLF was accompanied in the latter by similar arguments
from J.C. Penney, Inc., Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., Texaco, and Chevron. In
Union Electric Co. v. EPA and Western Oil & Gas Association v. Califor-
nia State Air Resources Board, the Foundation entered amicus briefs as-
serting an interest in economic development and arguing that the costs of
clean air requirements imposed were so prohibitive as to invalidate the
requirements themselves. 280 The merits of these positions aside, the argu-
ments were identical to those presented by both Union Electric and Appa-
lachian Power in the first lawsuit, and to those of nine separate oil com-
panies and two industry trade associations in the second.
4. Issues of Minority Representation
PLF has entered a more limited set of cases in support of contractors
opposing requirements for minority representation in public contracts. 8 '
While the "reverse discrimination" claims raised in these cases are indis-
putably difficult and important issues of public policy and constitutional
law, in at least two actions PLF undertook the direct representation of the
construction industries themselves. PLF represented the Association of
General Contractors and five private construction companies, for example,
in their challenge to the federal Public Works Employment Act.282 The
Association was a founder of PLF, and has been a sustaining force for the
development of other business PILFs as well. These ties aside, its finan-
cial means to conduct litigation on its own behalf, to say nothing of the
means of the private companies, seems beyond question. 83 Similarly, in
279. PLF v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980); Community Redevelopment Agency v. EPA,
525 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975).
280. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) Western Oil & Gas Assoc. v. California
State Air Resources Bd. 129 Cal. App. 3d, 181 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1982). In these cases, PLF filed
amicus briefs asserting an interest in economic development, and arguing that the costs of the clean air
requirements imposed were prohibitive.
281. See, e.g., Association of Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); Department of Gen. Servs. v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. App. 1978).
282. Association of Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal.
1978). The named plaintiffs also included Engineering Contractors Association; the American Sub-
contractors Association, Los Angeles County Chapter; the National Electrical Contractors Association;
Steve P. Rados, Inc.; Griffith Company; Gordon H. Ball, Inc.; Stoddard Enterprises; and the Granite
Construction Company.
283. Indeed, three counsel in the case are listed for PLF and one for the Associated General
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Department of General Services v. Superior Court,2 PLF represented
the Sacramento Builders Exchange, the National Electric Contractors As-
sociation, the Pittsburgh-Demoins Steel Co., the Ventura County Con-
tractors Association, and the California State Builder's Exchange. The ap-
parent ability of these groups to obtain private counsel aside, the State
Building Exchange and the Construction Trades Council of California are
significant PLF contributors.
From this summary, it can be seen that questions to PLF's litigation
under the IRS standards for public interest law arise most frequently
from its presentation of issues addressed fully and directly by some of the
wealthiest corporations and corporate law firms in America. Many of
these corporations and firms are also represented on PLF's board of trust-
ees and its roster of major donors, giving rise to problems of insider bene-
fit as well.28 5 This latter difficulty will remain pronounced for the other
firms in this study.
D. National Legal Center for the Public Interest
Encouraged by the initial success of the Pacific Legal Foundation, J.
Simon Fluor and other backers moved to reproduce business PILFs across
the country.
In January 1975, PLF commissioned a study to determine "by empiri-
cal research" the best method of multiplying the effectiveness of firms de-
voted to "limited constitutional government, private property, the Ameri-
can free enterprise system and individual initiative and freedom with
responsibility."28 The study was conducted by a San Diego industrial
firm's corporate counsel, Leonard Theberg.2 7 In an early memorandum
to PLF entitled "Expansion of the Pacific Legal Foundation Concept,"
Theberg explained that he had spent over three weeks on the road "meet-
ing with PLF staff and directors, national business leaders, academic lead-
ers, trade associations, lawyers, and many other individuals" to develop
Contractors of California.
284. Department of Gen. Servs. v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. App. 1978).
285. The summary is not an exhaustive list of these potential "insider" problems. In Committee
for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (1976), PLF filed an amicus brief supporting
the American Tunaboat Association, the Tuna Research Foundation, the Fishermen's Union of
America, and the United Cannery and Industrial Workers of the America to defend Department of
Commerce regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act which allowed the continuing take
(accidental killing) of porpoises in connection with the seining of tuna. PLF also filed an amicus brief
in United States v. Anderson Seafoods Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Fla. 1978), siding with various
commercial seafood interests against the regulation of fish adulterated with mercury under Federal
food and drug laws. The law firm of a PLF Trustee of long standing at the time lists the United
States Tuna Foundation as a representative client.
286. NLCPI, A Prospectus: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, dedicated to a bal-
anced view of the role of law in achieving economic and social progress (July 18, 1975) (attached to
NLCPI, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3)).
287. Id.
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options.2 88 He presented three models: a "branch model" enlarging PLF
itself through regional offices; a "multi-regional approach" shifting PLF
to a national coordinating body with separate but "interlocking" regional
litigating offices; and-Theberg's recommendation-an "umbrella model"
creating a separate national coordinating entity for new PLFs in other
regions. 8 ' Leading priorities in the recommended "plan of action" were
to obtain endorsement from the National Association of Manufacturers,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Industrial Council, and to
develop corporate fund raising. 290 This was the plan adopted.
In 1975, the newly formed National Legal Center for the Public Inter-
est (NLCPI) received tax exemption under section 501(c)(3). Its major
purpose was to "assist in the establishment of independent regional litiga-
tion foundations dedicated to a balanced view of the role of law in achiev-
ing economic and social progress." '91 NLCPI's board of fifteen was com-
prised of executives of major corporations.2 9 2 Leonard Theberg became its
first president. "What we cannot accept," Theberg offered as one of
NLCPI's first statements of philosophy, "are mindless proposals that
would sacrifice the people of the United States on an altar of nature. '293
The NLCPI articles of incorporation state that it shall 'have no mem-
bers and that all business is to be conducted by the board of directors.
Chairmen of the NLCPI board have included Charles R. Barker, chair-
man and chief executive of ASARCO, Inc. and G. James Wilkins, finan-
cial vice president of the Dow Chemical Company. J.R. Fluor, nephew
and successor to J. Simon Fluor, sits on the NLCPI board, as do Leslie
M. Burgess, vice president of the Fluor Corporation, and representatives
of Arthur Young and Co., the Fluor Corporation's accounting firm. Other
directors as of 1980 included representatives of ASARCO, Amway, the
Nevada Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, ARMCO, Reserve Mining, Phillips
Petroleum, United Telecommunications, Cincinnati Gas and Electric, Al-
lis-Chalmers, and Republic Financial Services.
Initial funding for NLCPI came in substantial part from J. Simon
288. Draft Memorandum from L.J. Theberg to David L. James, Chairman, Pacific Legal Foun-
dation 2 (undated).
289. Id. at 3-6.
290. Id. at 6-7.
291. NLCPI, Articles of Incorporation. In 1980, NLCPI announced Project Awareness,
"designed to acquainted [sic] the public and leaders of the business community with the objectives and
accomplishments of the seven associated public interest law centers." National Legal Center News,
Dec. 1980, at 1, col. 1.
292. Corporations represented included Dow Chemical, Dresser Industries, United Telecommu-
nications, Garvey International, Adolph Coors Co. and ASARCO. NLCPI, DiRECTORY OF LEGAL
CENTERs (1978).
293. B. Wood & T. Barry, Power Brokers in the Rockies: Privately-Minded in the Public Inter-
est, NMPE Power Structure Report #11, 1980.
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Fluor and a series of interests controlled by Richard Mellon Scaife. g'" As
important as foundation funding has been, sixty percent of the $700,000
NLCPI budget in 1979 is reported to have been contributed by 330 pri-
vate businesses, including the major chemical manufacturers, "the three
major auto makers, such oil companies as Texaco, Exxon, Gulf and Mo-
bil and a spread of other companies in fields as varied as steel and pota-
toes."'2 95 With this initial backing, NLCPI approached regions of the
country through cooperating chambers of commerce and business organi-
zations, setting up meetings on the clear and present dangers of public
interest law and identifying local and regional leaders willing to sponsor a
regional counterforce.
An illustrative meeting took place in Houston, Texas, in March 1980
under the auspices of "The Organization of Energy Consuming Citi-
zens. ' 298 Conference speakers included James G. Watt, then President of
the Mountain States Legal Foundation, which had been established two
years earlier, L. Frank Pitts, owner of Pitts Oil Company, Reed Irvine,
Chairman and founder of Accuracy in Media, and Milton Copulos, Di-
rector of Energy Studies at the Heritage Foundation.197 The conference
brochure explained that:
The American people are being literally browbeaten by the news
media, which has been censoring, omitting, and distorting the facts
on energy. Important statements by members of Scientists and Engi-
neers for Secure Energy (an organization which includes seven
Nobel laureates) are ignored, while anti-energy pseudo scientists,
with socialist credentials and false assertions, are quoted as if apos-
tles of the Gospels. These people are busily working towards their
goal of disorienting, demoralizing, demilitarizing and de-energizing
our nation. And they are, thus far, succeeding. This condition must
be reversed, or our nation will be destroyed.
Subjects covered would include "the government's role in impeding energy
development" and "interference by private persons and organizations with
development and utilization of energy sources." A subsequent section
pointed the way to the solution: a program of "coordinated litigation
294. Rothmyer, Citizen Scaife, COLUM. JOURNAisM Rav. July-Aug. 1981, at 41, 49. The Scaife
Foundation and Scaife-controlled family trusts are reported to have contributed $1.8 million to
NLCPI and its affiliated business PILFs from 1973 to 1980, and an additional $1.9 million directly
to the Pacific Legal Foundation. Id. at 47.
295. The Naderites of the Other Side, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1979, § 3, at 7, col. 1.
296. The Answer to OPEC is OEOC, Organization of Energy Consuming Citizens: There is No
Energy Crisis, There is only a Crisis of Access to Energy (undated) (announcing OECC conference at
Hyatt Regency Hotel in Houston, Texas, Mar. 28-30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as OECC].
297. Id. Accuracy in Media (AIM) is a conservative, media-reform project and the Heritage
Foundation is a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C.; both received significant funding from
corporate foundations and the Scaife Foundation and trusts (AIM has received $150,000 and the
Heritage Foundation $3.8 million from Scaife alone). Rothmyer, supra note 294, at 47.
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against government agencies, certain private groups and individuals." The
brochure promised:
[A] concrete and unique proposal will be presented to enable at-
tendees to become participants in the development of our energy and
other mineral resources on a free enterprise, profit seeking basis.
The proposal will show how this can be achieved while thwarting
the over-regulators and saboteurs masquerading as
environmentalists.
THAT'S WHERE YOU COME IN!
This may well be the most important conference you were ever in-
vited to attend.
On another level, Fluor and his associates looked to their own business
connections for support for the regional firms. The Associated General
Contractors of America, for example, "came on board"-"the first na-
tional organization to recognize the value of the regional litigating con-
cept."298 The Associated General Contractors led NLCPI to their 81,000
national members, "which in turn responded with additional encourage-
ment and financial support. 2 99 The response from these businesses "had
a snowball effect with their suppliers and industry allies, including labor,
because labor is an integral part of the construction industry." 30
0
Through organization and fund raising efforts such as these, NLCPI
generated the interest and support for five regional legal foundations and
two more in Washington, D.C., each exempt from taxation as a public
interest law firm. NLCPI then withdrew to a more passive role of coordi-
nation and support through publicity, conferences, newsletters, and gen-
eral fundraising.30 ' The litigating organizations and NLCPI remain in-
298. Fluor Memorial, supra note 193, at 3.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. For a more jaundiced view of NLCPI's present level of assistance to its sponsored business
PILFs, consider the following statement of Michael Horowitz, currently legal advisor to the Director
of Office of Management and Budget:
Last year's meeting of the heads of the six NLCPI firms. . . held in Denver, degenerated into
an extraordinary series of disputes regarding the effort of many firms to limit the ability of
MSLF to seek funds in "their" regional territories. (At the time of the meeting, CLF was
under its old leadership and immobilized by a then-sharply divided board). It was thus ironic
that conservative public interest law firms, presumably committed to competition as an under-
lying value, sought to use their umbrella entity to limit competition for funds, to limit the
growth and success of the most successful firm and, indeed, to compel that firm to effectively
subsidize their operations. Were anti-trust laws applicable to the operations of the NLCPI, its
Denver meeting would have constituted a primafacie, criminally unlawful conspiracy to dis-
tribute territories, punish efficiency and restrain competition. (The policy "adopted" at the
meeting, but happily now honored in the breach, was that any fund raising held within the
geographic turf of a "sister" NLCPI firm required full notice to the latter firm, together with
an opportunity on its part to be present during the fund raising appeal).
M. Horowitz, The Public Interest Law Movement: An Analysis with Special Reference to the Role
and Practice of Conservative Public Interest Law Firms 49 (1980) (unpublished draft on file with
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ter-connected, however. The chairman of the board of directors for the
Great Plains, Mid-Atlantic, Mid-America and Mountain States Legal
Foundations have all served on the board of NLCPI. Arthur Young and
Company, prominent in the organization of the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion,302 also assisted in the creation of the Mountain States Legal Founda-
tion.308 According to a representative for Mid-America, there is even
something of an informal division of labor:
With some exceptions, conflicts concerning water and land rights
tend to come to the Denver office, education to Philadelphia, regula-
tory agencies to Washington, farming to Kansas City, unionization
to Atlanta, ecology to Atlanta, industry to Chicago."0'
Each of these organizations mirrors the one we have just seen.
E. Mountain States Legal Foundation
The Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) was incorporated in
April 1977 by Joseph Coors of the Adolph Coors Co., Karl Eller of Com-
bined Communications Corp., and Leonard Theberg of NLCPI. Under-
written initially by an NLCPI grant of $58,000, within a year gross reve-
nue exceeded $250,000, and in 1981 revenue approached $1,250,000.305 A
1978 MSLF grant application shows that it had received contributions of
$500 or more from 175 corporations within its first year.38° These contri-
butions were supplemented by grants from corporate foundations, includ-
ing Coors, Phillips Petroleum, Amoco, Cities Service, and Marathon
Oil.307
As with Pacific Legal and NLCPI, the funding behind MSLF reflects
the mission. According to an NLCPI fund raising brochure for the firm,
MSLF was born in response to an environmental movement that was
"becoming an exercise in ideological fanatacism"; it was a "desperately
needed counterforce to those pursuing narrow-interest goals."30 8 As the
author, cited with permission) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz Report].
302. PLF, having spawned NLCPI, has not formally joined it.
303. The MSLF application to the IRS for recognition as a PILF lists a return address of "Bruce
S. Fink, c/o Arthur Young and Co., 1670 Broadway, Denver, Colorado."
304. Leroux, Conservative Voice.in Chicago, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 10, 1981, § 2, at 6.
305. Blodgett, supra note 196, at 74 (reporting MSLF budget for 1982-83 at $1.26 million).
306. Mountain States Legal Foundation, A Proposal for a Grant To provide General Operating
Assistance to the Mountain States Legal Foundation for the Expansion of Its Educational, Legal
Research and Litigating Activities in Defense of Our Free Private Institutions Private Rights, Private
Freedoms, Private Enterprise 13-14 (Aug. 11, 1978) (grant proposal to the Rockefeller Family Fund)
[hereinafter cited as Rockefeller Grant Proposal].
307. Id. The Scaife Foundation also provided "seed money," and an additional $200,000 in 1980
alone. Rothmyer, supra note 294, at 41, 47.
308. Proposal for the Rocky Mountain Legal Foundation (RMLF) NLCPI, at 2 (undated) (on
file with author).
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Foundation's first President, James Watt, described its interests, however,
"We're not broad based, we're narrow based; we believe in the free enter-
prise system."' 09 The MSLF goals were, flatly, "the maintenance of our
free market system" and "providing for responsible and sound economic
growth.""3 0 Watt explained: "I fear that our states may be ravaged as a
result of the actions of the environmentalists, the greatest threat to the
ecology of the west. 3 1 1 MSLF was "to counterbalance those groups that
are trying to block the economic development of the west.1
3 12
One may take the firm at its word. Government reports show one-half
of the nation's coal reserves and the majority of its low-sulphur deposits in
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Wyoming, Montana, and the western
Dakotas.313 Over eighty-five percent of America's uranium reserves are in
the same area, as are forty percent of domestic crude oil, twenty percent of
the natural gas, most of the high-grade oil deposits, and most geothermal
energy sites. Over 800 major energy-related projects are planned for the
twenty-four states west of the Mississippi, almost 500 of them in the
Rocky Mountain region. Colorado alone has 141 future energy projects in
development. As the pursuit of energy resources stimulates the Rocky
Mountain region, it stimulates the MSLF as well:
Mountain States Legal Foundation scored a tremendous victory in
successfully challenging the constitutionality of the Crude Oil Wind-
fall Profit Tax. The decision will strongly benefit both the energy
industry and taxpayers in general. . . Participating in the suit were
oil and gas associations representing virtually every independent oil
producer in the nation and the States of Texas and Louisiana
314
A look at the firm's boards of directors and litigation is also instructive.
Overall management of MSLF is provided by its directors, currently
numbering thirty-one, twenty-six of whom are presidents or chief execu-
309. Lindsey, Business Interests Fighting Back on Regulation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978, at 28,
col. 1.
310. Rockefeller Grant Proposal, supra note 306, at 9. The proposal went on to explain that
corporate foundations had unfortunately not yet "demonstrated an interest in funding organizations,
such as MSLF, which are fighting to preserve the very incentive and reward system that has allowed
families and corporations to establish the foundations." Id. at 10.
311. Memorandum of D. Burwell, National Wildlife Federation, to Senate Energy and National
Resource Committee Staff, at 9 (Jan. 5, 1981) (quoting James Watt in a 1978 Denver Post article)
(unpublished, on file with author).
312. Lindsey, supra note 309. These statements of purpose offer some counterpoint to those actu-
ally provided to the Internal Revenue Service in MSLF's application for exemption as a public inter-
est law firm. See Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152 (discussed supra note 162).
313. B. Wood & T. Barry, supra note 293, at 20. The information that follows is taken largely
from this report.
314. Mountain States Legal Foundation (undated, received Dec. 9, 1982) (on file with author).
MSLF's involvement in this case was as amicus curiae for the two states.
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tive officers of western investment, mineral, and energy development cor-
porations. 15 The board's executive members alone represent over one
hundred and twenty separate corporations and subsidiaries active in the
Rocky Mountain states, including by way of illustration: Atascosa Mining
Co., Flatiron Sand and Gravel Co., Hercules Oil and Gas Co., Western
Coal Co., Idaho Power Co., Morrison Knudsen Co. (Morrison Knudsen
Forest Products Co. and Morrison Knudsen International Mining Co.)16
and over a dozen banks, insurance businesses, chambers of commerce and
boards of trade.1
1 7
The Foundation has two classes of "membership" under its articles of
incorporation: individuals and organizations. Qualification for an organi-
zation requires a "commitment to the purposes" of MSLF and to annual
financial support.31 ' Individual contributors of over $1000 a year belong
to MSLF's "Freedom Club." "Members" receive no voting privileges or
other identified benefits, save reports on the firm's activities.
MSLF litigation is approved by a twenty-five member board of litiga-
tion, twenty-one of whom are partners in private firms and three of whom
are in-house counsel to major corporations (Boise Cascade, Union Pacific,
and Mountain Bell). 19 A sampling of corporations represented by the law
firms found on the board of litigation includes: Amoco, Tenneco, ARCO,
EXXON, Gulf Oil, Sinclair Oil, Humble Oil, Annaconda, Tuscon Gas
and Electric, Montana Power and Northwest Bell.
Litigation is conducted both by MSLF staff and by outside counsel:
"[lit should be noted that a substantial amount of the legal work being
done by the Foundation is by law firms retained to assist, with an under-
standing that substantial pro bono work is given to the Foundation.
3 2 0
Under one such arrangement, apparently, Mountain States has reported
paying one private law firm over $35,000 in legal fees; 21 at the time of
315. The Board also includes two mining consultants, an attorney, a rancher, and two public
officials, U.S. Senator Clifford Hansen and Congressman Wayne Aspinall.
316. Also represented on the board are Mountain Fuel Supply Co., Pacific Northwest Bell, Utah-
Portland Cement Co., Southern Cross & Livestock, National Steel and Shipbuilding Co., Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph, and Columbia Pictures Communications.
317. A more complete list of corporations represented by MSLF's Board of Directors includes:
Adolph Coors Co; American Farm Bureau Federation; Atascosa Mining Co.; Beneficial Life Insur-
ance Co.; Casper Chamber of Commerce; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Colorado Ass'n of Commerce
& Industry; Day Mines Inc.; Denver & Rio Grande R.R.; Entrada Industries, Inc.; First Interstate
Bank of Nevada; First National Bank & Trust of Wyoming; Flatiron Paving Co.; Fleischli Oil Co.;
Hercules Oil & Gas Co.; Idaho Mining Assn.; Idaho Power Co.; Kennecott Corp.; Morrison Knud-
sen Forest Products Co., Inc.; Morrison Knudsen Int'l Mining Co.; New Mexico's Landman's Ass'n;
Rinker Materials Co.; Rio Grande Industries; Southern Cross & Livestock; True Oil Co.; Utah-
Portland Cement Co.; Western Investments; and the Wyoming Farm Bureau.
318. MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1982-83 ANN. REP.
319. Id.
320. See Rockefeller Grant Proposal, supra note 306, at 3.
321. Mountain States Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, Part II, line 1.
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this arrangement, a senior partner of this firm was serving on MSLF's
board of litigation.
With this support, MSLF has established a staff of twelve attorneys
and fourteen additional personnel in its Denver offices. The firm has or-
ganized "executive committees" in each of the Rocky Mountain
states-Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Wyoming. Suggestions for litigation come from these committees and from
contributors to the firm. An early MSLF letter to corporate prospects in-
dicates the relationship between funding and MSLF involvement:
Thank you for attending the luncheon for the advancement of the
Mountain States Legal Foundation ....
Since the MSLF will be a non-profit public-interest law firm,
supported only by private donations, your participation will be vital
to our success. We need this participation in two ways. First, we
need tax-deductible contributions to establish an experienced and
dedicated legal staff; and, secondly, we need input from you and
your Company regarding areas in which litigation would be of bene-
fit to the broad public interest.3 22
MSLF has the second largest docket of the business PILFs, and the
largest of the NLCPI firms."" The evaluations were:
TABLE 2
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
Party/
Intervenor Amicus Total
Valid 11 6 17
Invalid 31 10 41
Questionable 5 5 10
Of all the business PILFs examined, MSLF most clearly raised ques-
tions of insider profit. In at least twenty-four cases on the docket, the
position MSLF was advocating directly benefited corporations represented
on its board of directors, clients of firms represented in its board of litiga-
tion, or major contributors to MSLF's budget.
3 2'
An illustrative case concerned the sale of assets of the Mountain Fuel
322. Letter from Clifford L. Rock, Vice-President, Public Affairs, MSLF (undated).
323. An additional seven lawsuits were identified but insufficient information was available to
evaluate them.
324. This statistic does not include those beneficiaries which were not identifiable as contributors,
as corporate subsidiaries, or as clients; also unidentified were those investments of major banks or
insurance companies which may have been at stake in the suit. This being so, the problem here is
conservatively stated.
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Supply Company at market price to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Wexpro
Co., approved by the Utah Public Service Commission.3"5 Upon a chal-
lenge to that approval, Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, and Mountain Fuel
shareholders intervened to uphold the price. MSLF appeared at their side
as amicus curiae before the Supreme Court of Utah, and before the Su-
preme Court of the United States, 26 to argue, as did the companies and
shareholders, that a lower valuation would be an unconstitutional taking.
Among those representing Mountain Fuel were two members of MSLF's
board of litigation. Further, Mountain Fuel Supply was listed as an "over
$500 contributor" to MSLF at the time, 27 while still other members of
the litigation board listed Mountain Fuel as a client. To complete the
circuit, the president and chairman of the board of the Mountain Fuel
Supply Company also sat on the board of directors of MSLF. Although
MSLF's argument in these proceedings was framed in constitutional
terms, 2s the case frankly concerned the valuation of corporate assets. The
corporations whose assets were at stake and their counsel could not have
been in a stronger position to influence MSLF's entry.
Mountain Fuel surfaces again in an appeal before the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice involving oil and gas leases assigned to Wexpro, the Mountain Fuel
subsidiary.2 9 MSLF represented Wexpro directly on this appeal. MSLF
has also since appeared as amicus on the side of Mountain Fuel in an-
other case before the Utah Public Service Commission. 330 Merits aside,
questions concerning the inside role of Mountain Fuel are inescapable.
MSLF's involvement in litigation for the City of Denver presents a
more attenuated insider program. Litigation erupted in the late 1970's
over construction of the Foothills Project, a reservoir to provide additional
water to the city. The city filed a preemptive suit in Colorado seeking,
somewhat innovatively, to enjoin opposition to the project. 31 Conservation
organizations meanwhile filed suit in Washington, D.C., against federal
defendants which had permitted the project. " 2 The City of Denver did
not appear in the Washington D.C. case, thereby preserving venue for its
case in Colorado. Instead, MSLF intervened on behalf of the water users
325. Committee of Consumer Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
326. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petition for
Certiorari, Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Utah Comm. of Consumer Servs., cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1014 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MSLF Amicus Brief].
327. Rockefeller Grant Proposal, supra note 306, at 12.
328. MSLF Amicus Brief, supra note 326. ("The court's decision . . . takes private property
without due process and just compensation and burdens interstate commerce," id. at 2).
329. MSLF, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, Schedule C.
330. Common Cause v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979).
331. City & County of Denver v. Andrus, No. 77-W-306 (D. Colo. filed Mar. 28, 1977).
332. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, No. 78-1522 (D.D.C. 1980 filed Aug. 15, 1978).
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of the City of Denver and moved at once to dismiss the action for failure
to join an indispensible party, the City of Denver."' 3 While maneuvers
like this are standard legal fare, they seldom occur without concerted ac-
tion. The City of Denver, for whom MSLF was acting in the D.C. pro-
ceedings, was represented in the Colorado action by an attorney who
served on MSLF's board of litigation. 3 '
MSLF actions on behalf of utilities offer another case in point. MSLF
represented plaintiffs Montana Power, Puget Sound Power and Light,
Portland Electric, and Washington Water, Power and Light in a chal-
lenge to EPA air quality regulations for power generating facilities.3
With the exception of Puget Sound, each of the utilities involved in the
litigation is a contributor to MSLF; all are listed as clients of firms on
MSLF's board of litigation. In a case against the Montana Public Service
Commission, MSLF intervened on the side of Mountain States Telegraph
and Telephone, the Northwest Mining Association, and the Montana
Chamber of Commerce to oppose disclosure of certain utilities informa-
tion. 3 ' A board member of Mountain States Telegraph and Telephone
sat on MSLF's board of directors; a member of MSLF's board of litiga-
tion listed Mountain States Telegraph and Telephone as a client.
MSLF has also been active in the controversy over utility "lifeline" or
"essential need" rates, which make services available to elderly, disabled,
and low-income individuals at a reduced price. At least two MSLF law-
suits and a ratemaking proceeding opposed the rates as inefficient and
unlawful.3 3 7 The first case filed, MSLF v. Colorado Public Utilities Com-
mission, 8' affords a glimpse of the inurement and economic interest
problems. In this case, MSLF apparently represented the Colorado Asso-
ciation of Commerce and Industry, People's Natural Gas, Kansas-
333. MSLF Motion to Intervene (filed Oct. 19, 1978) in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, No.
78-1522 (D.D.C. filed Aug 15, 1978).
334. In a more recent case, the City of Denver sued the Department of Agriculture to enjoin
restrictions on rights of way for another water supply reservoir, Williams Fork. See City & County of
Denver v. Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1981). MSLF intervened on the side of the city and
county to protect the interests of water users in future water supplies. Ignoring the fact that corpora-
tions represented on MSLF's board are among the Denver area's heaviest water users, a member of
MSLF's board at the time of this action again listed both the City and County of Denver as a client.
MSLF again came to the aid of the City of Denver in a challenge to requirements of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") for competitive bidding by the City in HUD-aided
projects. While these actions on behalf of the City are less bald than those for the Mountain Fuel
Supply Company, the presence of both the City's law firm on MSLF's Board of Litigation and of
corporate beneficiaries on both MSLF boards continues the "insider" pattern.
335. Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mont. 1977).
336. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Department of Public Serv. Reg., 634 P.2d 181 (Mont.
1981).
337. See MSLF v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 590 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1979); MSLF, Income Tax Re-
turn for 1980, Form 990 (listing Utah Pub. Sew. Comm'n and an administrative proceeding against
the Idaho Public Utilities Commission).
338. 590 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1979).
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Nebraska Natural Gas, Eastern Colorado Utility Co., Colorado Rural
Electric Association, and Iowa Electric Light and Power.339 The financial
interest of these groups is direct: Industrial users, as the largest consumers
of electricity, carry the largest burden of below-cost lifeline rates. Higher
industrial rates also lead to reduced consumption, which produces less
utility revenue and depresses demand for fuel from suppliers such as co-
plaintiffs People's Natural Gas and Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas. A
law firm represented on MSLF's litigation board lists the Colorado Rural
Electric Association as a client; Kansas-Nebraska is a major contributor to
MSLF. 40
Perhaps MSLF's most extensive legal work has been directed towards
opening federal lands to development. In a major case challenging De-
partment of Interior restrictions on mineral activity in wilderness areas,341
MSLF claimed to represent several of its "members" who, upon inquiry
by the Court, surfaced as applicants for oil and gas leases. No reason
appears why its lease-holding applicants/members were unable to obtain
representation through the private bar. In Utah Wilderness Committee v.
Exxon,3 42 another challenge to mining in wilderness areas, MSLF's inter-
vention on Exxon's behalf is colored by the fact that no less than six firms
on its board of litigation list Exxon as a client. Montana Wilderness Asso-
ciation v. United States Forest Service,34 3 in which MSLF appeared as
amicus, raised the issue of Burlington Northern's access to inholdings on
public lands; Burlington Northern is listed as a major contributor to
MSLF. The case of State of Utah v. Andrus,3 4 presented a similar ques-
tion of access to unpatented mining claims in wilderness study areas.
MSLF appeared as amicus for plaintiffs who included the Utah Mining
Congress, the American Mining Congress, and the Independent Petro-
leum Association of the Mountain States. The Petroleum Association is
listed as a major MSLF contributor. When a seizmographic exploration
company, CGG, appealed to the U.S. Forest Service for mineral access in
339. The assumption is made that MSLF represented these organizations because no attorneys
are separately listed for them. Even were this not the case, the question of inurement would remain
the same.
340. In a similar case, MSLF represented the Associated General Contractors of Wyoming in a
proceeding against the Secretary of Commerce challenging minority hiring requirements. See MSLF,
Income Tax Return for 1977, Form 990, Schedule 5, at 2 (discussing Associated Gen. Contractors of
Wyo. v. Secretary of Commerce). While government involvement in minority hiring is unquestionably
a valid subject for public debate and one affording an opportunity for PILF involvement from several
perspectives, in this case the Associated General Contractors has long been a major contributor to
MSLF. Again, dual questions of economic feasibility and inside benefit are raised.
341. PLF v. Watt, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1266 (D. Mont. 1982).
342. Utah Wilderness Ass'n v. Exxon, Civ. No. C-81-0903A (D. Utah filed Dec. 9, 1981).
343. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, Nine Quarter Circle Ranch v. United States Forest Serv. 655
F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981).
344. Utah v. Andrus, 636 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1980).
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a wilderness study area,$45 MSLF intervened on behalf of the Rocky
Mountain Oil and Gas Association, another MSLF contributor."'
The pattern is repeated in other fields of energy development. The
plaintiffs in Kerr McGee v. NRC3"4 were the Kerr McGee Corporation, a
variety of uranium mining and milling companies, and the American
Mining Congress; they, and MSLF as amicus, challenged the benefits and
costs of NRC safety regulations. Kerr McGee is listed as a client of a
member of MSLF's board of litigation, as is the Colorado Mining Associ-
ation. MSLF also appeared as amicus on the side of Mobil Oil, Mara-
thon Oil, and Amoco in their action to avoid taxes imposed by an Indian
tribe; 8' several firms on MSLF's litigation board list Mobil as a client.
MSLF also appeared as amicus for the Independent Petroleum Associa-
tion of the Mountain States and the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Associ-
ation to challenge penalties derived from a mandatory duty to report pol-
lution violations; 49 both are major MSLF contributors. MSLF also
participated recently in a challenge to the constitutionality of the windfall
profits tax brought by the Independent Petroleum Association of America,
claiming in its intervention (as co-counsel for the State of Louisiana and
Texas) that the tax unlawfully seizes the property of a politically unpopu-
lar minority (i.e., oil interests).3 50 The merits aside, affiliates of the Inde-
pendent Petroleum Association are major contributors to MSLF.
Two of the more difficult MSLF actions to evaluate for insider benefit
were those challenging OSHA practices for safety inspections of private
businesses. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., involved the need for a search war-
rant; Stoddard Lumber v. Marshall questioned OSHA procedures for
scheduling investigations.3 51 MSLF, in amicus appearances, advanced the
345. MSLF, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, schedule 6 (discussing CGG v. United
States Forest Sew.). MSLF entered several other cases to challenge access restrictions, a position
which would benefit mineral developers but in which no identified developers appeared as parties. As
a general rule, where the interests were so diffuse the participation was rated "valid." Where the ties
became closer to identified companies directing or supporting MSLF, the ratings were "questionable"
or, as in the Exxon case, "invalid."
346. Id.
347. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1982)
(withdrawn from bound edition).
348. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 449 U.S. 1008 (1980) (granting motion of
MSLF to file as amicus).
349. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
350. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982). An MSLF news release
following a district court decision invalidating the tax explains that the suit, which will "strongly
benefit the energy industry," was participated in by "oil and gas associations representing virtually
every independant oil producer in the nation." MSLF's release closes "by calling on its friends and
supporters so the fight for fair tax policy can continue unabated. Your tax-deductible contribution will
assist the Foundation in this appeal, and in its other crucial cases." MSLF "Action Update," (un-
dated, received, Dec. 9, 1982).
351. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627
F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1980).
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position of the two corporations. Also entering amicus appearances on
Barlow's behalf were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Fed-
eration of Industry and Business, and the American Farm Bureau Feder-
ation. A member of MSLF's board is president of the American Farm
Bureau Federation. Another sits on the of the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce. A private practitioner in Boise, Idaho, represented Barlow, the
business plaintiff in the first case. The same attorney also sat on MSLF's
litigation board. A contemporaneous NLCPI newsletter reveals that
MSLF entered the Barlow's case at the specific request of this attorney.
52
MSLF's federal income tax return for the following year indicates pay-
ment of more than $35,000 in legal fees to the attorney's Boise firm.
353
Of course, a number of MSLF cases raise no questions of insider inure-
ment or economic stakes and stakeholders, and are of an unquestionably
public interest character. Several other cases of probable benefit to MSLF
"insiders" were rated valid because the potential connections were simply
too tenuous.3 54 The discussion above, however, does illustrate a problem
epitomized by MSLF: the benefit of influential persons within. Indeed,
one way of understanding MSLF's otherwise rather random docket is to
look not merely at economic interests of the region but at those very inter-
ests that provide the firm's direction and support. No small number of
proceedings seem to have been selected simply in order to assist the ongo-
ing litigation of corporate donors and clients. Harsh statements, but well
within the record.
F. Mid-America Legal Foundation
The Mid-America Legal Foundation (Mid-Am) was among the first of
the NLCPI offspring, incorporated in October 1975. Serving the seven
midwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
and Wisconsin, Mid-Am was "designed to appear in court to balance the
one-sided views of so-called 'public interest' pressure groups."355 It would
be "allied with other true public interest litigation foundations interested
352. National Legal Center News, NLCPI, Spring, 1977, at 1. See also MSLF Income Tax
Return for 1978, Form 990, schedule 6, at 7; Letter from John Runft to MSLF members, "Com-
ments From a Winner" (undated) (on file with author). The Form 990 informed the IRS that "Plain-
tiff's attorney requested MSLF to intervene," id.; no reference was made to this attorney's position on
MSLF's litigation board. While this reporting demonstrates no impropriety, it does show the inade-
quacy of the information the IRS presently requires to reveal overlapping private and public interests,
a subject later addressed in this study.
353. MSLF, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, schedule A, pt. II.
354. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (EPA water
quality standards for Colorado River). Similar cases, where the threads were a little more clear, were
rated as "questionable." E.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (challenging utility regula-
tion under PURPA.)
355. Mid-America Legal Foundation Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1977.
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in preserving the free-enterprise system around the nation."35 6 Contribu-
tions in the first year exceeded $80,000.'11 One year later, Mid-Am's
gross revenue had doubled, and by 1980 the firm reported contributions
totalling $261,685, most of which came from corporations and founda-
tions. These revenues support a professional staff of four attorneys in
Chicago. "
Overall direction of Mid-Am is provided by three officers and a
sixteen-member board of directors. All three officers and thirteen mem-
bers of the board are either presidents, chairmen, or chief executive of-
ficers of prominent mid-western manufacturing and industrial concerns,
including General Motors, 3M, ARMCO, Franklin Electric, Freuhauf
Corp., and Winnebago Industries. 60 The Mid-Am board's executive
members alone represent more than forty separate corporations active in
the mid-west 61 and over a dozen banks, finance corporations, insurance
businesses, trade associations, and chambers of commerce.3 6"
In addition to this board, Mid-Am also maintains a ten-member public
affairs board, and a fifteen-member legal advisory board. The public af-
fairs board is comprised of representatives from corporations from all
states in the region. 63 The legal advisory board consists of attorneys from
prestigious mid-western law firms.3 " Both groups recommend cases for
Mid-Am involvement, although the board of directors makes the final
decision.3 65
The most striking features of Mid-Am are its ties to two mid-western
business associations-the Illinois Manufacturers' Association (IMA) and
the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry (CAC&I). Both
groups have a long history of involvement in business development. The
IMA, founded in 1893, is the nation's oldest and largest state industrial
association. The association staffs its own lobbying committee in Spring-
field to promote pro-business legislation.3 6 In 1981, it contributed more
than $130,000 to pro-business political candidates through the Manufac-
turers' Political Action Committee-an IMA affiliate. The President of
356. Id.
357. See Mid-America Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990.
358. See Mid-America Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990.
359. Interview with Madonna M. Shields, Director of Development, Mid-America Legal Foun-
dation (Sept. 21, 1983).
360. News from Mid-America Legal Foundation, vol. 6, 1982.
361. E.g., Hudson-Thompson, Inc., Krueger Metal Products, Inc., Mountain Fuel Reserves,
Sundstrom Corp., Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, Inc., ARA Services, Inc, Lennox Industries,
Inc., Lincoln Finance Corp., Trane Co.
362. The Board of Directors also includes two attorneys in private practice and the president of a
Michigan college.
363. Id.
364. See Shields Interview, supra note 359.
365. Id.
366. Illinois Manufacturing Assoc. 1981 ANN. REP. at 1.
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Marblehead Lime Corporation is a director of both Mid-Am and IMA.36
The Borg-Warner Corporation is also represented on both the Mid-Am
and IMA boards of directors, though not through the same individual. 68
With IMA political and legislative services in place Mid-Am has become,
to an extent which will be noted, IMA's legal services arm.
CAC&I has also played a strong role in representing regional commer-
cial interests. Founded in 1904, the Association currently has a staff of
more than sixty individuals and a membership of over 6500. It is organ-
ized into seventeen divisions and fifty-one committees specializing in com-
mercial and industrial development, finance, governmental affairs, and
taxation. 69 Like IMA, CAC&I has overlapping links with Mid-Am. Of-
ficers from Inland Steel Company and FMC sit on its board, as they do
on the board of Mid-Am. Perhaps more instructive, the chairman of Mid-
Am served on the senior council of CAC&I.






Valid 0 1 1
Invalid 4 9 13
Questionable 1 9 10
In five cases, Mid-Am provided direct legal representation for a corpo-
rate litigant. In still more, Mid-Am represented IMA and CAC&I. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment v. Costle,370 for example, presented an en-
vironmental group's challenge to approved Clean Air Act programs in
Illinois and Indiana. When EPA's original answer to the complaint
threatened to affect their interests, steel companies within the region, in-
cluding Jones and Laughlin, Republic Steel, United States Steel, Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube, and Interlake, intervened. The chairman and chief
executive officer of Interlake was on Mid-Am's board at the time. Mid-
Am soon intervened for the IMA.
Similarly, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA371 Mid-Am
367. Id. at 14.
368. Id.
369. CHICAGO FACES AND PLACES, Oct. 1979, at 4.
370. 515 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Il. 1981).
371. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982). Mid-Am maintained this action in National Ass'n of Metal
Finishers v. EPA, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1785 (3d Cir. 1983). In its challenge to the substance of
the pretreatment regulations, Mid-Am, representing CAC&I, was joined by the Ford Motor Co., the
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intervened on behalf of both IMA and CAC&I to support EPA's post-
ponement of an effective date for regulations on the discharge of toxic
pollutants into publicly-owned treatment works. Several regional chemical
concerns also intervened, including Union Carbide Corporation, American
Cyanamid Company, the Chemical Manufacturers' Association, and
FMC Corporation. Mid-America's legal argument was but a slightly dif-
ferent articulation of these corporations' first line of argument in the
lawsuit.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC,3 7 2 Mid-Am again in-
tervened on behalf of IMA and CAC&I to argue that the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank) did not have to comply with the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act before acting upon a request for financial assistance. As
found in the lawsuit, Eximbank has provided over $20 billion in direct
loans and financial guarantees to assist exports of equipment and products
from American business corporations. Given the corporate interests di-
recting Mid-Am, which hold an equally direct stake in the largesse of the
Eximbank, the action would have been at least questionable. More telling
here, however, was Mid-Am's additional representation of the Crosby
Valve and Gauge Company. At this point any philosophical rationale for
Mid-Am's intervention is overtaken by the economic interests of its clients.
In two other cases, Mid-Am filed amicus briefs on behalf of defendants
charged with violations of federal securities laws. Aaron v. SEC 73 found
Mid-Am arguing that the commissioner was required to make a showing
of scienter, and not mere negligence, to enjoin prospective violations of
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Similarly,
in Investors Research Corp. v. SEC,37" Mid-Am argued that to find "wil-
ful" violations of § 17(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
SEC is required to prove that the actor knew or reasonably should- have
known that his conduct was illegal. The selection of such cases by a public
interest law firm seems questionable; when one thinks of technical ques-
tions of defense against federal securities laws, private business interests
more readily come to mind. That these interests are entitled to their day
in court is beyond question. Whether they are entitled to a second layer of
tax-exempt representation should require a different answer.
National Association of Manufacturers, the Chemical Manufacturer's Association, and Interlake
Steel. Id. at 1792.
372. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
373. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
374. 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
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G. Gulf Coast and Great Plains Legal Foundation
The Gulf Coast and Great Plains Legal Foundation ("GPLF") was
incorporated in September 1976 as the "Great Plains Legal Foundation,"
with offices in Kansas City, Missouri. The firm's application to the IRS
for recognition as a tax exempt public interest law firm describes its
origins:
A group of businessmen in the central states area independently ar-
rived at the conclusion that a public interest law firm was needed to
serve that region. The National Legal Center for the Public Interest
has assisted in the organization phase and it is anticipated that the
organization will share information with NLCPI and similar organi-
zations for mutual assistance.
3 7 5
Not surprisingly, seven of the eight original directors were business execu-
tives of such corporations as Monsanto, Texas Commerce Bancshares,
Montana-Dakota Utilities, Martin Tractor, Liberty Manufacturing Com-
pany of Texas, and Republic Financial Services.176 GPLF's current chair-
man is the chief executive of Republic Financial Service of Dallas and a
past director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Its vice-chairman (and
former chairman) is a retired president of the U.S. Chamber.17 The firm
is also assisted by two advisory boards in public affairs and legal affairs.
The public affairs advisory committee includes representatives of Alcoa,
Dow Chemical, Emerson Electric, United Telecommunications, EXXON,
Northwestern Bell, Montana-Dakota Utilities, and Sears and Roebuck
(two members).3 78 The legal advisory committee includes corporate coun-
sel from Monsanto, Cities Service, Peabody Coal, Marion Laboratories
and the LTV Corp.
79
Fundraising was a matter of outreach through these corporations into
the American heartland.38 0 Referring again to GPLF's application for
exemption:
375. Great Plains Legal Foundation, Application for Recognition of Exemption under Section
501(c)(3) (Sept. 30, 1976).
376. The Board also includes such concerns as EXXON and United Energy Resources, Inc, and
two GPLF staff attorneys See GPLF News, Fall 1980, at 4. The degree to which these staff members
participate in litigation decisions in this capacity is unknown. Service guidelines require litigation
decisions to be made by Boards of Directors independent of staff. Rev. Proc. 71-39 § 3.05, 1971-2
C.B. 575, 576.
377. See supra note 213.
378. GREAT PLAINS LEGAL FOUNDATION, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 6 (1980).
There are no women on GPLF's public affairs committee nor, with the exception just noted, on any
of its Boards. Indeed there were no women identified on any Board of Directors, Litigation or Public
Affairs Committees of any business PILF in this study.
379. It also includes six attorneys in private practice, five law school deans and professors, and
one judge.
380. GPLF's original declared territory included Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Id. at 1.
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To date, the organization's fund-raising activities have been limited
to the personal solicitation and indications of support by officers and
directors of the organization throughout the Central States area, in-
cluding primarily, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Texas.381
In 1977, its first full year of operation, the firm reported $303,500 in
receipts; in 1981 it reached a high of $431,160.'82 These revenues reflect
substantial corporate donations. Of $289,000 received in 1978, $149,000
came from seven corporations and corporate foundations (e.g., EXXON,
Monsanto, the Olin Foundation, the Texas Education Association), none
at less than $15,000."' 3 These moneys have supported at least three staff
attorneys and several administrative personnel.
As GPLF has grown financially, it has sought to grow geographically
as well. One initiative was to change its name to the Gulf Coast and
Great Plains Legal Foundation, to symbolize an interest in the South-
Central states.3 84 GPLF then conducted negotiations with the Mountain
States Legal Foundation, proposing a merger in 1981.385 When these dis-
cussions failed, GPLF announced a merger the following year with the
"Legal Foundation of America," described as a Texas firm with a track
record in cases ranging "from energy to criminal justice. ' 388 GPLF's June
1982 newsletter identified twenty-eight cases in which the Legal Founda-
tion of America was then involved. From the descriptions offered, six ac-
tions supported utilities in regulatory and ratemaking cases (e.g., North-
ern Utilities, Inc., Kansas Power & Light, Oklahoma Gas and Electric),
another six supported such commercial concerns "opposing confiscatory
taxation" (on behalf of the Superior Oil Co.) and "opposing unreasonable
'usury laws'" (on behalf of Republic Bank),387 and three more supported
businesses involved in labor management disputes. This merger invests
GPLF with an office in Houston, Texas, at least one additional staff at-
torney (as executive vice-president),388 and another new name: the "Gulf
and Great Plains Legal Foundation of America."
381. See id. at 1.
382. Great Plains Legal Foundation Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990. GPLF appears to
compensate its personnel with some generosity: its President at $69,000 in 1981, and a second attor-
ney at S46,000, exclusive of other employee benefits and contributions.
383. GPLF Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990 (attachments F, F-I).
384. Gulf Coast and Great Plains Legal Foundation News, Sept. 1981, at 1 ("Our name has been
changed to more accurately reflect the nine states the Foundation serves.").
385. Minutes, Great Plains Legal Foundation Meeting of the Board of Directors (Feb. 13, 1981)
(on file with author).
386. Merger Strengthens Foundation Position, Gulf Coast and Great Plains Legal Foundation
News, June 1982. No independent research on Legal Foundation of America cases was conducted in
the course of this study.
387. It is perhaps a coincidence the Republic National Bank of Dallas is listed as a representative
client of the law firm of a member of GPLF's Board of Directors.
388. The Legal Foundation of America was apparently served by two counsel, husband and wife,
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The purpose of this organization and funding is of course the practice
of law, the objectives of which are stated broadly in GPLF's Articles of
Incorporation: "To provide legal representation and to assist other organi-
zations in providing legal representation for the citizens of the United
States, corporate or individual, in matters of public interest at all levels of
the judicial process." 8 9 The exact nature of this representation, "corpo-
rate or individual," is reflected in GPLF's "Mission Statement," which
notes that government action "may unnecessarily infringe upon the rights
of individuals and thwart sound economic growth."39" A subsequent
GPLF brochure categorizes its legal activities under the following head-
ings: energy ("Will federal regulations and court decrees prevent our
country from developing energy resources sufficient to meet our needs in
the next decade?"), business regulation ("OSHA"), agriculture ("impossi-
ble pesticide regulatiops"), land use, academic freedom, and individual
remedies. 91
GPLF cases were evaluated as follows:392
TABLE 4
GREAT PLAINS LEGAL FOUNDATION
Party/
Intervenor Amicus Total
Valid 6 7 13
Invalid 7 6 13
Questionable 1 3 4
Typical of a line of GPLF cases is its representation of the St. Louis
Regional Commerce and Growth Association-an organization claiming
over 3000 corporations and individuals as members-in a 1979 challenge
by the American Petroleum Institute (API) to EPA air quality standards
for ozone. 93 Also parties to the case were DuPont and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association. Although DuPont and the Chemical Manu-
facturers Association are not directly represented on GPLF's board, Mon-
santo provided a founding director, Dow Chemical was represented in
in Houston, Texas.
389. Great Plains Legal Foundation, Art. of Incorporation, art. V (Sept. 14, 1976).
390. Great Plains Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990.
391. GPLF, "In the Courts . . . Challenging ever increasing government regulation and red
tape" (undated brochure on file with author).
392. This study was unable to locate four GPLF cases through any reporting system. Efforts to
obtain GPLF assistance in locating these cases were unavailing. GPLF newsletters refer to the cases
as Raun v. Andrus, USA v. City of Springfield, Missouri Congress of PTAs v. U.S. Postal Service,
and Oxley v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Because no independant check could be made on the nature of
these cases or of GPLF's involvement in them, no ratings were attempted.
393. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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GPLF's public affairs committee, and Monsanto appeared again on the
legal advisory committee.3 94 The Olin Foundation was a major contribu-
tor. 95 GPLF's incoming president in the spring of 1980 had been counsel
to Monsanto and Marion Laboratories of Kansas City.39 The number
and inside positions of these chemical corporations, which had a financial
stake in the outcome of the proceedings, raise unavoidable questions of
insider benefit.
397
GPLF has sided with utility intervenors arguing that EPA new source
performance standards were too strict. In Sierra Club v. Costle,398 GPLF
represented the Missouri Association of Municipal Utilities, composed of
more than forty-four urban electrical utilities.399 The Montana-Dakota
Utilities Company is represented on GPLF's board. GPLF's brief in an-
other case supported a challenge to EPA water discharge standards by the
Consolidated Coal Company and the National Crushed Stone Associa-
tion.400 The Peabody Coal Company is found on GPLF's board, as is
EXXON, a major coal producer; other coal companies are listed as repre-
sented by private firms on GPLF's board and legal committee. GPLF also
sided with oil interests in a proceeding opposing the Windfall Profit Tax,
and with the nuclear power industry in another.401 Among oil corpora-
tions that are on GPLF's board or committees or are member-clients are
Exxon, Cities Service, Occidental, American Liberty Oil, Westland Oil
Development, Ruby Exploration, Linger Petroleum, Montgomery Explo-
ration, Plumb Oil, Wainoco Oil, Crystal Oil, Ashland Oil, ARCO, Conti-
nental Oil, Phillips Petroleum and Texaco; also represented are primary
manufacturers and suppliers for nuclear plants, Westinghouse and Gen-
eral Electric.
GPLF is not unaware of the public relations impact of the insider-
industries on its board. In a board meeting on February 13, 1981, legal
394. See GPLF, Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 1023; GPLF, 1982 ANN. REP. 16; NLCPI,
Directory of Legal Foundations (June 1980).
395. See GPLF, Income Tax Return for Form 990 (attachments F, F-I) (listing Olin as contrib-
uting $10,000 in 1976 and in 1977).
396. National Legal Center News, Spring 1980.
397. Other cases illustrate GPLF's nexus to the chemical industry. For example, it entered EPA
cancellation hearings for the pesticide 2-4-5-T, on behalf of Arkansas and Louisiana rice and seed
growers associations. GPLF Legal Found. News, Sept. 1981, at 3. GPLF apparently followed this
initiative with a "model brief" challenging the regulation of pesticides and herbicides. Id. GPLF also
appeared before the National Academy of Sciences Food Safety Policy hearings in favor of the contin-
ued use of nitrites as a food preservative.
398. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see GPLF, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, attach-
ment E (explaining GPLF position).
399. GLPF, 1982 ANN. Ra'.
400. National Legal Center News, Spring 1980, at 2 (announcing intention to file amicus brief in
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980)).
401. See GPLF, 1982 ANN. REP. 8 (describing involvement in Hollis v. United States, No. 82-56-
C (W.D. Okla.), challenging constitutionality of Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980); Brief
filed in Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant Construction Case, GPLF News, Oct. 1978, at 1.
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action was approved to defend construction of a General Motors plant in
Kansas City, Kansas.402 The authorization was conditioned, however, "on
assurances that steps would be taken to guard against erroneous public
inferences which may arise out of participation on the same side as Gen-
eral Motors. 40 3 The "public inferences," not the participation, seem to
have been the concern. Although no statement on this point was recorded,
a founding member of GPLF's board of directors lists General Motors as
a representative client of his law firm in Kansas City."'
H. Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation
In 1977, NLCPI formed the Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation
(MATLF) in Philadelphia, where it was to represent "traditional Ameri-
can values . . . at all levels of judicial and administative proceedings,"
especially those in six east-coast states.4 0 5 MATLF identifies these values
more precisely in its literature as "free enterprise, private rights, sound
economic development and individual liberties."' 08 MATLF's position
was to be frankly pro-business:
Ask yourselves why private rights, the free enterprise system and
sound economic development in this country are in jeopardy. It's a
question worth your considering. Even if you work for government,
your job depends on it. Nader's groups, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Public Citizen Litigation Group and the like have
had a ball this past decade in knocking business and our enterprise
economy. Regardless of the circumstances, the favorite target of the
activists or extremists always seems to be the American business sys-
tem and our free enterprise institutions. The favorite target of the
anti-business zealots are the leaders of the private sector-because
the activists simply don't believe in either the private sector or in a
free economy.407
402. See GPLF, Income Tax Return for 1981, supra note 382.
403. The authorization was further conditioned upon a finding that GPLF's interests "would not
otherwise be represented." Id.
404. The remainder of GPLF's docket displays a range of subject matter from reverse discrimina-
tion to federal regulation of advertising directed at children. In most of these cases, the economic
interests, while never absent-food producers and manufacturers for example, no small economic in-
terest in the central states, share an interest in the regulation of television advertising of food products
for children-appeared sufficiently secondary to rate as valid. In Donavan v. Baldwin Metals Co.,
642 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1978), however, a case involving the need for search warrants for OSHA
inspection of business places, GPLF filed an amicus brief for the Frisco Engineering, Erection and
Fabrication Co., a party whose private interest appeared dominant.
405. MATLF, Defending Your Rights 3 (undated pamphlet).
406. Id. at 3.
407. Trea, Private Rights and Free Enterprise, PENNSYLVANIA PUB. RELATIONS SOCy NEWS-
LETTER (Sept. 1979) (unpaginated reprint). Trea was formerly general manager of the Pennsylvania
Newspaper Publishers Association.
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Initial funding for MATLF came from the Sun Company, Betz Labo-
ratories, Ingersoll-Rand, the United States Steel Foundation, the Alcoa
Foundation, NLCPI, and the Scaife Foundation.40 8  The budget has
grown from $125,000 in its first year to over $340,000 in 1981.40" It sup-
ports a modest staff of two attorneys in Philadelphia and a third in New
York City.
MATLF's board is composed of sixteen members, fourteen of whom
are presidents, vice-presidents or chairmen of major business corporations
with interests in, inter alia, coal, chemicals, electricity, computers, manu-
facturing, and insurance.410 The general counsel for the mid-atlantic re-
gion of Sears is currently president of the Foundation. These men are
described in MATLF's literature as providing "grassroots leadership" for
the firm and its work.411
The firm is also assisted by a legal advisory council and a public affairs
advisory council. The twenty-one legal advisors include the general and
corporate counsel of sixteen separate corporations, among them Rockwell
International, Consolidated Natural Gas, Lehigh Portland Cement, the
American Iron and Steel Institute, and Merck and Company.41 The pub-
lic affairs advisors, twelve in all, are characterized as "civic and business
leaders from the Foundation's region," and include representatives of Du-
Pont, Bethlehem Steel, United States Steel, and Alcoa.413 Under its by-
laws, MATLF has no members. 4
One-quarter of MATLF's actions supported the position of electric
408. The individual donations from these sources, in the first two years alone, ranged from $7,500
to $75,000. Other contributors at the outset included the Contractors Associations of Eastern and
Western Pennsylvania, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, General Electric, Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
PPG Industries, Tasty Baking Co., the Armstrong Cork Company, IR International Management
Corp., and Kananee Industries, Inc. NLCPI, Progress Report No. 2: The Mid-Atlantic Legal Foun-
dation, Feb. 24, 1977, at 2.
409. Corporate foundation contributions in 1981 included those of: U.S. Steel; Vulcan, Inc.;
Rockwell International; Pittsburg National Bank; PPG Industries; H.J. Heinz Co.; Gulf Oil; and
Alcoa. Directory of Pennsylvania Foundations (1981) (available at Free Library of Philadelphia).
410. A complete list of corporations represented on the Board includes: Armstrong Cork Co.;
Philadelphia Electric Co.; Princess Susan Coal Co.; Utica National Insurance Group; Lawyers Co-
operative Publishing Co.; National Legal Center for the Public Interest; Sperry Corp.; Jackson,
Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell; Cyclops Corp.; Sears, Roebuck & Co.; General Elevator Co., Inc.; Ingersoll-
Rand Corp.; Systems Manufacturing Corp.; Union Camp Corp.; and Hercules, Inc.
411. MATLF, Defending Your Rights, at 20 (undated).
412. A complete list of the corporations represented on this council follows: Merck & Co., Inc.;
Bethlehem Steel Corp.; Middle Atlantic Lumbermens Ass'n.; Suburban Propane Gas Corp.; Balti-
more Gas & Electric Co.; Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co.; United Telephone System-Eastern
Group; American Iron & Steel Institute; Smith-Kline Corp.; Lehigh Portland Cement Co.; Cyclops
Corp.; Pennwalt Corp.; Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.; Consolidated Natural Gas Co.; Rockwell Interna-
tional; Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. Three of the remaining five members are in private law practice;
two are professors of law.
413. A complete list of corporations represented on the Public Affairs Advisory Board includes:
Consolidated Natural Gas Co.; Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.; Rockwell International; Carlisle Tire &
Rubber Co.; Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.; United States Steel Corp.; Gunn Public Relations,
Inc.; Harsco Corp.; Bethlehem Steel Corp.; Gleason Works Co.; Aluminum Company of America.
414. MATLF's bylaws, as amended Feb. 26, 1981, make no provision for members.
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utilities, an industry well-represented on its three boards. Over half of
MATLF's entries were to contest the application of environmental laws to






Valid 3 2 5
Invalid 2 8 10
Questionable 3 2 5
As will be seen, this summary grants MATLF the benefit of some consid-
erable doubts.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission 1 5 and Cen-
tral Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service Commission,41 6 MATLF
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the plaintiff utilities to challenge a New
York Public Service Commission regulation barring the inclusion in
monthly bills of inserts discussing "controversial matters of public policy."
Invoking both the due process clause and the First Amendment, MATLF
argued that regulation violated the utilities' right of free speech. At the
time of the litigation, the vice-president and general counsel of Philadel-
phia Electric Company sat on MATLF's board. At the same time, the
associate general counsel for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company was a
member of MATLF's legal advisory council. Another member of
MATLF's legal advisory council was a partner in a Philadelphia law
firm that specialized in the representation of public utilities.
In the same vein, MATLF actively participated in the defense of the
Nine Mile Point nuclear station before the New York State Public Service
Commission.417 The Commission had ordered an independent economic
audit of the project. During a public comment period on the audit, the
state Consumer Protection Board questioned the project's economics. In
subsequent hearing on the issue, MATLF represented the Business
415. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
416. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
417. Other MATLF appearances on behalf of utilities include Aeschliman v. United States Nu-
clear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev 'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978). See MATLF,
Income Tax Return for 1978, Form 990, Schedule A (listing participations). A third suit, Allied
Chem. Nuclear Prod., & General Atomic Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1979), found MATLF directly involved as plaintiff along with, inter alia, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, Allied General Nuclear Services, and the Capital Legal Foundation. MATLF Report,
Winter, 1981, at 4.
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Council of New York State, the Chamber of Commerce of Oswego, and
the Greater Syracuse Chamber of Commerce. Instructively, the chairman
of MATLF's public affairs advisory council is a partner in a law firm
which, in turn, is legal counsel for the Business Council of New York
State.
Instances of insider benefits are not restricted to utility cases. In Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co.,""8 a New York state court upheld a $500,000 judg-
ment entered against Eli Lilly & Company on behalf of the daughter of a
mother who used the drug diesthylstibestrols (DES). MATLF filed a
brief arguing that the imposition of market share liability in such a case
could have "serious adverse effects" in future product liability litigation.
MATLF's ties to the industry at issue seriously compromise its role. Lilly
has been a generous donor to the business PILFs.419 The vice president
and general counsel for Warner-Lambert Company, a major pharmaceu-
tical producer, sits on MATLF's legal advisory council, as do the vice-
president, secretary, and general counsel for Smith-Kline Company, an-
other pharmaceutical manufacturer. The chairman of MATLF's legal ad-
visory council is corporate counsel for Merck & Co., yet another major
drug company.
MATLF also undertakes direct representation of private individuals. In
United States v. 51.9 Acres & Alan F. & Marian L. Felwig,420 and
United States v. 13.26 Acres & Charles C. Evans, Jr., & Vicki L. Ev-
ans,4 1 the firm represented two landowners in their challenge to the gov-
ernment's condemnation of property that each had purchased for retire-
ment along the Pennsylvania Appalachian Trail. The Department of
Interior sought to acquire the properties to protect the scenic hiking trail;
MATLF intervened to allege that the Department had failed to negotiate
with the individual land owners in good faith. In Hovsons, Inc. v. Secre-
tary of Interior,2 MATLF provided similar representation for two land-
owners who challenged the New Jersey pinelands management plan. The
landowners claimed that the land-use restrictions involved would devalue
their property to the point that they constituted a "taking" of private
property. In all three cases, MATLF's participation was rated questiona-
ble-not invalid-since it is possible, although not likely, that the litigants
lacked the financial means to pursue their claims.
In Twin Coast Newspaper v. Department of Commerce,423 however,
MATLF intervened directly on behalf of American Lumber Interna-
418. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 776 (1982).
419. See MATLF, Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990. See also supra p. 1469.
420. See MATLF Report, Spring 1981, at 1 (listing participations). The cases are unreported.
421. Id.
422. 711 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1983).
423. Citation unavilable, referred to in MATLF Report, Spring 1981, at 1.
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tional, contending that shippers' export declarations should be considered
confidential because American Lumber would suffer from the disclosure.
Ostensibly, MATLF was protecting "small business enterprises"; in fact,
it was providing free legal representation for a private company. Coinci-
dence or no, a member of MATLF's legal advisory council is a member of
the enterprise involved, the Mid-Atlantic Lumbermen's Association. In a
similar venture, MATLF negotiated with the Pennsylvania Compensation
Rating Bureau for the reclassification of lumberyard employees into two
groups, thereby reducing the insurance premiums that employers must
pay.42 Again, MATLF provided the legal work for an industry-again,
one that happened to be represented by a member of its Board.425
L Southeastern Legal Foundation
In the fall of 1975, Leonard Theberg travelled to Atlanta to organize
the Southeastern Legal Foundation (SELF). At a meeting hosted by the
West Lumber Company, "a group of businessmen in Atlanta arrived at
the conclusion that a public interest law firm was needed. '428 "The need,"
explained an early SELF newsletter, "for debate and philosophical dis-
cussion is now secondary to the need for action designed to result in poli-
cies of government which will permit the strength of a market oriented
economy . . . to reassert itself.
'427
According to SELF's articles of incorporation, it is "[t]o provide and to
assist in legal representation for the citizens of the United States of
America, corporate or individual, on matters of public interest at all levels
of the administrative and judicial process on a non fee basis."' 2 8 Behind
this statement were some now-familiar impulses: "well-meaning activists"
have "so impeded the development of our economy and our energy re-
sources that our nation's health and future are threatened.' 42 In keeping
with its rather unabashed business orientation, SELF announced one of
424. Id.
425. See also Marple & Radnor Townships v. United States Secretary of Transp. & Penn. Secre-
tary of Transp., Civ. No. 81-46-27 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 12, 1981). MATLF served as counsel for a
group of 14 parties, who intervened to secure completion of the Mid-County Expressway (I-476-"the
Blue Route") in Pennsylvania. The group included the Delaware County Local Government, the city
of Chester, individual taxpayers of Marple and Randon, United States Congressman Robert Edgar,
the AFL-CIO council of Delaware County, the Chester Group (a business and financial consortium),
and the Delaware County Chamber of Commerce. At least the last two groups are parties whose
representation by MATLF is questionable; neither is a public charity, and both have at their disposal
the apparent means to obtain representation from the commercial bar. The direct representation of §
501(c)(6) chambers of commerce and business associations is a phenomenon this study has discovered
to be common with other business PILFs, the Mid-America and New England firms prominent
among them.
426. SELF Tax Form 1023, Feb. 12, 1976, at 3 (attachment VI, question 5).
427. SELF Newsletter, June 1976, at 2-3.
428. SELF Articles of Incorporation, art. 3(b) (Feb. 11, 1976) (emphasis added).
429. Message from the President and Chairmen of the Board, SELF, THIRD ANN. REP. 1 (1979).
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its early initiatives in the following fashion: "The Birmingham Chamber
of Commerce and the Southeastern Legal Foundation will present a semi-
nar on what you can do to combat the increasing government regulation of
your business.1 43 0 One thing you could do, of course, was to contribute
SELF.
431
The firm's initial moneys were raised by the NLCPI, reported as
$17,500 in 1975.432 Two years later, SELF had received donations from
eight private foundations, including those of United States Steel and
United States Sugar, and from sixty-five of the largest oil, chemical, bank-
ing, lumber, construction, retail merchandise, and utility enterprises in the
South.4 " In 1977, contributions totalled $296,000. 434 In 1980, the sum
had risen to $419,000, 4a5 and in 1981, to over $500,000. 4 36 The donations
"ranged from $25 to 25,000 '" 437 and, concluded Business Atlanta in 1981,
the Foundation "has had little difficulty in raising money. '438 Indeed, the
article reported, in the previous year "free enterprise defenders garnered
about $10 million of the $60 million contributed to both conservative and
liberal public interest firms, even though the older liberal organizations
outnumbered them ten to one."43 9 SELF's president explained: "mostly
we receive gifts from individuals who like the principles we stand for."'44
0
These same interests have directed SELF from its beginnings. Its first
board was composed of Theberg of NLCPI and the chief executive of-
ficers of several Atlanta-based firms.441 A 1976 news release welcomed
430. SELF, Action Update, Nov. 1976, at 2.
431. On the subject of funding, SELF, in harmony with its associated business-sponsored public
interest law firms, has strongly opposed government financing for public interest organizations. See
SELF FOURTH ANN. REP. 1980; SELF IN ACTION: FINANCING THE LIBERAL LOBBY 4 (1980);
Lauterbach, Southeast Legal Foundation Snarls Liberal Red Tape, Bus. ATLANTA, Dec. 1981 (on
file with author); Legal Times of Wash., Feb. 5, 1970, at 26 (Letter to the editor from B. Blackburn,
director, SELF. Expressing a fear that donees will not bite the hand that feeds them, SELF's presi-
dent has explained that the firm prefers "to exist on the contributions of a broadly based public,
rather than government." Blackburn letter, supra. Just how broad SELF's alternative base would be,
and whether SELF would be willing to bite the hands of these sources in turn, was left unsaid.
432. SELF, Tax Return for 1975, Form 1023, at 5 (attachment V).
433. SELF, FIRsT ANN. REP. (1977). Listed corporate contributors included: Alabama Assoc.
Gen. Contractors; Alabama Gas; American Bus. Prods.; American Cast Iron Pipe; Atlanta Gas Light;
Chevron, U.S.A.; Cooper Indus.; Deering-Milliken; Dow Chem.; Duke Power; Eli Lilly Int'l; Ethyl
Corp.; Exxon; Florida Power & Light; Flowers Indus.; GM; Georgia Ass'n Realtors; Georgia Pac.;
Gold Kist, Inc.; Gulf Oil; Irby Constr.; J.A. Jones Constr.; Kimberly Clark; S.S. Kresge; Mobil Oil;
National Bank of Georgia; Pepsico; Redfern Food; R.J. Reynolds; Rohm & Haas; Royal Crown
Cola; Sears Roebuck; Shell Oil; Southern Bell; South Carolina Electric & Gas; Southern Co.; Stauffer
Chem.; Tenneco; Texas Transmission Gas; Textiles, Inc.; Union Oil; and Winn-Dixie Stores.
434. SELF Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, at 2 (question 11(d)).
435. Id. (question 11(a)).





441. SELF Tax Form, 1023, Feb. 12, 1976, at 1 (attachment 1).
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"three more tremendously successfully businessmen" to the board.44 By
1981, the board had expanded to nineteen trustees with the addition of
executives from, inter alia, Florida Power and Light, T.A. Jones Con-
struction, United American Can, Gages Enterprises, and Linder Indus-
trial Machine Company.44 Under this direction, SELF operates with a
professional staff of four attorneys from offices in Atlanta, Georgia. Its
self-described region includes the states of Alabama, Florida, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.





Valid 3 5 8
Invalid 2 3 5
Questionable 1 3 4
Southern Appalachian Multiple Use Council v. Bergland4 44 illustrates
SELF's environmental action. SELF filed suit on behalf of commercial
lumber and mining interests to challenge a federal decision to withdraw
over 31,000 acres of U.S. forest from multiple uses while it was being
studied for inclusion in the wilderness system. 43 Several companies asso-
ciated with SELF stood to gain from the maintenance of the multiple-use
classification. The president of one such corporation, the West Lumber
Company, served on the SELF's original board of trustees,""' and is a
major contributor. Other donors with identifiable interests in the outcome
of the litigation included the Georgia Pacific Company and four energy
corporations. No less than seventeen potentially-interested companies are
listed as clients of the private law firms associated with SELF's board of
legal advisors.4
442. SELF, Action Update, Nov. 1976, at 1.
443. SELF, FiFTH ANN. RE'. (1981).
444. 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2049, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 20679 (W.D.N.C. 1981).
445. Plaintiff South Appalachian Multiple Use Council included "representatives of the forest
products industry, such as companies and individuals working in the lumber business," 15 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 2050; its alleged injury was the "increase in cost of operations from $45.00 to $50.00
per thousand board feet," id. at 2051. Another plaintiff, The Save America Club, included "those
who are concerned about the economic prosperity of their state," id. at 2050, and more particularly
about developing "mineral resources lying beneath the forest," id. at 2051. Three individual plaintiffs,
all forest users, were also added.
446. Id. at 2050. See supra p. 1485 (discussing role of West Lumber Co. in establishing SELF).
447. See also McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1979) (presenting question of whether
consumers of pesticide Mirex who opposed cancellation of Mirex registrations have right to prevent
settlement (involving indefinite suspension of EPA hearing to which both the registrant and EPA have
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Insider interests remain present in SELF's nuclear energy actions. In
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,4
48
environmental groups had challenged NRC rules providing that, for pur-
poses of NEPA, the permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would
have no significant environmental impact and, therefore, no effect upon
the licensing decision. SELF appeared as counsel for an amicus organiza-
tion known as Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy ("SE2"), argu-
ing in support of the defendants, which included Consolidated Edison and
the NRC itself, that the "zero release assumption" was proper.449 SELF's
ties to the industry at issue were troublingly close. Through 1981, a chief
executive of Florida Power & Light (FP&L), served on SELF's board; in
1982, another FP&L executive joined the board of legal advisors. FP&L
operates four nuclear power plants. Major SELF contributors include
Duke Power, Atlanta Gas Light, and South Carolina Electric & Gas. In
addition, Duke Power and Virginia Electric & Power Co. are listed as
clients of two members of the litigation board. Each of these utilities has
invested heavily in nuclear power.450
SELF has also demonstrated an interest in labor cases. While no labor
case was rated invalid, several showed a close relationship to the private
interests of SELF's supporting industries. In United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,'45 a class of non-minority employees of Kaiser Alumi-
num challenged an affirmative action agreement between United Steel-
workers and Kaiser. In its brief on behalf of the non-minority employee,
SELF argued that even the voluntary use of affirmative action quotas
must be strictly limited. Kaiser Aluminum is a major client of a firm rep-
agreed). On behalf of the petitioners, the Louisiana Department of Agriculture, and two Georgia state
congressmen, the SELF argued that the EPA administrator improperly terminated the hearing. The
likely financial beneficiaries of SELF's position in this case were those engaged in agricultural pro-
duction and chemical manufacturing industries. Seven SELF board members and at least an equal
number of SELF's major contributors represent those interests; 3 SELF litigation committee members
represent 10 corporations also involved in these areas.
448. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
449. That this relationship was not coincidental is borne out by SELF's remaining cases in the
field. In FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), both SELF and Florida Power & Light filed
companion amicus briefs. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
SELF's brief argued in favor of the Price-Anderson Act, which provides a limitation of liability for
nuclear power companies. Aside from the obvious economic benefit to utility companies associated
with SELF, insurance companies also stood to gain from the limitation of liability; nearly 50 insur-
ance companies are listed as the private clients of the firms represented on SELF's litigation board.
450. For a more generalized example of the insider problem, see NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1979), where SELF argued in support of the Commission's decision not to require disclos-
ure of corporate compliance with environmental laws in registration statements for the public.
Whatever public interest, separate from that of corporations, might be imagined in non-disclosure, the
most obvious dividends from SELF's position ran to SEC-regulated corporations themselves which
are, of course, the major component of SELF's Board of Directors, contributors, and clients of firms
represented on SELF's litigation committee.
451. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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resented on the SELF litigation board, and SELF's position, in apparent
opposition to Kaiser, was at first blush unusual. On closer analysis,
SELF's brief contains the following statement:
In the typical collective bargaining agreement, such as the one
Weber has challenged, the employer and the union agree to take cer-
tain affirmative action. The impetus for such agreements may be
simply the good intentions of the parties, or as in this case, fear of
future litigation and threats from the Federal government.452
The perceived fears to which the quotation refers are most likely those of
the employer, Kaiser Aluminum. SELF's role is now more clear. Its brief
permitted Kaiser, through the auspices of this firm, to attack the collective
bargaining agreement it made with United Steelworkers without the ex-
pense of having to retain private counsel, and while maintaining an ap-
pearance of good faith. Because this hypothesis remains unproven, the rat-
ing for this case was questionable. Because the hypothesis seems quite
likely to be accurate, the rating is probably forgiving.453
J. New England Legal Foundation
The organizational statement in its newsletter, "The Docket," reads:
"New England Legal Foundation is a tax exempt, nonprofit public inter-
est law foundation representing the economic interest of citizens in courts
and administrative proceedings. 454 In its 1982 Annual Report, NELF's
Chairman and Executive Director jointly declare that its successes have
"firmly established NELF as the legal advocate for the economic interests
of the region. '455 Just so.
NELF was formed and funded by the New England Business Council,
with additional funding sought from banks, corporate offices, law firms,
and unions.456 The first revenues were modest, $146,387 in 1977, 45  with
452. Brief of Southeastern Legal Foundation, Amicus Curiae at 12, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See SELF Report, Spring, 1979 at 1.
453. Ratings of the other labor cases could be equally generous. In Virginia ex rel. Comm'r,
Dep't of Highways & Transp. v. Marshall, 588 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979), for example, Virginia
planned to construct a segment of interstate highway using state and federal matching funds. The
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act, decided that the additional work on a related
rail line required the payment of a higher minimum wage than that paid for conventional construction
work. SELF argued that the Secretary's decision under the Act had increased construction costs.
NCLPI Legal Activities Rptr., Feb. 1980; SELF Report, Spring 1978. One might assume that the
contractors involved would have been able to retain private counsel. Further, while several contractors
are associated with the SELF as contributors and board members, it could not be determined if these
firms were engaged in the construction of the highway at issue. The mere possibilities in this scenario,
without more, are not sufficient to throw the SELF's activities into question. But the doubts on both
feasibility and inurement grounds remain.
454. NELF, The Docket, Apr. 1983, at 2.
455. NELF, 1982 ANN. REP. 1.
456. A Business Brand of Public Law, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 16, 1976, at 42.
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steady increases to a projected revenue of $500,000 in 1983.458 This pro-
gressive growth in contributions, and the increasing requests for NELF
legal action "demonstrated the confidence of potential clients" in the
organization.
459
The nature of NELF's donors, and a clue as to its "clients," can be
provided by categorizing its income sources into three groups: corporate,
foundation, and individual. Of $131,000 in contributions during 1977,
corporations contributed $110,000, or 84%; $15,000, or 11%, came from
foundations (a category which includes corporate foundations); $6,000,
less than 5%, was from individuals (the figure probably includes gifts
from corporate officers). 460 The pattern held in 1982, with 98% of all
contributions received from corporate and foundation donors.461 In five
years, total income from individuals, however placed, rose from $6,000 to
$9,000.462
The same priorities appear on NELF's board, which, in 1982, con-
sisted of twenty-four officers and members at large.463 Sixteen were lead-
ing executives of corporations which loom large in the economic develop-
ment of the New England region, including the First National Bank of
Boston, Federal Home Bank of Boston, Cabot Corporation, Connecticut
Bank and Trust, and the Aetna Life and Casualty Company.4" NELF
litigation is approved by a legal review committee. The current chairman
is senior vice president and general counsel of the Gillette Company. 4 5 Its
chairman from 1980 to 1982 was the vice president, general counsel, and
corporate secretary of Aetna.466
Supported by this funding and under this board's direction is a staff of
four attorneys headquartered in Boston. It is, of course, theoretically pos-
sible that NELF's activities would be divorced from the corporate inter-
ests that support them. Instead, NELF appears to go out of its way to
advertise the services it performs for the New England business commu-
nity. Its 1982 Annual Report promises "the extension of our formal work-
ing relationship with business and trade associations. '4 7 An April 1983
report describes NELF's representation of the Greater Hartford Chamber
457. NELF Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, at 2, item 16.
458. NELF, supra note 454, at 2. Income levels in the intervening years are reported as $224,000
in 1978, $273,000 in 1979, $350,000 in 1980, and $445,000 in 1982 (1981 figures were unavailable).
Id. at 7; NELF Income Tax Return, supra note 457.
459. NELF, supra note 454, at 1.
460. Id. at 8 ("Source of Contributions" Table).
461. Id. The figures are $311,000 from corporate sources, $110,000 from foundations, and $9000
from individuals.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 10-11.
464. Seven additional Board members were partners in private firms which had, in common, large
corporate practices. One member was drawn from academia. Id. at 11.
465. NELF, The Docket, Apr. 1983, at 2.
466. Id. at 3.
467. NELF, supra note 454, at 2 (emphasis added).
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of Commerce and the Connecticut Business and Industry Association on
siting legislation for waste storage.468 A July 1983 report shows NELF
drafting similar legislation on behalf of the Massachusetts Business
Roundtable, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Massachu-
setts High Technology Council and the South Shore Chamber of
Commerce.
469
NELF's services extend even beyond these business groups. NELF has
reported the representation of "its clients," Aerovox and Pflow Industries,
two profit-making corporations, in a suit against the Massachusetts Eleva-
tor Board concerning restrictions on conveyors. As NELF explained the
interests in the case, Aerovox is "one of many companies in Massachusetts
which uses conveyors," while Pflow is a "conveyor manufacturer.
'470
These examples preview the nature of NELF's legal work. The NELF
docket was evaluated as follows:
TABLE 7
NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION
Party/
Intervenor Amicus Total
Valid 2 5 7
Invalid 3 17 20
Questionable 1 5 6
In its first years, NELF's litigation showed an almost single-minded
pre-occupation with energy development. The firm's federal tax return for
1979 listed nineteen proceedings in which it was engaged as a party or
amicus. 1' Of these, fifteen concerned energy production: six cases in oil
development, six in nuclear energy, and three more in utilities regula-
tion. 4 2 NELF's docket has since broadened somewhat into labor and
468. NELF, supra note 453, at 5.
469. NELF, The Docket, July 1983, at 3.
470. Id. at 4. In another action, contemporaneously reported, NELF represented The New Eng-
land [Business] Council, Associated Industries of Massachusetts, a major manufacturing organization
and three individuals as clients in a brief defending Massachusetts' Hazardous Waste Facility Siting
Act. Id. at 5.
471. NELF, Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990.
472. The cases listed on the schedule were: Oil: Massachusetts v. Andrus, Conservation Law
Found. v. Andrus; In re Nomination of Georges Bank as a Marine Sanctuary; Roosevelt Campobello
Int'l Park Comm'n v. Costle; In re NPDES Permit Application No. ME 0022420 of the Pittston Co.
In re Applications for Exemptions filed by the Pittston Co. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Endangered
Species Review Bd.; and Pittston Co. v. Endangered Species Comm. Nuclear energy: Massachusetts
Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Utils.; Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
NRC; In re New England Power Co.; New England Power Co. v. Goulding; In re An Inquiry into
Comparative Economics of Generation of Elec. by Nuclear & Other Means; In re Boston Edison Co.
v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Util.; Other energy matters: In re Application of Conn. Light &
Power Co.; In re Application of the Hartford Elec. Light Co.; Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York
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toxic substances issues. While these issues admit certainly of several pub-
lic interests, the firm's actual involvement is accompanied by some now-
familiar problems.
For one, NELF litigation shows little sensitivity to the presence of in-
side beneficiaries. Miner v. Gillette Co.' concerned a challenge to an
Illinois class action statute that extended jurisdiction over Gillette even
though it was not a domiciliary of that State. In an amicus brief in sup-
port of Gillette, NELF argued that the Illinois statute was an impermissi-
ble intrusion upon the sovereign power of sister states. At the time the
litigation began, the senior vice-president and general counsel of Gillette
served on the board of NELF. He has since become chairman of the
NELF litigation committee.
Inside interests appear again in First National Bank v. Bellotti,'47  a
suit to invalidate state-imposed limitations on corporate contributions to a
public referendum. NELF's amicus brief joined the First National Bank
and the brief of other amicii, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
to argue the restrictions were unconstitutional. While corporate free
speech is doubtless a principle with public interests broader than corpora-
tions themselves, NELF's participation in this case may also reflect the
fact that its chairman is executive vice president of plaintiff First National
Bank of Boston.
Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Environmental Protection
Agencyg 4 5 presents the insider problem in a different form. Representing
Connecticut Business and Industry, a trade association that also litigates
through counsel retained from the private bar,7'6 NELF intervened to
support EPA's approval of a Connecticut regulation that raised the per-
missible levels of sulphur content in fuel. The vice-chairman for Connecti-
cut Business and Industry serves on the NELF board. He also serves as
chairman of the Barnes Group of corporations with subsidiaries in foun-
dries, smelters, heavy construction, mechanical contracting, and steam
heating,4'7 enterprises with no small financial stake in sulphur emission
levels.
State Pub. Util. Comm'n; New England Legal Found. v. Costle. NELF Income Tax Return for
1979, Form 990, Schedule A, attachments to line 78 at 1-7.
473. 459 U.S. 86 (1982) (certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
474. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
475. 696 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1982).
476. Telephone interview with public information representative, Connecticut Business and In-
dustry, Inc. (Oct. 14, 1983).
477. These subsidiaries include: Barnes Hind Pharmaceuticals; J.J. Barnes (mechanical contrac-
tors); John S. Barnes Corp. (industrial hydraulic equipment); Barnes & Jones (steam heat appara-
tus); Barnes Press; Barnes & Reinecke (electronic, earth-moving and mining equipment on-site design
and drafting service); Robert A. Barnes (laundry supplies, aluminum smelter); W.F. & J.F. Barnes,
Inc. (lumber, building products).
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NELF cases in support of utility companies are similarly colored. One
NELF director, for example, also serves as vice-president for eight sepa-
rate New England utility companies. 7 8 It is not surprising then to find a
NELF brief supporting a Connecticut Light and Power petition for a re-
view of a FERC order suspending a proposed new rate schedule.7' Con-
necticut Light and Power is one of the utilities served by the NELF direc-
tor. NELF later intervened for Connecticut Light and Power in a
subsequent lawsuit.4 80 Yet another action found NELF before the Con-
necticut Division of Public Utilities Control in two rate hearings styled In
re Application of the Connecticut Light and Power and In re Application
of the Hartford Electric Light.'81 NELF's director is a director of Hart-
ford Electric Light as well.
At least ten cases found NELF representing one or more trade associa-
tions, chambers of commerce or business leagues. In Conservation Law
Foundation v. Andrus, for example, NELF prepared a brief of amicus
curiae for four New England chambers of commerce."8 2 Similarly, in
Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt,"83 NELF filed for itself and the
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. The linkage between the business
PILFs and these business associations on issues, representation, and even
funding sheds light on a more appropriate tax-exempt status for this type
of legal work, a subject soon to be addressed below.
K. Capital Legal Foundation
The Capital Legal Foundation ("Capital"), incorporated in Washing-
ton, D.C., in 1977, is the last of the studied firms. Originally sharing
offices with NLCPI, Capital started operations with grants and contribu-
tions totalling $143,000,"'' supporting one attorney and a single secretary.
In 1979, with contributions at $147,500 and expenditures at $154,000,485
Capital recruited a new leader from a private, international law practice
in Boston. The new president, described by the media as "eccentric" and
"brash," has described himself as more of a "libertarian" from the "radi-
cal middle" than a "pro-business" conservative.486 Since then, Capital's
478. City and Suburb Electric and Gas Co., Connecticut Gas Co., Connecticut Light & Power
Co., Electric Power Co., Hartford Electric Co., Holyoke Water Power Co., Northeast Utilities, West-
em Massachusetts Electric Co.
479. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FERC, 627 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
480. See NELF Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990, NELF, schedule A, item 13.
481. Id. item 16.
482. NELF, Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990 (unreported case).
483. 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983).
484. Capital Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1979, Form 990, schedule A, Part IV,
line 11.
485. Id., Part I, line 12.
486. Blodgett, supra note 196, at 75.
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public statements have had a tough-minded, independent ring. "We are
not pawns of the business community," its president has asserted in re-
ported interviews, and demonstrated on at least one occasion.487 Perhaps
as a gesture of this independence, Capital recently severed its ties with its
parent, NLCPI.
Capital has adopted as its motto: "A Public Interest Law Firm Con-
cerned with a Fair, Free Market Approach to Federal Regulation." " g
The firm's stated interest is in cases that "have a reasonable potential to
alter fundamental federal law in our country in a fashion favorable to
us";489 it monitors federal agencies for "upcoming issues of significance to
our constituents."' 90 Determining exactly what is meant by "us" and "our
constituents" is an exercise that leads to people and money.
In 1980, Capital's financial outlook changed dramatically for the better.
The firm received $305,000, against expenditures of and $255,000."9' The
next year, Capital raised $591,000, spending $506,000.92 The firm's
1982 operating budget was projected at over $850,000, 493 sufficient to em-
ploy five attorneys, nine support staff, and three legal interns. The sudden
improvement in financing was the result of gifts from business corpora-
tions and their private foundations. As of 1981, sixty-three percent of
Capital's contributions came from private foundations while thirty-seven
percent was donated by the business community. In the words of its presi-
dent: "Frankly, without the foundations, we go down the tubes."' 4 Capi-
tal's contributor list for 1981 also included twenty-five of the largest oil,
gas, chemical, and construction corporations in the world, each with major
domestic and international operations. 95 Contributions from individuals
accounted for less than two percent of the firm's revenues.
Capital's board of directors is composed of its president, four executive
officers of major corporations, two academicians, and a representative
487. E.g., Zeidner, Can Pro Bono be Pro Business?, A.B.A.J. Oct. 1983, at 15. Indeed, its presi-
dent has indicated that he plans to "challenge" U.S. Department of Defense spending policies, id.,
suits which would be likely to alienate defense contractors. Capital has sued to oppose federal indem-
nities for U.S. banks holding defaulted loans to Poland. See CAPITAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1982
ANNUAL REPORT 4.
488. CAPrrAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT (1981).
489. Memorandum from Dan M. Burt to Chairman and Board of Directors entitled "Mid-Year
Report," undated, on file with author, at 6.
490. Id. at 10.
491. Capital Legal Foundation, Income Tax Return for 1980, Form 990, Part I, line 12.
492. Id., Part III, line 40.
493. CAPrrAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1981, ANN. REP. 12.
494. Transcript of telephone conversation between Dan Burt and John Richard of NYPIRG at 7,
15 (Apr. 9, 1982) (on file with author).
495. The list includes Fluor Corp., Chase Manhattan Bank, 3M, Twentieth Century Fox, Ball
Corp., Union Carbide, Westinghouse Electric, General Electric, Ford Motor Co., Dow Chemical,
American Gas Association, Houston Oil and Minerals, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
Exxon, Gulf Oil Corp., Marathon Oil, Mobil, Phillips Petroleum, Shell Oil, Southern California
Gas, Sohio, Sun Company, Texaco, and Union Oil of California. Mokhiber, Capital Legal Founda-
tion: Behind the Public Interest Facade (undated) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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from the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Both
Peter J. Fluor, president of Texas Crude, Inc., and Leslie M. Burgess,
vice president of Fluor Corporation, sit on Capital's board, Burgess as
chairman. Unlike the other business PILFs, Capital maintains neither a
legal advisory council nor a public affairs council. If case selection is
screened at all beyond the staff, it is apparently by this board.





Valid 4 1 5
Invalid 5 2 7
Questionable 2 1 3
Private inurement is the most troubling theme of this docket. Unmistak-
able here are the strong ties between Capital and the Fluor Corpora-
tion,497 a multi-billion dollar contractor for energy facilities in the United
States and abroad. The corporation also owns substantial domestic and
foreign properties in oil, coal, and gas. Fluor has been particularly active
in the Middle East since 1940, and its gas-gathering plant in Saudi Ara-
bia is the largest such facility in the world. Between 1977 and 1979,
Fluor's contracts with the Arabian American Oil Company
("ARAMCO"), a United States oil firm consortium, gave Fluor revenues
totalling over one half billion dollars; Exxon, Texaco, and Mobil
Oil-also major contributors to Capital-own thirty percent of
ARAMCO."'9 Fluor's 1979 profits of just under $100 million place it
among the 100 largest American corporaions.499 The vice president of
Fluor serves on Capital's board as does Peter Fluor, a major stockholder.
When asked in one interview about his relationship with Peter Fluor,
Dan Burt, Capital's president, responded, "Peter is a personal friend,
which is why he is on the board." 500
496. In addition to litigation, Capital has engaged in a range of ancillary activities such as the
publication of white papers and books (e.g., D. BuRT, infra note 514) and opposing nominations to
administrative positions (e.g., Reuben A. Robertson as chairman of the Administrative Conference).
CAPITAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1981 ANN. REP. 7-8, and lobbying for or against proposed legislation
(e.g., the Equal Access to Justice Act), id. at 8.
497. For a fuller discussion of Capitol and Fluor, see R. Mokhiber, supra note 495. Inter alia,
Fluor's Burgess introduced Burt to Capitol. Id. at 1.
498. Id.
499. BIG BUSINESS DAY, CORPORATE SHADOW BOARDs; BIG BUSINESS DAY SPECIAL REPORT
25 (undated) (excerpted in R. Mokhiber, supra note 495, at 25).
500. Transcript of telephone conversation between John Richard, New York Public Interest Re-
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The relationship is also professional. Burt has previously represented
the Fluor Corporation on legal matters.5"1 Burt likewise has strong pro-
fessional interests in Saudi Arabia. The private law firm which Burt
founded maintains offices in Al Khobar; Fluor's Arabian, Ltd., headquar-
ters are also located in Al Khobar. When Burt more recently joined a
Pittsburg-based law firm as head of its Washington, D.C. office, his back-
ground as an international law and tax specialist with a "large number of
clients in Saudi Arabia" reportedly gave him expertise in the area.50 2 The
relationship between Burt and Fluor, Burt's private legal practice in
Saudi affairs, and Burt's direction of a public interest law firm creates a
situation in which, to say the least, harmonies of private and public inter-
est can arise.
Arise they do. Intentionally or not, Capital's actions have benefitted
Fluor and other Capital supporters and directors. In 1978, the Securities
and Exchange Commission informed Fluor that Fluor officials "may have
been or are making payments to foreign officials including payments in
Saudi Arabia." 503 Shortly thereafter, Capital announced that it had
targeted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") for modification or
repeal. On May 30, 1980, Capital submitted "extensive comments to the
Commerce Department on the FCPA's dangerous effect on United States
exports. ' 50 4 Subsequently, during an off-the-record session with the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Commerce Department and senior State and Treasury
Department officials, Capital "presented a new proposal to decriminalize
the FCPA and limit its penalties . . . ."o Whatever rationale might be
offered for these actions, there can be no denial that Capital's participa-
tion aided Fluor and other supporters with enterprises overseas. Burt has
offered the following rationale:
When you introduce a concept like the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act you have to ask yourself what does it do to the exports. And let
me tell you, there are countries in the world where you won't sell
products, you just can't sell it. It's hard to believe, but that's how it
works. Do you have any idea what it is like in Saudi Arabia? I lived
there, and I'm telling you, aside from the personal danger, you don't
sell anything unless there is someone getting it one way or the other.
And you're not going to change the morality in Saudi Arabia ...
search Group, and Dan Burt, President, Capital Legal Foundation 6 (Apr. 9, 1982).
501. Id. 4-5, 8 (Apr. 11, 1982).
502. Brevetti, Saudi Economy Said to be Threatened, J. Comm., Aug. 23, 1982.
503. Letter from SEC to Fluor Corp. (Sept. 27, 1978) (quoted in R. Mokhiber, supra note 495,
at 2).
504. Burt, Capital Legal Foundation 1980 Mid-Year Report 8 (unpublished).
505. Id.
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What the hell are you going to do about the legislation? It is the
stupidest [expletive deleted] law I've seen in my life."'
Taking the statement as accurate, and disassociating it from Fluor, from
other donor corporations, and from Burt's private, international practice,
it would be difficult to style the interest represented here as essentially
public.
The insider benefits do not stop with this case. Because the Fluor Cor-
poration is heavily involved in oil and gas production, its workers are also
systematically exposed to the carcinogen benzene. In Industrial Union v.
American Petroleum,507 suit was brought challenging the validity of a
proposed OSHA regulation which would have reduced the permissible ex-
posure limit on airborne benzene. Capital argued on brief, as did numer-
ous other parties, that the regulation should be invalidated because it was
unsupported by appropriate government findings. Whatever Capital's ar-
gument did to refine the level of analysis for the court, it also supported
Fluor and other oil and gas interests which contribute to the firm.
In a similar vein, Capital has worked to overturn OSHA standards
governing the permissible amounts of exposure to lead in the work-
place.508 It may only be coincidental that St. Joe's Minerals, one of
Fluor's largest subsidiaries, is also the largest producer of lead in the
United States. As a last example, in 1976 Fluor was granted a $9 million
contract from the federal government to design and engineer a new high-
capacity facility for solidifying liquid nuclear wastes.509 Shortly thereafter
Capital entered a federal rulemaking on nuclear waste disposal and the
effect of plutonium recycling.
10
More visibly promoted on the Capital docket are the representation of
private individuals pitted against an overbearing government. The firm
has sued the Federal Communications Commission on behalf of Simon
Geller, the operator of an FM radio station, whose broadcast license was
not renewed.511 In Putnam v. Department of Labor,512 Capital defended
the sole proprietor of a small business which sold hand-knitted ski caps
and sweaters.51 Whatever the attractiveness of these issues or clients, the
506. Transcript of telephone conversation between John Richard, NYPIRG, and Dan M. Burt
(Apr. 11, 1984), at 5 (on file with author).
507. Industrial Union v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
508. USWA v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also R. Mothiber, supra note 495,
at 2.
509. Id.
510. Burt, supra note 504, at 9; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759
(3d Cir. 1979) (Capital challenged suspension of NRC decision on nuclear fuel recycling).
511. Geller v. FCC, No. 82-2400 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 28, 1982); see CAPrrAL LEGAL FOUNDA-
iON, 1982 ANNUA l REPORT 3.
512. The case is described in CAPITAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1981 ANN. REP., 4; see Capital
Legal Found., Newsletter, July 27, 1982.
513. The U.S. Department of Labor cited Putnam and his suppliers (who worked, in the main, at
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question rises whether these individuals, represented directly by a PILF,
could have retained private counsel. 5 4
This question is unavoidably raised in Capital's leading case of the mo-
ment, Westmoreland v. CBS.51 5 On January 23, 1982, the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS) aired an investigative special entitled "The
Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," which documented an alleged
conspiracy between President Johnson, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and General William Westmoreland's headquarters in Viet Nam over
America's growing role in that war during 1960's. In September 1982,
claiming that through deceptive editing and reporting techniques he was
subjected to "character assassination,"5 " Westmoreland filed suit for libel
in the amount of $120 million against CBS, Mike Wallace, CBS's presi-
dent and producer, and CBS's paid consultant for the special. Capital is
representing Westmoreland in the action; it has been assisted by Accuracy
in Media ("AIM") in raising funds for the case.5 The case was rated
invalid. At bottom, granting Capital the highest of motives, General West-
moreland is being given tax-exempt counsel to litigate a civil damage
claim. The private bar has long and actively represented well-known indi-
viduals in libel actions against major media defendants, for large damage
awards.
In the final analysis, Capital's docket reveals an organization not so
home) for violations of DOL's regulations promulgated under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Capital argued that the regulations in question were outdated and oppressive. The firm was successful
in seeking a change in the regulations, and hoped that the result would "help facilitate a fundamental
change in the direction of federal regulation in the workplace away from the expansion of federal
control which has characterized it for the last four decades." Capital Legal Found. Newsletter, July
27, 1982; see Stowe Woolens Owner Survives Probe, Burlington Vt. Free Press, Dec. 7, 1980, at 4.
514. Another activity from which Capital has drawn attention is its critique of a network of
organizations fostered by consumer activist Ralph Nader. The critique was later published. D. BURT,
ABUSE OF TRUST: A REPORT ON THE RALPH NADER NETWORK (1982). Capital's President has
complained of "the reign of terror Nader and his groups have brought down upon the economy," that
Ralph Nader himself is "rich" and unconscious of the effects of his actions on the poor, and that
Nader groups, while seeking disclosure of corporate financing in public affairs, have been reluctant to
disclose their own financing. Id. at 139-42. Responses to these allegations have included observations
that Capital itself had not complied with the disclosure requirements of state charitable solicitation
statutes, and that Capital's President, with a private law practice and an annual salary from Capital
of $80,000 a year, was in a tenuous position to level charges of elitism. See Capital Legal Founda-
tion-Partial List of Errors and Omissions, 1-3 (undated) (on file with author). This debate, while not
without its interest, is not probative in the context of this study.
515. Civ. No. 82-7913 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 13, 1982) See Capital Legal Foundation, Capital
Letter, "Independent Journalism-of Threats and the Public Trust," September 16, 1982, wherein
Capital describes the initiation of the Westmoreland suit.
516. Fund-raising letter from General William Westmoreland on behalf of AIM (undated) (on
file with author).
517. AIM is a tax-exempt organization formed in 1969 "to bring issues of media abuse to the
attention of the public as a means of developing a greater sense of media responsibility." Id. AIM has
formed the Westmoreland Legal Aid Fund to raise money for the lawsuit, and mailed out letters to its
members soliciting donations. In his fundraising letter for AIM, General Westmoreland set forth his
version of the facts of the CBS special, praised the work of AIM, and closed with an exhortation to
join the ranks of AIM's members. Id.
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broadly aligned with business interests as other PILFs studied, but by no
means free of their influence. The ties between Capital, Fluor, and other
corporations provide the continuing potential for insider benefit, whether
or not intended, and serve to underscore the dangers inherent in the reli-
ance, by this firm and others, on financing and direction from the business
sector. As will next be seen, this reliance has also been noted and criti-
cized from an entirely different source.
L. Corroboration from an Unlikely Quarter: The Horowitz Report
All too often, conservative public interest law firms serve as mere
conduits by which monies contributed by businessmen and founda-
tions are given to private law firms to assist it in the prosecution of
"its" cases.518
The analyses just presented are not flattering. The proposition that the
examined firms are reacting to ideology and only indirectly reacting to
business interests appears belied by their dockets, their direction, and their
funding. The author was not privy to the actual case discussions, fund
raising, and the full range of corporate and client interests that, perhaps
less incriminatingly and perhaps more so, led to these actions. The story is
thus far limited to the public record.
Confirmation comes from an insider. In 1979, the Scaife Foundation, a
major underwriter of conservative organizations and of several business
PILFs, commissioned Michael Horowitz to analyze the effectiveness of its
contributions.5"9 Horowitz came to the task as a strong proponent of their
practice. 52 0 His conservative credentials were established in service on the
National Advisory Committee of the Republican National Committee, as
legal advisor to Senator Paul Laxalt, and by his appointment as General
Counsel to the Office of Management and Budget in the current Adminis-
tration. His analysis for the Scaife Foundation took him within each of
the examined business PILFs, to their staffs, to donors, and to meetings of
their boards and litigation committees. His report, over one-hundred
pages in draft, is a tour-de-force of public interest law and the new busi-
ness PILFs from a strongly supportive and frankly acknowledged con-
servative view. In unambiguous language, as an insider and friend,
Horowitz found the same state of affairs.521
518. Horowitz Report, supra note 301, at 30a.
519. Id. at 1.
520. Mr. Horowitz begins his study: "This has been a difficult report to write; difficult because it
is often critical of people I very much like and of a movement for whose success I so much hope." Id.
521. The full contents of the Horowitz Report are not discussed here. The relevant sections of the
Report for this study are those which identify the relationship of the business community to these
PILFs. They are not isolated sections nor are they taken out of context; for reasons quite different
from the tax considerations of this study, Mr. Horowitz sees this relationship as the critical limiting
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The Horowitz Report starts from a premise quite removed from the
requirements of § 501(c)(3) for public interest law firms. Horowitz sees
PILFs as players in a larger clash of philosophies, a battle that will be
won not in the courtroom but in the minds of legislators, judges, the me-
dia, and-ultimately-the American people. The "conservative" PILF,522
however, "will make no substantial mark on the American legal profes-
sion and American life as long as it is seen as and is in fact the adjunct of
a business community possessed of sufficient resources to afford its own
legal representation.1 52" The perception is unfortunately, he laments,
well-grounded. "Conservative public interest law firms are seen as being
largely oriented to and indeed dominated by business interests, a descrip-
tion which is unhappily not wide of the mark for many such firms."152'
The task for these firms is "to mitigate their present appearance and real-
ity as duplicative spokesmen for business interests.
52 5
The report identified several ways in which business interests dominate
these PILFs, none of them surprising to readers of earlier sections of this
study. "The movement is. . . dominated by business leaders who are its
limited but important financial subscribers.1 526 The boards of directors of
the even more broadly oriented groups, such as the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion, are "homogeneous bodies of businessmen.1 52 7 The PILF agendas ca-
ter almost exclusively to the interests of businessmen, forgoing other, more
genuine opportunities to vindicate conservative values. 528 "It is critical
that the conservative movement seek out and find clients other than large
corporations and corporate interests.1 529 Horowitz went so far as to fore-
see "the coming presence of an enormous number of circumstances in
which a conservative public interest law movement may be opposed to the
positions of many businesses and industries.15 30 Whatever the size of this
perceived opportunity, it would be fair to conclude from the examined
dockets that the business PILFs have yet to embrace it.
Case handling and fees are also suspect: "all too often" funneled to
private practice. 53 1 Several PILFs "routinely serve as conduits for the
factor in the future of these organizations.
522. Unlike PLF's Zumbrun and other business-PILF spokesmen, Horowitz studiously avoids
the "pro-business" label in his report, characterizing the firms instead as "conservative." This distinc-
tion is indeed the goal of his report.
523. Horwitz Report, supra note 301, at 2.
524. Id. at 1.
525. Id. at 2.
526. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 51 ("[D]irect receipt of funds by conservative public interest law
firms from organizations comprised solely of businessmen has been and is likely to remain a source of
fundamental and effective criticism of these firms.").
527. Id. at 70.
528. Id. at 83.
529. Id. at 85. Horowitz goes on to suggest new vistas of "conservative" PILF involvement such
as the "social values" of the "middle-class." Id. at 86.
530. Id. at 26.
531. Id. at 58.
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payment of substantial if at times reduced fees to private firms."5 2 These
payments rise to the level of a "conflict of interest" when made to "public
interest law firm board members or key advisors." ' Even with reduced
fees, "such payments severally prejudice the relationship between the firm
and its advisors/board members" and "throw into question" the latter's
"motivations and commitments." 5"
The report speaks to case selection in more detail-"the unhappy ex-
tent to which cases chosen by many conservative public interest law firms
focus on the needs of the business community, to the exclusion of other
areas of interest."5 35 It "may not be accidental" that the case agendas,
which reveal a "striking preoccupation" with environmental and land use
matters, "reflect the greatest direct concerns of the movement's business
donors.""3" All of these factors help confirm the description of these
PILFs as "business-oriented entities.
'53 7
Horowitz seeks to divorce these PILFs from the business community.
He recommends seeking alternative clients-such as the poor and consum-
ers-to articulate conservative positions."3 ' There is a whiff of the
Potemkin village about these recommendations. At bottom, as Horowitz
acknowledges early in his report, "the need to protect the profitability and
productivity of the private business sector" forms a "significant premise"
of any conservative PILF.539 That this profitability cannot find adequate
private representation in all but the most extraordinary cases seems hard
to imagine. It seems equally unlikely that business corporations would be
willing to invest heavily in firms that did not, under whatever cover, re-
present their interests. Thus, for these PILFs to find other named clients
to carry the business "prense" would not seem to change materially the
nature of their litigation. Whatever the merits of the Horowitz's sugges-
tion, the examined PILFs have yet to apply it even as cover; alternative
clients have yet to become the norm.
The Horowitz Report is the analysis of a philosopher, an idealist, and a
friend. It finds that the service of these firms to corporate interests is a
fundamental impediment to their success. It does not address the impedi-
ment this same relationship poses to their tax exempt status. That status
is, however, predicated on the same principle: the independence of quali-
fied, exempt firms from interests which could be adequately represented
by the commercial bar. The dockets examined in this study and the con-
clusions drawn from them are not an anomaly. They are the way it is.
532. Id. at 4.
533. Id. at 59.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 83.
536. Id. at 82-83.
537. Id. at 60.
538. Id. at 85, 86.
539. Id. at 1.
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IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE BUSINESS
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMS FOR TAX EXEMPTION AS PUBLIC
CHARITIES
Some private attorneys are reported to be upset with the PLF for
attracting clients who otherwise would have paid for legal counsel.
(As a tax-exempt foundation, the PLF may not accept fees). But the
resentment is competitive, not based on ethical or legal
considerations.
Business Week.5' 0
The Horowitz report examined the operation of the business PILFs in
terms of their long-term success. Given the nature of their litigation, it has
been surprising to find no research questioning the qualification of these
firms as public charities under section 501(c)(3)."' This study raises these
questions. It remains to be seen what can or should be done about them.
A. The "Operational Test" in Action: Some Suggestions for
Improvement
Consider an application to the IRS for exemption as a public interest
law firm, providing in pertinent part:
(1) The organization has no members.
(2) Under its articles and bylaws, overall management of the or-
ganization is vested in a Board of Directors, a majority of whom at
all times will be executive officers, directors or chairmen of major
commercial or industrial corporations.
(3) The organization will receive more than half its annual
540. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 6, 1976, at 42.
541. See supra p. 1512-14. There are perhaps reasons. The charitable exemption provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code are an arcane field of law, and one in which it is often difficult to raise
and resolve legal questions. No one challenges the Service without at least some subliminal fear of
retaliation, and few may test the Services policies in court, other than with respect to their own
taxation, without formidable problems of standing. Perhaps the best explanation for the silence on this
issue is that there is no incentive to raise it. The IRS has no financial interest in questioning the
eligibility of these firms sua sponte; no meaningful revenue is slipping through its fingers. The tradi-
tional public interest firms, living in rather constant concern for the continuation of their individual
tax exemptions, are effectively deterred. Indeed they may well perceive the business PILFs as some-
thing of a shield: "If those activities are lawful, ours have to be." The recent legal scholarship on the
subject of public interest practice has been slender, and has tended to discuss the IRS rulings on fees
and funding. See supra note 94. For two contemporary studies of business PILFs from a political-
science perspective, see P. Rubin & E. Jordan, Business Oriented Legal Foundations: Who Needs
Them? An Economic Justification (unpublished manuscript 1981) (on file with author) and R.
O'Connor & L. Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law (un-
published manusript 1983) (on file with author). Even these analyses, which tend not to examine the
nature of the litigation, are few and far between. For other, largely unpublished studies in this re-
search, see supra notes 171 and 301. The most penetrating analysis, albeit lightly documented, is the
Horwitz Report supra note 301. The basic eligibility question has simply not been asked.
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funding from commercial and industrial corporations and corporate
foundations.
(4) Cases selected by the organization for litigation will be re-
viewed and approved by either the described board or by a litigation
committee, the majority of whom at all times will be staff counsel to
major commercial or industrial corporations or partners in law firms
representing corporate clients.
(5) The organization will primarily undertake litigation wherein
the legal issues it addresses and the position it takes on these issues
are identical to those being presented by corporate interests in the
litigation.
(6) The organization will also enter litigation involving those
same corporations and corporate clients that are represented on its
boards of directors and litigation, taking the same side and the same
legal positions.
(7) The organization will occasionally represent an individual
business corporation directly, and on other occasions non-charitable
collectives of business interests.
(8) The organization will also enter proceedings, but no more
than fifty percent of the time, which involve no identified commercial
or industrial interest. 4
2
From the preceding docket histories and analyses, it is fair to say that this
application captures the operation of the studied PILFs. It seems also fair
to predict that such an application would have difficulty receiving IRS
approval as a tax-exempt charity.
Approvals are nonetheless obtained, and maintained-in part a reflec-
tion of the inability of the Service's "organizational test" to identify the
real nature of the firm.4 3 More particularly, these discrepancies reflect a
failure of the Service's "operational test." 44 The information presently
542. For some of these firms, an additional statement would provide: "The organization will un-
dertake the representation of individuals directly in actions seeking the recovery of large money dam-
ages. These individuals are not required to be indigent or otherwise unable to obtain representation by
the private bar."
543. Contrast the above application, for example, which corresponds most obviously to the Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation with the actual application submitted by the Mountain States Legal
Foundation and described in Rev. Rul. 75-74. See supra p. 1452. The actual application makes no
allusion to those commercial and industrial interests that influence, if not control, its Board manage-
ment, its case selection, and its funding.
544. It would be unfair to suggest that this failure represents a sympathy in the current adminis-
tration with the business-oriented goals and objectives promoted by these PILFs, although this sympa-
thy is indisputably present. Before his appointment as Attorney General, William French Smith was
involved in the establishment of the Pacific Legal Foundation. See supra notes 186-87. The author of
the Horowitz Report, see supra note 301, is currently with the Office of Management and Budget.
Other business PILF leaders have played a prominent role in the current administration, including
James Watt, former President of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, more recently Secretary of
the Department of Interior, and James Marzulla, Watts successor at Mountain States, now with the
Department of Justice. The "operational test" did not apparently surface these discrepancies any
more clearly under the previous administration of President Carter. It seems more likely, in addition
to those reasons noted earlier, that the Service is simply reluctant to take any action which will stir up
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required of PILFs simply does not include the information needed to dis-
cover what the firm is actually doing. For example, nothing in the re-
quired Form 990 discloses the business and financial interests of members
of a PILF's board of directors, the corporate clients of its litigation ap-
proval committees, or the roster of its corporate donors.54 5 Thus, an IRS
examiner has little information to help determine whether or not there is
"'private inurement," that is, whether the decisions to commit the services
of the firms are being influenced-for influence, not control, is the Ser-
vice's articulated standard" 6'-by self-interested donors and decision-
makers.
On another level, little information is available to evaluate-without
considerable additional and independent investigation-whether the issues
involved in a PILF's docket could have been adequately presented by ex-
isting parties. Form 990, while it seeks the PILF's statement of its interest
in the matter, does not require identification of the issues raised by the
commercial bar on behalf of those commercial clients in the same proceed-
ings. Thus, a firm may simply state its interest as "availability of energy
resources" or "unconstitutional interference with free enterprise," without
noting that these same interests are those of co-plaintiff Exxon. The fail-
ure of the "operational test" with respect to these firms is not necessarily
a matter of will. It would be extremely difficult for anyone, however in-
quisitive, to determine from Form 990 the extent to which a firm operates
in conformance with the law.5"
For these reasons, the Service, whatever it chooses to do about the activ-
ities of the business PILFs in question, should shore up its reporting re-
quirements in each of the areas necessary to determine the continuing eli-
gibility of a PILF under the Service's own standards. While such an effort
should involve the give-and-take of public rulemaking, which would elicit
suggestions no doubt superior to those presented in this study, the follow-
ing thoughts concern the shape of the necessary reporting requirements.
As a starting point, any reporting requirement that imposes a burden
and that is not of material use ought to be rejected as unnecessary for the
hundreds of organizations which might have to comply. Fortunately, the
universe of affected organizations can be narrowed from the start. The
objective is to surface those monetary interests that could affect the case
selection of a public interest law firm-in an analogous way to the (pro-
hibited) effect the Service has recognized might stem from the receipt of
the issue of public interest law, having gone through such a difficult exercise in putting it to rest only
a decade ago.
545. A PILF must, however, disclose any donors contributing more than 2% of the PILF's gross
income.
546. See supra notes 30-33.
547. Indeed, it took this author and the students who assisted him many months to develop infor-
mation on the interests and issues of only the eight subject PILFs. Even this information is conceded
to be incomplete, particularly with regard to questions of private inurement.
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attorneys' fees.54 s In the case at hand, the improper inducement comes not
from the receipt of fees but rather more directly from the receipt of fund-
ing. The information required should be tailored to this interest.
On the litigation side, it would therefore make sense to require PILFs
to contrast their issues and positions with those of parties on the same side
represented by commercial counsel. It would not be necessary-indeed it
would be punitively burdensome-to require all PILFs to list the issues
of all parties in a proceeding in which they were involved. The only over-
lap in question, the one which is prohibited by the Service's revenue rul-
ings, is that between commercial representation and PILF representation.
If the PILF is not on the side of commercial counsel, no more need be
said. If a PILF aligns itself with commercial counsel, however, it should
have at the least the paper burden of showing how, if at all, the issues it is
raising cannot be raised by the commercial bar. Such a requirement limits
the reporting to the problem in the least intrusive fashion.5 49
Disclosure of the business interests of members of a PILF's board and
litigating committees could be similarly tailored. Much of this disclosure
would involve little more information than is already contained in a
PILF's annual report.550 But the lateral connections of these individuals
are also important-their memberships on other corporate boards, and,
with respect to members of litigation committees, an identification of their
corporate clients, individually and those of their law firms. In another
context, representation by the firm itself would raise questions of conflict
of interest under the canons of ethics.551 Here, the clients of the law firm
represent those interests which could affect the case selection of a PILF.
5 5 2
By way of analogy, if the mere possibility of recovering attorneys' fees at
an indefinite point in the future might so affect case selection by a PILF
as to require close supervision by the IRS,55 then the actual presence of
548. See Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (PILF charging clients fees not exempt under §
501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (PILF may accept court- or agency-awarded fees and
remain exempt under § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 76-5, 1976-1 C.B. 146 (PILF loses exemption under §
501(c)(3) if it employs private attorney on salaried basis and also pays him court-awarded fees). It
does seem anomalous that while the Service's fee restrictions stem from the possibility of an improper
commercial motive, the more obvious possibility of a commercial motive in contributions to the busi-
ness PILFs would have been so long overlooked.
549. Without such reporting, the Service's requirement that PILFs raise only issues inadequately
represented by the private bar will remain largely illusory. There will be little information to prompt
an IRS audit, and no record to start with were an audit to begin. The additional information would
save time and effort, at minimal cost to those few operating PILFs which would find themselves so
often aligned with the commercial bar that reporting could be considered an imposition.
550. Indeed, these reports often contain brief biographical sketches of their board members high-
lighting their business and industry credentials.
551. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1981).
552. The "private inurement" question of influencing case decisions is more a "marriage" of
interests than a "conflict," but in the PILF context, the situation raises much the same problem.
553. See supra note 548.
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an interested client in the firm of a PILF decisionmaker should likewise
at least come to the Service's attention.
The last and most potentially troublesome area of reporting is informa-
tion on those private donors who could benefit from litigation brought by
a PILF. Under current requirements, little information of this type is re-
quired and there is a correspondingly small basis for the Service to make
even an inquiry as to whether the prohibited activity-influence of case
selection-is taking place. As we have seen, in almost all of the PILFs
studied, there is at least a strong suggestion, and with some, strong evi-
dence, that it does take place. Yet the confidentiality of sources of funding
is one of the most prized attributes of all public charities. This confidenti-
ality goes to the very existence of charities, and mandatory disclosure may
compromise First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and
expression.5 Counterbalancing these considerations is the Service's obvi-
ous need for information of some sort in order to supervise the appropri-
ateness of exemptions.
These competing interests call for disclosure of the minimum informa-
tion necessary to do the job. One approach would be to lower the "two
percent of gross revenue" threshold for major donors. As things currently
stand, a corporation may give up to $50,000 annually to a firm the size of
the Pacific Legal Foundation-excluding additional contributions from
corporate officers and associated corporate foundations-without these
contributions and their possible connection to a PILF's docket appearing
on the PILF's return. The case for disclosure is no less strong for PILFs
of a smaller size, for which a just less than two percent contribution of,
say, $5000, may mean the difference between pursuing a particular action
or not. For these reasons, a one-half of one percent threshold seems more
appropriate. 555 There are, however, drawbacks to such a proposal. On the
one hand, even contributions below one half of one percent may remain
influential. On the other hand, such a requirement may be over-broad in
its reporting burden and its potential for abuse.
A second approach would be to impose an affirmative duty on the
PILF to declare the financial interest of any major donor (for example,
$1,000 or one half percent, whichever is the smaller)-or of any member
554. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association protects NAACP
membership lists from state scrutiny). Working against disclosure is the spectre that not only might
other organizations raid the contributor lists of successful PILFs, but that undue pres-
sure-government, corporate, or otherwise--could be applied against donors to a PILF whose activi-
ties were considered unpopular. Cf. id. at 462-63 (discussing private harassment and "interplay" of
state and private actions).
555. It goes without saying that a lowered threshold does not prohibit, or even question, the
propriety of major donations. It serves merely to flag those financial interests which may be influenc-
ing a PILF's choice of suits. The Service has recognized the need for this type of information with its
"two percent" rule. The question raised here is simply whether two percent is not much too accom-
modating to reveal the kinds of influence at work.
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of its board or of any client of the firm represented on the litigation com-
mittee member for that matter-in any case or proceeding the PILF en-
tered. This approach has the advantage of being more selective and less
likely to lead to abuses-either through raids on contributors or by undue
pressure on them-by other organizations or the government. It carries
the disadvantage, however, of relying primarily on the willingness and
thoroughness of the PILF to reveal the very interests which may be influ-
encing its decisions.
These recommendations for reporting and disclosure are not pretended
to be exclusive. They do, from the experience of this study, include infor-
mation that the Service will need if it is to supervise those requirements it
has announced and affirmed for more than a decade for the practice of
public interest law.
B. Altered States: Qualification of the Business PILFs Under More Ap-
propriate Tax-exempt Categories
Were an audit of the studied PILFs conducted along the lines just indi-
cated, it seems inescapable that serious questions would arise concerning
their continuing qualification as public charities under section 501(c)(3).
This is not to suggest that the representation of business interests has no
place in the courtroom. Nor is it to suggest that business points-of-view
are not entitled to constitutional protection, 551 or even to disparage the
availability of tax exemption under the Code. It does, however, suggest
that an effort should be made to find a better fit.
1. Qualification Under Sections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6)
As a starting point, no tax exemption should be available to firms or-
ganized to represent the interests of specific business members or contribu-
tors. As important as such representation is to the adjudication of legal
issues, that function is the raison d'etre of the private bar.557 The Service
will allow considerable indirect inurement to donors and directors of sec-
tion 501(c)(4) and (c)(6) organizations so long as a "primary," collective
benefit is identifiable beyond them.5 58 The section 501(c)(4) category
seems appropriate for these firms, if only because of the Service's expan-
556. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
557. This observation should apply equally to groups of businesses advocating their mutual eco-
nomic interest. Collective financing agreements are common among business groups for representation
on issues of common concern; major firms commonly represent these concerns before courts and gov-
ernment agencies. (For example, the law firm of Hunton & Williams of Richmond, Virginia, regu-
larly represents the interests of large utility associations and companies before the federal courts. See
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Even the more expansive tax-
exempt categories under § 501(c) providing for civic leagues and for trade associations disqualify
activities which benefit primarily the individual members and contributors to such an organization.
558. See supra pp. 1431, 1433.
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sive, "anything-not-bad" concept of "social welfare" for (c)(4) organiza-
tions.559 Furthermore, treasury regulations specifically provide for the
classification of an organization under section 501(c)(4) if it has failed the
more stringent section 501(c)(3) criteria. 80
Section 501(c)(6) provides an even more logical niche. Due to the di-
verse nature of the businesses that support them, it is unlikely that these
PILFs would qualify under the "single line of business" test for tax-
exempt business leagues.56 No reason comes to mind, however, why they
do not qualify in the same fashion as the litigating arms of chambers of
commerce, which are defined geographically rather than by lines of trade.
For those PILFs that are national in scope there is an obvious analogy to
the United States Chamber of Commerce. For those firms focused more
regionally, the geographic test is as satisfied as it is for local and regional
chambers. Supporting this analogy is the fact that chambers of commerce,
both nationally and locally, have been primary movers in the creation and
support of the business PILFs. Moreover, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce maintains its own litigating organization, the National Chamber
Litigation Center (NCLC), which brings lawsuits on behalf of the Cham-
ber's interests generally and those of its individual members and contribu-
tors.5"2 A look at the NCLC shows a striking similarity to the business
PILFs.
2. The National Chamber Litigation Committee: A Litigation Model
for the American Business Community
Their brief complemented ours and augmented the arguments we
made. They raised our credibility level. In fact, there is no doubt in
my mind that we appeared in a better light before the court as a
result of their involvement.
Senior Vice President,
Georgia-Pacific Corporation" 3
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was slow to react to the the Powell
Memorandum of 1971." It was not until 1977 that the Chamber, ob-
559. See, e.g., Senate Hearings supra note 18, at 172 (statement of Arnold & Porter) (stating
before the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty that: "Although the §
501(c)(4) category came into the statute in 1913, no stable concept of the scope of this provision has
been developed by the Service in the intervening years. Indeed, in practical application it has largely
become a dumping ground for oganizations which failed to qualify under § 501(c)(3), but were suffi-
ciently acceptable as engaged in 'social welfare").
560. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(v) (1960).
561. See supra p. 1432.
562. The Chamber has, notably, not requested § 501(c)(3) status for NCLC, apparently on the
premise that it would not be eligible.
563. NCLC, Business is Our Only Client (undated fundraising literature).
564. See supra pp. 1457-58 (discussing Powell memorandum). The Chamber's response was not
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serving that "business can lose its collective shirt" in ways which "can be
countered only through the courts,"' 5 65 created the NCLC under section
501(c)(6) of the Code to represent "businesses' point of view before the
courts and regulatory agencies on issues of broad and critical importance
to the business community."
'5 6
The similarity to the business PILFs in these stated goals extends also
to funding and organization. Initial funding and logistical support were
provided directly by the Chamber.5"' The support has since broadened to
include contributions from state and local chambers of commerce, trade
associations, corporations, and a few individuals. 568 NCLC's legal staff, of
four attorneys at its watershed, 569 represents the Chamber with the occa-
sional assistance of counsel in private firms on an ad hoc basis. NCLC
cases are screened by one of two legal affairs committees before approval
by the President, the Labor Law Advisory Committee, and the Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law Committee, composed of corporate counsel
for such familiar corporations as Sears, General Motors, General Electric,
U.S. Steel, and Shell Oil, and members of private law firms representing
major corporate clients.
570
The similarity between NCLC and the business PILFs is reflected also
in their dockets. 57 "1 The Chamber takes on more labor-management con-
limited to litigation. The Chamber also stepped up its legislative program and launched a strong
public information campaign. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, News Release (Oct. 11, 1982)
(reporting on articles published by Chamber attacking "partisan" nature of environmental
movement).
565. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, The National Chamber Litigation Center.
Serving Business on the Legal Scene 3 (unpublished report 1978) [hereinafter cited as NCLC
Statement].
566. Id. NCLC described its goals as being:
To challenge senseless, irresponsible laws and regulations on a national scale. To tackle
restrictive anti-business activity in labor relations, consumer affairs, trade regulations, constitu-
tional law, administrative law and environmental law. To conduct needed legal research to
provide members with useful and accurate information on legal issues affecting the business
community. To provide programs which offer members a forum for discussing legal concerns.
To act as a national legal advocate for the business community on matters of public policy.
Id. This study examines parallels between the Chamber's litigation programs and those of the busi-
ness PILFs. The National Chamber is not, however, the only Chamber engaged in litigation. Re-
gional and local chambers have established tax-exempt firms to represent their interests. See, e.g.,
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Chamber Legal Center, Avoyelles Sportsman's League v. Marsh, No. 82-'
3231 (5th Cir. 1982).
567. Singer, Liberal Public Interest Law Firns Face Budgetary, Ideological Challenges, Nat. J.,
Dec. 8, 1979, at 2055.
568. NOLC Statement, supra note 564. Contributions range from $250 to $12,000. See NCLC,
Fact Sheet (undated). A budget of $300,000 in 1978 grew to $444,000 in 1979, and appears to have
stabilized at about $400,000 a year. Telephone interview with Stanley Kaleczyc, NCLC attorney
(Nov. 22, 1983).
569. NCLC's legal staff is presently down to three attorneys. Interview with Stanley Kaleczyc,
supra note 567.
570. Singer, supra note 567, at 2055. Currently, both U.S. Steel and Sears, Roebuck are on
NCLC advisory committees. NCLC, The Business Advocate, Summer 1983, at 8 (newsletter). Both
corporations have been active contributors to the business PILFs as well.
571. This study does not perform the same analysis on NCLC's docket that it performed for the
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troversies, but includes a familiar range of energy, environmental, and
corporate rights issues as well. Not infrequently, Chamber briefs are
found side by side with those of the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation, and their progeny in these cases, particu-
larly at the U.S. Supreme Court level. Almost all of the Chamber's ap-
pearances in litigation are as amicus curiae, reflecting its relatively modest
level of investment from the business community, a level which may be
understandable when compared to businesses' available alternative, invest-
ing in a section 501(c)(3) business-sponisored PILF.
The Chamber and NCLC appeared in thirty-two reported decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court between 1978 and 1983. Of these, twenty-three
cases involved alleged employment discrimination, termination, maternity
leave, benefits, collective bargaining, and similar labor-management is-
sues. This category also saw entries by the New England Legal Founda-
tion,572 the Washington Legal Foundation,573 and the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation.574 Another four Chamber of Commerce cases raised such energy
and environmental issues as nuclear power regulation, retail gasoline ser-
vices, and health standards for cotton dust and for benzene in the work-
place; two of the Chamber briefs here were accompanied by briefs from
the Pacific and Capital Legal Foundations.57 The Chamber also ap-
peared in four cases favoring corporate rights to promotional speech, to
political speech, and to resist investigation by OSHA and the IRS. The
business PILFs also filed briefs in each of these cases, 576 as they did in the
Chamber's last case, which alleged discrimination in education. 57 7 In all,
no less than ten Supreme Court cases found briefs from both the Chamber
of Commerce and business PILFs. It should go without saying that all
Chamber appearances and all legal foundation appearances were on be-
half of the corporate litigants.
578
business PILFs because there is no question of contributors and potential overlapping interests. What
is at issue is the nature of the cases undertaken, and their similarity to those undertaken by these
PILFs.
572. NRLB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
573. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1980); Carbon Fuel Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979). The Washington legal foundation is a business sponsored PILF
located in Washington, D.C.; it was not considered in this study because it has not been allied with
the National Legal Center for the Public Interest or the other legal foundations.
574. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
575. Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Pacific Legal Foundation); Indus-
trial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Capital Legal Foundation).
576. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (attorney-client privilege in IRS investiga-
tion) (New England Legal Foundation); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 (1980) (political inserts in monthly bills) (Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, New England Legal
Foundation, Washington Legal Foundation); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (war-
rantless searches by OSHA) (Mountain States Legal Foundation); First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) (corporate expenditures on referenda) (Pacific Legal Foundation).
577. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). (affirmative action in admis-
sions) (Pacific Legal Foundation).
578. NCLC's docket and its relationship to the other legal foundations is shown in the following
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The Chamber's litigation is not examined here in the detail afforded
that of its tax-exempt counterparts. Issues of business influence and repre-
sentation by the private bar are not relevant to an organization which does
not claim to be a public interest firm free of such influence. The Cham-
ber, however, does provide a candid model of what it considers to be, up-
front, litigation on behalf of American business. Although the Chamber
has carved something of a niche in labor law, the niche is by no means
exclusive. 57 "  The business PILFs have also been active in labor-
management litigation; the Chamber appears in corporate energy, envi-
ronmental and other business litigation. The fact is that the Chamber and
the business PILFs are doing largely the same things in the same ways. 8
Those corporate positions which the Chamber is supporting because they
frankly support corporations, the business PILFs are supporting for "the
well-being of the free-enterprise system." As a legal matter, the rhetoric is
irrelevant. The question under section 501(c)(3) is simply whether the
chart:
Type of Number of Number of Briefs Filed




Energy & 4 Pacific-1
Environment Capital-I





In lower federal court cases, the Chamber's emphasis on labor issues becomes even more pronounced,
although it is by no means exclusive. Of 33 cases at the district and appellate level, 28 involved labor
practices or management challenges to labor law requirements. NCLC's participation in the five other
cases supported corporate positions against the FEC, the SEC, the EPA, and OSHA. Even with the
larger pool of cases, the overlap with entries from the legal foundations diminishes but does not disap-
pear. In NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for example, both the Southeastern Legal
Foundation and the Chamber of Commerce filed amicus briefs. It also bears mention that in at least
one case the Chamber intervened as a party litigant. See Francis v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 78 (D.
Md. 1974). This participation removed whatever theoretical distinction might have arisen from the
Chamber's prediliction for participation as an amicus. The business PILFs themselves have appeared
as amicus curiae in almost two-thirds of their cases. See Appendix I.
579. The overlap in labor law is most pronounced between the Chamber and the National Right
to Work Committee, another business-sponsored organization granted exemption under § 501(c)(3).
580. Beyond similarity of purpose, funding, and docket, there is also evidence that the NCLC
coordinates its activities on occasion directly with the business PILFs. A Chamber attorney explained
that the overlap between his § 501(c)(6) organization and the § 501(c)(3) business PILFs did not
bother him, although "we may be a little more honest in our representations." He continued: "We
have cordial relationships [with the business PILFs]- and communicate to avoid duplication of efforts.
Avoidance of duplication is important now because of limited funding." Telephone interview with
Stanley Kaleczyc, NCLC attorney (Oct. 26, 1982).
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corporate position in these cases was so inadequately presented by the
corporate litigants, among the largest and best financed in the nation, as
to warrant additional, public interest representation.
The NCLC indicates an appropriate tax-exempt category for an organ-
ization that litigates primarily on behalf of the business community at
large: section 501(c)(6). This section is the most logical category, on the
basis of their records, for the business PILFs. As common sense tells us in
making the classifications of our everyday lives: If it walks like a duck,
quacks like a duck, has feathers, and is frequently found with the other
ducks . . . we place it with the ducks.
3. The Effect of Re-qualification
The legal effect of qualification under sections 501(c)(4) or (c)(6), as
opposed to section 501(c)(3), is, of course, the unavailability of deductions
to donors for their contributions. Given the nature of the contributors, this
reclassification may not have a significant economic impact either on those
corporate donors which can afford to forgo the deduction, or on others
which will simply take the deduction as a necessary business expense.581
Reclassification may have a more significant effect on eligibility for special
postal privileges, particularly for those firms which are involved in direct
mail fundraising,582 and on the donation requirements for private founda-
tions.583 But as Michael Horowitz has explained, the deductibility of con-
tributions is not the purpose behind qualification of these firms as public
charities under section 501(c)(3). The purpose is an ideological counter-
force to the perceived anti-business points of view advocated by the civil
rights, consumer, and environmental public interest law firms. Viewed
more broadly, the quest is for legitimacy in the minds of educators, legis-
lators, the press, the courts, and the general public. An advantage in all of
these areas goes to the ones wearing the white hats.
The ideology of American business is as valid as any other and deserves
a full hearing, among other places, before the courts. The problem is that
not all valid points of view are entitled to tax deductions for their appear-
ances in court: only the ones which would not otherwise appear. As a
general rule, private business is fully capable of presenting its views. It
purchases billions of dollars in advertising annually for this purpose. It
employs thousands of members of the private bar. If a more generalized
voice-of-business is needed, this is the accepted role of Chambers of Com-
merce in the field, and of section 501(c)(6) in the Code.
581. The availability of a business expense deduction, rather than a charitable contribution de-
duction, will depend on how directly the PILF's activities serve the interest of the donor. See supra
note 141.
582. See supra note 45.
583. See supra note 42.
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C. Reaching the Altered State: Questions of Standing
Assuming arguendo either that one or more of the business PILFs ex-
amined in this study are improperly qualified as public charities under
section 501(c)(3) of the Code, or that there is at the very least a more
appropriate exempt category for them under either sections 501(c)(4) or
(c)(6), the question arises whether anyone besides the Internal Revenue
Service could compel the indicated change in exempt status.584 Congress,
of course, could amend section 501(c)(3) to identify eligible and ineligible
public interest law practices. Given the complexity and political sensitivity
of these issues, Congress is highly unlikely to enter this field.5 85 Further-
more, even were Congress to risk codifying some concept of public interest
law, it is even more unlikely that it could do more than enact the Service's
current tests, leaving the Service with the same responsibility it has now
to interpret and appl9 them. Any challenge, then, would have to look to
the courts. It would in all probability founder, at the threshold, on the
judicial doctrine of standing.
1. Falling over Standing
The constitutional basis for standing derives from Article III, section 2,
which limits the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." ' The
doctrine rejects lawsuits that are not sufficiently adversarial to focus issues
for decision, retaining those where the plaintiff has a "personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy. ' 5 7 The Administrative Procedure Act of-
fers standing to persons "adversely affected" by agency action "within the
meaning of a relevant statute. '5 88 While the Supreme Court has recently
focused on the Act's adverse affect ("injury in fact") requirement with
widely varying results,589 standing to challenge benefits conferred on an
584. This question assumes as well that the affected organizations, because of the benefits re-
ceived, would be the last to seek such a change in status.
585. Charitable organizations, as a body, comprise a formidable lobby in Washington, D.C. The
support for public interest law firms as a charitable class has also been demonstrated. See supra TAN
116-32.
586. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of standing, see K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRA-
TrE LAW 97-119 (6th ed. 1977); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTmCE &
PROCEDURE § 3531 (1975 & Supp. 1977). Criticisms of the standing limitations can be found in
Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative Reform, 30
RuTGERs L. REV. 863, 873-76 (1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandon-
ment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977).
587. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
588. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). Early Supreme Court cases construed these terms liberally. See, e.g.,
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (data-processing firm may
sue agency ruling that banks do not violate banking laws by providing data processing); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
589. In Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), an organization advanc-
ing the interests of users of free hospital services challenged an IRS rule change for exempt hospitals
which allowed reductions in these services. The Court could neither find that the alleged injury (de-
nial of services) had been caused by the Treasury ruling (according to the Court, the hospitals might
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exempt organization has been almost uniformly denied. 59 ° This strict ap-
plication of the standing requirement appears to bend, however, in the
presence of claimed violations of constitutional rights.
In Green v. Kennedy, plaintiffs challenged the tax exemption for pri-
vate schools that excluded black students on the basis of race.591 The
plaintiff parents had alleged no attempt to enter or use the segregated
schools. They alleged no discrimination against their children by these
schools. As the appellate court recognized, "the sole injury they claim is
the denigration they suffer as black parents and school children when
their government agrees with the tax exempt status of educational institu-
tions in their communities that treat members of their race as persons of
lesser worth.1592 For the majority, this was enough. Given the grievance
alleged, it was unnecessary to trace either a cause or a cure from the
have denied these services anyway), nor that the injury could be cured by courts (as the hospitals were
free to abandon their exempt status, and continue to deny the services). Id. at 42-44. In Duke Power
Co., v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), homeowners challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Price-Anderson Act, which limits the liability of nuclear-plant owners. The plaintiffs alleged
that they would not be put at risk from the hazards of nuclear energy but for the plants which, in
turn, would not have been built but for the Act. Id. at 69, 74-75. Six Justices had little difficulty
tracing this "chain of causation" through its probabilities (despite the fact that the plants were free to
operate without the Price-Anderson Act) and across the Article III threshold. Id. at 74-77. What one
is to make of these formulations for standing has been the subject of commentary, and of at least some
suspicion that the newly articulated principles can be manipulated to accept, or reject, virtually any
case desired, see Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is remarkable that
such a series of speculations is considered sufficient either to make this litigation ripe for decision or to
establish appellees' standing. . . . [W]henever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage
in the business of giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our independence and
our strength.").
590. For a thoughtful discussion of standing in suits contesting the tax status of third party orga-
nizations, see Asimow, Standing to Challenge Lenient Tax Rules: A Statutory Solution, TAXES, Aug.
1979, at 483. Reviewing the case law as of 1979, Professor Asinow concludes "It now seems unlikely
that anyone has standing under present law to challenge favorable tax treatment accorded to someone
else," id. at 491, and proposes a federal statute to remedy the difficulty, id. at 491-503. See United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying standing to taxpayer asserting that secrecy of CIA
expenditures violated art. I, § 9, cl. 7, requiring public accounting of governmental expenditures));
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to End the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying standing to taxpayers
and citizens opposing armed forces Reserve membership of Congressmen as violating incompatability
clause, art. I, § 6, cI. 2, and allowing undue executive influence on taxing and spending decisions).
591. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), appeal disnissed sub non. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). Faced with motions to dismiss based on standing, a three-judge court
resolved the issue in an order for preliminary injunction with the simple declaration that the parents
"have standing to attack the constitutionality of statutory provisions which they claim provides an
unconstitutional system of benefits . . . that fosters and supports a system of segregated private
schools." 309 F. Supp. at 1132. In 1976, the case was re-kindled by the same plaintiffs as an action to
enforce the prior injunctive order. Shortly thereafter, the parents of black children attending public
schools in eight other states filed a separate lawsuit seeking a similar order and relief nationwide.
Resolution of these two cases was delayed at first by IRS proposed guidelines conforming its policies
to the earlier court order, and subsequent riders to the Treasury Department's appropriations bills
prohibiting the use of funds to carry out these guidelines. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 823-26
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (summary of events). In 1980, the district court granted the relief sought in the
reopened litigation and dismissed the action brought by the other parents in other stated for, inter alia,
lack of standing. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 793-94 (D.D.C. 1979).
592. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerL granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109
(1983).
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government exemption to the practice of the schools to the injury. "The
very act by the IRS of according tax exemption to a school that discrimi-
nates in their vicinity causes immediate injury to them, plaintiffs main-
tain, and that is the only injury for which they seek redress." 593
Claims under the First Amendment have been favored in the same
fashion.594 In 1982, a range of individuals and organizations challenged
the exemption of the Roman Catholic Church and its member churches
for violation of the Code's prohibitions on lobbying and political campaign
activity.59 5 Plaintiffs alleged that the Church was engaged in a nationwide
plan to change abortion laws through legislative influence and participa-
tion in elections. By contrast, no charity with opposing views on abortion
was permitted to support legislation and candidates on the issue.59 Ob-
serving that the allegation of a First Amendment violation does not per se
confer standing on litigants, 97 the Court rejected various individual plain-
tiffs and groups whose interests were essentially ideological,59 not rising
above the "whistleblowing" discounted in earlier cases. 99 For an organi-
zation which provided counseling services for pregnant women, however,
and for several "clergy plaintiffs," leaders of other churches which com-
pelled consideration of abortion as part of their ministry, the court found
that the challenged exemption "diminishes their position in the commu-
nity, encumbers their calling in life, and obstructs their ability to commu-
593. In so ruling, the court relied on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), where parents
of black school children in the public schools system sought to enjoin a Mississippi state program of
lending books to, inter alia, segregated private schools. Writing for the Supreme Court, the Chief
Justice had found no "causal" proof necessary that white school children would re-enroll in the inte-
grated public school system were the loans to stop: "the Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to private
school and the continued well-being of that school." Id. at 465-66.
594. This treatment is presaged by Justice Stewart's brief concurring opinion in Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization: "I add only that I cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the
First Amendment area, where a person whose own liability was not affected ever could have standing
to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). It should be noted that the majority opinion in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion did not close the door to litigation challenging the exempt status of another organization: "We do
not reach either the question of whether a third party ever may challenge IRS treatment of another,
or the question of whether there is a statutory or an immunity bar to this suit." Id. at 37 (majority
opinion).
595. Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
596. Plaintiffs initially offered four constitutionally derived bases for standing: the establishment
clause of the First Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, "voter standing,"
and "tax payer standing." Id. at 476. The plaintiffs withdrew the final ground for standing before the
district court filed its opinion. Id. at 476 n.1. Like "taxpayer standing," "voter standing" is not avail-
able to challenge PILF exemptions.
597. "[Q]ffense to one's sense of fidelity to separatist principles is an insufficient injury to bring
suit for an alleged establishment clause violation." Id. at 477 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952)).
598. These entities included individual members of the church who objected to its practices and
pro-choice groups which provided medical aid and other services to women seeking abortions. 544 F.
Supp. at 478-79.
599. Id. at 480.
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nicate effectively their religious message." 600 This injury sufficed: "The
granting of a uniquely favored tax status to one religious entity is an une-
quivocal statement of preference that gilds the image of that religion and
tarnishes all others.2
60 1
From these cases, a narrow window of uncertain dimensions appears in
the otherwise formidable barrier to standing to question the tax status of a
third party organization. Through this window claims based on particu-
larized economic injury or constitutional rights may be admitted. Neither
would easily accommodate a challenge to the tax-exempt status of a busi-
ness PILF. A section 501(c)(6) chamber of commerce litigation center for
example, which is not qualified to received contributions deductible under
section 170 to its donors, might claim injury in its competition with the
business PILFs for donors within the same pool of corporations and indi-
viduals.6 2 A more fanciful plaintiff might be any non-business PILF
which could allegedly raise more money by forging a similar alliance with
corporate interests, in turn for a sympathetic ear on the PILF's litigation
agenda. The chamber plaintiff, however, would find it difficult to prove
that disallowing the business-PILF exemptions would "cure" its problems
to the degree required. 03 The PILF plaintiff would face an even more
speculative chain of causation, and pre-emption by another remedy: a pro-
spective ruling on the desired degree of corporate influence,04 followed by
declaratory, judicial review.60 5
It thus appears unlikely that a plaintiff could establish standing without
an additional allegation of injury rising to constitutional proportions. The
shape of such a claim is not easily perceived. No abridgment of civil rights
600. Id.
601. Id. The same opinion, by contrast, found no standingwhatever under the alleged violations
of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. Plaintiffs alleged no discrimination against their
interests: "Their acknowledgement that the Code has been applied properly to them concedes that
they have not been injured, in purely fifth amendment terms, by the alleged misapplication to the
church defendants." Id. at 483. In the court's view, the plaintiffs were not being mistreated; they were
merely asserting that the government was disregarding the law with regard to someone else. But see
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983). There, the Court accepted the stand-
ing of a plaintiff § 501(c)(3) organization for an equal protection challenge of exemptions of, and
deductions for donors to, veterans' organizations. The alleged inequality concerned a limitation on
lobbying for § 501(c)(3) groups, while the veterans' organizations under § 501(c)(19) are allowed to
lobby without restriction. Although the Court rejected the claimed inequity on the merits, it in fact
reached the merits without finding an impediment in the standing doctrine.
602. Arguably, the injury is here tangible and particularized: The donor dollar is the lifeblood of
these organizations, and the competitive quest for it is empirical, as are the advantages to the organi-
zations qualified under §§ 501(c)(3) and 170, both in terms of the deductions available to donors and
the more desirable corporate image of "public interest" contributions.
603. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); American
Soc'y of Travel Agents 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978); see also
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no standing for indepen-
dent U.S. oil company to challenge IRS tax credits for payments by large U.S. companies to foreign
governments), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
604. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(1) (1967).
605. I.R.C. § 7453 (1982).
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or discrimination in the equal protection sense leap to mind.60 6 The clos-
est one can come to the First Amendment might be freedom of speech,
impaired by the government's imprimatur of "public interest" on entities
which are not qualified for it, "denigrating" those firms which genuinely
undertake to represent otherwise-unrepresented interests. The press, the
court system, potential donors, and a watching public are thus made more
cynical and more prone to look at all public interest firms as serving un-
disclosed, self-interests instead.
However accurate these allegations may be, they do not present the
stuff of particularized injury. Were they sufficient to squeak over the Ar-
ticle III threshold, courts would reject the cases on "prudential" grounds
as "beyond the zone of interest" protected by the Code, and beyond the
competence of the courts to address and resolve.107 As well they should.
The specter of all-outwarfare among public interest groups with strong-
ly-felt and directly-opposing ideologies, each able to challenge another's
tax-exempt qualifications, is an unsettling one.108 The potential for abuse
of the judicial process is obvious. Absent then the most clearcut violations
of IRS requirements-alleged involvement in political campaigns, for ex-
ample-the problem seems to be best left to of the Service itself. If a prod
is necessary, there are other, less drastic mechanisms through the oversight
committees of the Congress, investigations by the Government Accounting
Office,609 the press, and, just perhaps, analysis by concerned scholars and
members of the bar.
2. Standing as a Sword
Southeastern's representation of the public interest includes the rep-
resentation of the several hundred individuals which contribute
financially to Southeastern.
Brief of the Southeastern Legal Foundation 10
PLF, its members, supporters, and contributors would derive sub-
stantial benefit from the air pollution planning, construction of sew-
606. But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
607. Because of this negative conclusion on the prospect of standing, other potential barriers to
litigation challenging the Service's exemption of a third-party organization, including the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act, the Service's "prosecutorial discretion," and sovereign immunity are not pursued further in
this study. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
608. For a strong and recent statement of the Supreme Court's reluctance to review tax exemp-
tions for charitable organizations representing "diverse indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints," see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
609. The General Accounting Office, for example, has recently completed a study highlighting the
Service's failure to monitor the activities of private foundations. This study has resulted in promises of
a response by the Treasury Department. See Tax Administration: IRS Fails to Collect Foundation-
Related Data, GAO and Agency Agree, TAx'N & Ac=ra. (BNA), May 11, 1983, at 6-5.
610. Brief of Southeastern Legal Foundation Amicus Curiae, at 2, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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age treatment facilities, and construction and maintenance of roads
that would be financed by the Federal funds withheld from the State
by the Administration.
Petition of the Pacific Legal Foundation.
While the concept of standing may preclude a third-party challenge to
the tax status of the business PILFs, it does offer the opportunity to chal-
lenge the entry of these PILFs into specific litigation and to surface the
financial interests behind them.
A PILF may satisfy the requirements for standing in one of three ways:
as an organization, as the representative of its members, 12 or as the attor-
ney for an outside interest. Organizational standing is limited to the cor-
porate body itself. Without a showing of economic injury,13 PILFs of all
persuasions have found this a difficult standard to meet.614 Allegations
demonstrating a strong organizational interests in the subject matter of a
dispute, be they in wilderness or in a free market economy, have not suf-
ficed. This restriction has been a particular problem for the business
PILF.
Two suits under the Clean Air Act, Pacfic Legal Foundation v. Gor-
such"1 5 and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle,616 challenged
EPA requirements for state action to improve air quality in areas which
had not attained national minimum standards. MSLF filed its action as
an organization and on behalf of state legislators, adding somewhat more
grandly as a plaintiff the "State of Colorado ex. rel. Mountain States. 6 17
PLF's petition alleged that "PLF, its members, supporters, and contribu-
tors, are vitally interested in maintaining a republican form of government
for the State of California and a legislature that is free from unlawful
coercion by unelected federal officials."6 8 The petition, while not specify-
ing who these "members" were, described the organization as follows:
Policy for PLF is set by an eighteen member Board of Trustees com-
posed of concerned citizens who reside throughout the State of Cali-
fornia and the States of Washington and Idaho. Thirteen of the
eighteen member Board are attorneys. The Board evaluates the mer-
611. Petition of Pacific Legal Foundation, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Gorsuch, 690 F.2d 725
(9th Cir. 1982) (withdrawn from bound edition).
612. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
613. Cf Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (organization which
purchased steel to challenge administration efforts to reduce steel imports).
614. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing denied despite strong organiza-
tional interest in retaining natural character of an area proposed for development).
615. 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (9th Cir. 1982).
616. 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980).
617. Id. at 756-57.
618. 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1131.
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its of any contemplated action and authorizes such action only where
the Foundation's position has broad support within the general com-
munity. The Board has approved the filing of this action. 19
The Ninth Circuit found this interest insufficient. As an organization,
PLF "does not breathe the air in California, nor is its corporate health
affected by what the Administrator has or has not done in California." 2 0
The Mountain States appeal met a similar fate: "Neither petitioner,
Mountain State Legal Foundation, nor the individual petitioner-
legislators, has alleged a sufficient 'personal stake' in this controversy to
entitle it to raise constitutional arguments on behalf of the State of
Colorado." '621
The same difficulty arose in Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission,6 22 the firm's chal-
lenge to a California state law restricting the development of nuclear en-
ergy facilities.0 2 The action was brought on behalf of PLF, several San
Diego-based associations, and a nuclear engineer who claimed that the
law caused the loss of his job at the Sundance Nuclear Power Plant. The
District Court. found that these "general allegations of lost jobs and envi-
ronmental harm" were "speculative," "conclusory," and "failed to demon-
strate a concrete injury, 624 findings which were affirmed on appeal.625 In
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt,2 6 PLF filed in an organizational ca-
pacity to contest the withdrawal of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area
from mineral entry. Although PLF quickly amended its complaint to add
six "members and supporters" as plaintiffs, 2 it argued its organizational
standing separately to the court, to no avail. The Tenth Circuit could find
no organizational injury.
628
619. Id. at 1129.
620. Id. at 1131 (citation omitted).
621. 630 F.2d at 761.
622. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
623. For a fuller discussion of this case, see supra note 226.
624. 472 F. Supp. 191, 195 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
625. 659 F.2d at 909 (affirming 472 F. Supp. 191). The Ninth Circuit also found no standing for
the nuclear engineer. Id. at 913.
626. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
627. Id. at 984 n.1.
628. In arguing to the contrary, PLF relied on Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (standing found for non-membership trade association), and Coles v.
Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980) (standing granted to non-profit organization
formed to eliminate housing discrimination). PLF's reliance on these cases and the Court's disposition
of them are revealing. Hunt involved a classic trade association. Its Board was de facto membership:
"They alone elected, served on, and financed the Commission." 529 F. Supp. at 993. PLF could not
argue Hunt too strongly without acknowledging that it was de facto a trade association as well, and
similarly self-"served" with regard to its board and "membership." Coles, by contrast, involved an
organization dedicated to achieving a specific, identifiable objective. Its standing to sue for violations of
law affecting this objective was distinguished from that of PLF, whose goals were "not 'functional"'
in the same way. Id. at 993-94. Once again, for PLF to claim that its goals were functional would
either stretch the truth or admit it, neither choice a satisfactory one. In staking its claim as a public
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PLF has on one occasion established organizational standing, requiring
some creativity and a forgiving court. In Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Goyan, PLF challenged the Federal Food and Drug Administration regu-
lations that would reimburse attorney's fees and costs of participants in
that agency's proceedings. 29 For standing, PLF asserted that the firm
would suffer considerable economic costs from having to monitor the pro-
posed reimbursement process, a proposition the Fourth Circuit found suf-
ficient.630 Other circuits, and the Supreme Court, might look at such orga-
nizational injury-injury-as-watchdog-as at best a self-inflicted wound.
Whatever the strength of this argument, it would not have availed the
business PILFs in the preponderance of the cases examined in this study,
which were not rule-makings over which the organizations could claim
continuing "watchdog" interests. For these cases, and indeed for the rea-
son PLF has tried so persistently to sue as an organization, associational
standing comes into play.
While the Supreme Court has kept a tight lid on organizational stand-
ing, it has allowed wide latitude for organizations to represent their mem-
bers. Herein lies a dilemma for the business PILFs. Several, by their very
articles and bylaws, have no members.6 3 Others declare a class of "mem-
bers" which may or may not pass muster.63 2 Even for those member inter-
interest law firm, PLF has forfeited its right to claim, for standing purposes, the single-mindedness of
its "function" or the self-serving nature of its Board and "membership."
629. 500 F. Supp. 770 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
630. 500 F. Supp. at 773.
631. See Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, Bylaws Art. IV ("The Corporation shall not have
members."). See also PLF v. Watt, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1602, 1603 (9th Cir. 1983) (PLF
asserted standing through an affidavit of injury to one of its "member" trustees).
632. See supra p. 1532 (characterizing PLF's contributors as its "members" in Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Watt). The Mountain States Legal Foundation amended its Articles of Incorporation
in 1977 to provide two classes of members, individual and organization: "Any person, corporation, or
other organization that pays the membership dues for the appropriate membership category shall
become a member of the corporation." MSLF Income Tax Return for 1978, Form 990, attachment
("Amendments to Article Four of the Articles of Incorporation"). While Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972), which denied an organization standing when no members were involved, implied
that the Court would allow standing based upon injury to a single member, it did not define what that
membership interest would have to be. A more recent case, brought by a business PILF not associated
with the NLCPI firms, suggests that a narrow definition may be adopted. Federal Election Comm'n
v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982), turned on a provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act prohibiting corporations and labor unions from making certain expenditures
on federal elections, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1982). The statute also provided, however, that organizations
without capital stock could establish segregated funds for political activity, so long as these funds were
solicited from the organization's "members." Id. § 441b(b)(4)(c). The District of Columbia Circuit
gave a broad construction to the term "members" and included 267,000 contributors to the organiza-
tion in question. 665 F.2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Reversing, the Supreme Court required more:
Although membership cards are ultimately sent to those who either contribute or respond in
some other way to respondent's [NRWC] mailings, the solicitation letters themselves make no
reference to members. Members play no part in the operation or administration of the corpo-
ration; they elect no corporate officials, and indeed there are apparently no membership meet-
ings. There is no indication that NRWC's asserted members exercise any control over the
expenditure of their contributions. Moreover, as previously noted, NRWC's own articles of
incorporation and other publicly filed documents explicitly disclaimed the existence of mem-
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ests which do pass, the process of demonstrating standing will also begin
to demonstrate the real interests in the litigation. In the few cases to fol-
low this process to date, the results have been instructive. The joint action
by PLF and MSLF to enjoin mineral withdrawals in the Bob Marshall
Wilderness is a good example.' 8
As noted above, PLF brought this action in its own name but soon
added six "members and supporters," each of whom held applications for
oil and gas leases in the Bob Marshall area. While the court found that
these individuals alleged sufficient economic injury to establish standing
on their own behalves, their nexus to PLF was insufficient to establish
standing for the firm.63 MSLF, however, was able to show that eight
individuals who held "non-competitive lease applications to lands within
the three wilderness areas" were its "members." '35 Their injury was not a
"generalized grievance"; the withdrawal "diminished the market value of
their lease applications."6 While several of these "memberships" were
open to question, at least one was not and that membership was sufficient.
The result of this standing analysis was that PLF was out of the case,
PLF's individual "supporters" were in, MSLF was in via its individual
"members," and the common denominator for all, the only interest cogni-
zable in the case, was the value of privately-held mineral leases. This fact
revealed, the charitable nature of PLF and MSLF's representation be-
comes appropriately doubtful.
Similar revelations arise in other business PILF cases. The Southeast-
ern brief quoted at the start of this section equates the firm's public inter-
est with the "several hundred individuals who contribute financially to
Southeastern. ' 637 These individuals, as earlier seen, comprise a list of the
largest corporate interests in the South. Similarly, in Pacific Legal Foun-
dation v. Gorsuch, the described injury to the firm's "members, support-
ers, and contributors" lay in the loss of a "substantial benefit" from feder-
ally-subsidized public works programs.6"8 As also earlier described, PLF's
challenge to public access requirements of the California Coastal Commis-
bers. We think that under these circumstances, those solicited were insufficiently attached to
the corporate structure of NRWC to qualify as "members" under the statutory proviso.
103 S. Ct. at 558. Whether this same analysis will be applied to membership for purposes of standing
remains to be seen. At least two courts, in opinions antedating Federal Election Committee, have so
reasoned and ruled. See Consumers Union v. Miller, 84 F.R.D. 240 (D.D.C. 1979); Health Research
Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 1979). Until this issue is resolved, it remains something of
an unexploded grenade for all public interest law organizations.
633. Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
634. Id. at 990 (individual plaintiffs "supporters" not members of PLF).
635. Id. at 993 (MSLF has standing to represent members).
636. Id. at 990, 992.
637. Brief of Southeastern Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae, United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
638. Pacific Legal Found. v. Gorsuch, 690 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1982).
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sion was quickly distilled to the interests of a few private coastal
landowners." 9
Thus, the business PILFs are particularly vulnerable to challenges to
their standing. Organizational standing will be rarely established. Mem-
bership standing will depend often on financial interests. These interests
may not disqualify the business PILFs from litigation. The firms will
continue to represent members and their investments where available, and
those of outside parties where not.'" In the end, challenges to their stand-
ing act more as a searchlamp than a sword. They will rarely bar. They
will cast a healthy light. At the least, they will educate the court in the
case at hand and the public over time that what we have here is not litiga-
tion to vindicate a public interest, but a rather identifiably private and
financial one instead. So long as the IRS unblinkingly accepts a PILF's
direct representation of private elevator companies, mineral locators, real
estate developers, the clients of its litigation committee members, and the
corporate interests of its directors, this education may be the most that can
be achieved.
D. Reflections on Another Remedy: "A Plague on Both Your Houses"
[Iff I could meet on the Potomac River on a raft in the middle of the
night with the ambassador of our counterparts on the left, and if we
could agree to sever our roles, I would unhesitantly agree to such a
treaty.
Michael Uhlmann, Director, NLCPI" '1
One of the anomalies of the business PILFs is their view of 'judicial
activism.""' Prominent founders, supporters, and directors maintain their
opposition to an active judiciary while urging the business community to
get into the game." 3 Other spokesmen and supporters, however, call for
639. See supra pp. 1470-71.
640. Indeed, the trend may be for the business PILFs to forgo actions on their own behalf and
represent business interest directly. According to one MSLF attorney, that organization is represent-
ing its "clients" in their own names now to avoid problems with standing. The clients in question
were several ranchers in Western Colorado with grazing privileges on several thousand acres of public
lands. Interview with Connie Brooks, attorney for MSLF (Dec. 1983).
641. Horowitz Report, supra note 301, at 31.
642. Judge Malcom Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, was quoted in a recent NLCPI
newsletter as saying:
'Judicial activism' has disrupted our well-designed Constitutional balance of separation of
powers, brought disrespect to the judiciary, hampered the judiciary in performance of its legiti-
mate tasks, shifted the highest governmental policy determinations to nonelected officials, and
has been both caused by and caused evasion of responsibility by the legislative and executive
branches.
NLCPI, Criminal Justice Reporter, Nov. 30, 1983, at 4.
643. See infra p. 1547.
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the opposite remedy: to revoke the exemptions for all public interest "im-
pact litigation," getting everyone out of the game."
The premise for this approach has been alluded to earlier.8 45 The attor-
ney's function is to represent clients. Courts sit to adjudicate disputes be-
tween individual clients, not those of larger classes of the public. When
courts stray from client cases they stray into legislative territory, upsetting
the balance of government and substituting their personal values for those
of the electorate. The answer is to remove the courts from the resolution
of issues more properly decided by legislators. The method is to restrict
the judiciary and the bar to client cases, or, failing that, to discourage an
expanded role by terminating government financing and tax exemptions
for public interest law. 4"
1. The Impact of Administrative Agencies
As persuasive as this approach is in theory, it does not address signifi-
cant aspects of the way American democratic government has developed,
644. For an illustration of this approach, see Address of Professor Ralph K. Winter, Yale Law
School, to the American Enterprise Institute, Organized Public Interest Litigation and the Judicial
Model (1980) (on file with author). Professor Winter has since been appointed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
645. See supra p. 1457-58; see also infra p. 1547-48.
646. See Exec. Order No. 12404, 19 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 224 (Feb. 10, 1983) (declaring
organizations that "seek to influence the ... determination of public policy through ... litigation on
behalf of parties other than themselves" ineligible to participate in Combined Federal Campaign).
The order was challenged by several PILFs, including the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and invalidated by a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The opinion
stressed the qualification of the PILFs as charities under § 501(c)(3) id. at 1258, and the charitable
benefits of their litigation-the firms provide "direct health and welfare services to individuals or their
families," within the meaning of the executive order, "by seeking judicial enforcement of the common
law, statutory and constitutional rights of their clients, and by obtaining health and welfare benefits
for the needy," id. at 1260. The dissent, however, found that the mandate to include advocacy groups
"distorts the nature of charity." Id. at 1268 (Starr, J., dissenting). In a similar vein, the administra-
tion has also proposed to eliminate federal grants and contracts to advocacy organizations. See OMB,
Lobbyists at Loggerheads Over Advocacy Curb, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1983, at A17, col. 2 (opponents
"threatened to take their case against the proposal and its belligerent and beleaguered author, OMB
general counsel Michael J. Horowitz, to the White House"). An effort to curb public interest litiga-
tion more directly is reflected in positions taken recently by the U.S. Government on the award of
attorney's fees. Congress has enacted more than one hundred statutes authorizing attorney fee awards
for a broad range of civil rights, consumer, environmental protection and other public interest litiga-
tion. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976); 5 U.S.C. §
504 (1982) (Equal Access to Justice Act). In recent litigation, the government has successfully con-
tended that fee awards be restricted to "prevailing" parties, even under statutes which authorize a
court to allow recovery whenever it determines that such an award is "appropriate." Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). The government has also attempted to limit the size of the
awards themselves to a basis of the costs involved, as opposed to the "market value" of the services
rendered. But see Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F. 2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting government's
proposal to limit awards to costs). After other circuits agreed with the District of Columbia opinion
and rejected the proposed limitation, see, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F. 2d 598 (1st. Cir. 1980);
Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F. 2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980), the administration has prepared legislation to scale
fee awards to the salaries of government lawyers involved in the action. For a critique of this propo-
sal, see Yost, Don't Further Weaken Citizen Lawsuits, N.Y. Times Nov. 12, 1983, at 23 (editorial).
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including the rise of governmental agencies. The administration of public
policy in health, safety, natural resource development, communications,
transportation, energy development, consumer and employee protection,
labor relations, and environmental protection, for only a few examples,
has evolved into separate, highly complex government programs. The leg-
islation affecting these programs runs to volumes of the U.S. Code, pro-
viding legislative objectives and standards, leaving discretion for imple-
mentation by agencies in areas too technical (or too politically hazardous)
for the Congress to resolve. Within these mandates, some broad, some
narrow, government agencies have become major decisionmakers on al-
most every conceivable social issue, including those of most direct concern
to American corporations."
7
The merits of expanded agency power in American government are
well beyond the scope of this study."" The fact of their power, however, is
too pertinent to ignore. Institutional checks on this power are provided by
the legislature and the courts. A proposal which would rely on the legisla-
ture alone to provide the necessary checks ignores the fact that there is, at
the national level, but one legislature with but limited time (and often no
more particular knowledge of the details of an agency program than a
conscientious court could muster) to attend to, among all of its other pri-
orities, the programs of several dozen federal agencies, each with
thousands of employees, each program raising a host of issues including,
at bottom, whether these employees are adhering to legislative policies and
standards. The Congress can, and does, attempt to arrange its priorities to
oversee its most volatile laws.0'9 It can also, through appropriations, with-
hold funds for programs which have proven unpopular to a significantly
647. The agency decisionmakers, like the courts, are elected by no one. The terms of office of
independent federal agency commissioners and almost all agency staff extend beyond any single ad-
ministration; departmental secretaries and other agency heads are usually appointed with only routine
approval by one house of Congress. To characterize review of these decisions as an unconstitutional
intrusion on legislative authority requires therefore some extension of the concept of the legislature.
648. It is interesting to note, however, that in the New Deal administration of President Franklin
Roosevelt, agencies were welcomed as a counterforce to corporate influence on social policy decisions,
created to protect the public interests. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 95, at
26-29. By the late 1960's, the prevailing perception was that the agencies had become captured by
private interests, giving momentum to judicial action and to public interest litigation. By the late
1970's, business interests perceived the agencies as captured by liberal, anti-business elements, a major
factor in their resort to litigation and to the creation of the business-sponsored PILFs.
649. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982), for example, which strikes a contro-
versial balance between protection and development interests, has been reviewed and amended or
reauthorized by the Congress five times in the past ten years. See generally M. BEAN, THE EVOLU-
TION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 329-41 (1983) (explaining original development of Endangered
Species Act). Congress, at the time of this writing, was struggling through similar conflicts over the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982). Another mechanism for Congressional supervision of
agency action was the "one-house veto," allowing rejection of an agency proposal by less than a full,
bicameral vote. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 244(c)(2) 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)
(1982). In 1983, the Supreme Court found this mechanism unconstitutional, INS v. Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983), sending congressmen and scholars in search of another means to the same end.
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vocal constituency.650 No one can seriously contend, however, that this
level of oversight is adequate to ensure agency compliance with the law.
There is simply too much agency action and too little Congress. The other
safeguard, for better or for worse, involves the courts. The great bulk of
public interest litigation-left, right, and center-involves the actions of
governmental agencies.
Recognizing that the courts will necessarily have some role in the reso-
lution of social issues which have been delegated to government agencies,
the critics of public interest law would seek to restrict courts and public
interest attorneys to cases involving concerns of "live clients." ' The dis-
tinction blurs from the start. Litigation on behalf of the poor, political
minorities and social minorities, has long been recognized as charitable.6 5 '
As has been seen, while much of the work of the leading organizations in
these fields has responded to the plight of individual "clients," a signifi-
cant effort has involved the identification of problem programs and impact
litigation to change the ways in which they are being implemented. If the
contention is that such litigation for a monetary remedy is proper, but for
such a remedy as changing an agency practice is not, it seems an unneces-
sarily restrictive one and one which flies in the face of a line of precedent
viewing litigation for the reform of certain programs as a constitutional
right.65 Nor can a logical distinction be made among those individuals
whose civil rights have been injured, those whose rights to resist summary
eviction are ignored, and those whose asserted rights involve a safe work-
place, a public hearing before being relocated by a government construc-
tion project, or simply breathing lead-free air. All of these injuries raise
questions of social policy. All come before courts in public interest
litigation.
Perhaps the proferred "live client" test simply requires the presence of
a warm body. But even now, all litigation requires the identification of an
650. The legislation-by-appropriations approach to the resolution of issues has been widely and
justifiably criticized as government action which has been given little consideration in the Congress,
the courts, or any other forum. By its very secretiveness it is the approach most susceptible to abuse by
narrow-interest groups. It is, nonetheless, increasingly used. A vocal minority can be placated without
surfacing an issue for general debate, and without congressional accountability.
651. See Winter, supra note 643.
652. "[T]he undisputed evidence in this record reveals that as a result of the NAACP LDF's
litigation effort, primarily on behalf of low income blacks, 'hundreds of thousands of persons have
received direct benefits, such as income supplementation in the form of back pay and future earnings,
better educations, improved health care, better housing and other living conditions, humane conditions
of incarceration and, in the case of our capital punishment program, life itself."' NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting affidavit of J.
Greenberg, Director-Counsel, NAACP LDF). Neither LDF nor the ACLU has required poverty as
a condition of undertaking representation. Rather, they have looked to the underlying issue. Poverty,
then, would not be a criterion which characterized the clients of even the most widely accepted public
interest practice.
653. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.C. 415 (1963). Indeed, such an approach boils down to an
injury permit system: The illegality is condoned subject to the payment of damages, however inade-
quate the damages may be for victims of discrimination, air pollution, or any other unlawful practice.
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injured individual for purposes of standing.'" The proposition may then
boil down to the somewhat obscure principles of barratry-who contacts
whom first. When the National Highway Transportation Safety Adminis-
tration proposes weakening automobile bumper standards, for example, or
the Environmental Protection Agency considers doubling the accepted
particulate emission levels in urban areas, must a PILF wait until some-
one walks in the door? May it, upon notice, alert people who it knows are
interested in the problem? This may be the rub for some, but this objec-
tion, too, has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.655
At bottom, a "live client" requirement for public interest law represents
little more than an attempt to de-lawyer one side of some of the major
legal action in America. In the meantime, on all of these issues raised by
government agency actions, the private bar does not sleep. Its contacts
with government agencies on behalf of corporate America far exceed those
of public interest organizations.656 It follows the Federal Register daily for
notice of surprises not of its own making, and it will use the judicial sys-
tem no less vigorously to set broad precedent and secure administrative
practices favorable to its commercial clients. The "live client" requirement
ratifies a status quo in which moneyed interests may raise broad issues at
will, while restraining access by others. Stated this baldly, the proposition
is not likely to carry the day.
In sum, it is quite late in the development of American society to try to
close the door on public interest law. 5 The nature of our government
requires the practice, as does a large and increasing body of federal laws
predicated upon citizen lawsuits for their very effectiveness.658 It would
doubtless be more pleasant to return to a less complicated and less litig-
ious world. One sees few people predicting it. Once the validity of repre-
senting any class of underrepresented citizens is acknowledged-a point it
is assumed everyone has by now passed-attempts to limit the class be-
come as selective and result-oriented as attempts to define the public inter-
est. 59 This is not to assert that all litigation should be accepted as in the
654. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
655. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (ACLU may inform potential plaintiff that free legal
assistance is available).
656. See infra p. 1552.
657. For recent attempts to close at least some side doors on public interest advocacy, however, see
supra note 645.
658. For a listing of statutes providing attorney's fees, see Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness
Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975).
659. Proponents of "live client" restriction are most aggressive in their criticism of the "liberal"
PILFs. See Winter, supra note 643. One example of the problem of selectivity in the application of
these principles is the recent attempt to disqualify Planned Parenthood from the Combined Federal
Campaign as an ineligible charity, an attempt which, following a temporary restraining order, has
apparently been abandoned. See Gifts Ok'd to Planned Parenthood, New Orleans Times Picayune/
States Item, Sept. 16, 1983, at § 1-6. One would hope the crowning example arose in NAACP Legal
Defense Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which the plaintiff PILFs were barred
from a federal campaign list which included both the Moral Majority and the U.S. Olympic Commit-
1539
The Yale Law Journal
public interest. It is to say that the guidelines developed by the IRS after
an excruciating review of the question-hinged on access and on the in-
ability of financial interests to raise the issue-appear to be the most in-
ternally consistent, and the most fair.
2. The Impact of Money
The role that money is currently playing in American olitics is dif-
ferent both in scope and in nature from anything that has gone
before. The acquisition of campaign funds has become an obsession
on the part of nearly every candidate for federal office. The obsession
leads the candidates to solicit and accept money from those most able
to provide it, and adjust their behavior in office to the need for
money-and the fear that a challenger might be able to obtain
more.
660
There is another emerging difficulty with "plaguing both houses" of
public interest law on the grounds that its practice will stimulate, in the-
ory at least, an undemocratic transfer of power to the judiciary. We have
never seen a time when the power of financial interests, predominantly
that of large corporations (but also that of large labor unions), so thor-
oughly influenced the other two branches of government."" The courts
have become the only branch which, if not for sale, does not openly seek
major corporate contributions and reciprocate by, at a minimum, provid-
ing special access to decisionmaking.
Following the proliferation of government agencies in the New Deal,
the problem of undue influence was perceived as one of ensuring a dis-
tance between a new, expanded executive and corporate America, between
the regulator and the regulated.6"' Ten years ago, political contributions
were still the gambit of a few wealthy donors, and of a limited number of
labor and business trade organizations.66" Contributions were becoming
tee, on grounds that the PILFs they were "controversial," id. at 1261-64, and did not provide services
to the "truly needy," id. at 1259-60.
660. Drew, Politics and Money (pt. 1), NEw YoRKER, Dec. 6, 1982, at 54. Ms. Drew, the politi-
cal reporter for the New Yorker, continued the article in the December 13, 1982, issue.
661. Id.
662. The problem did not arise from the outright purchase of agency decisions-there was at least
no marketplace for the purchases to occur-but rather from an unseemly coziness between the two as
business executives and their lawyers rotated through the agencies on their way to the top. The prob-
lem was met with conflicts of interest statutes; see, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.
§ 591-98 (1982). These statutes have been criticized both as being too lax and too strict-leaving the
impression they have probably struck the right balance.
663. Prior to the 1970's, a few labor unions and trade and professional associations had estab-
lished political action funds. The AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education ("COPE") was an
early leader; the Business-Industry Political Action Committee ("BIPAC") was an early business
response. These groups were sanctioned under an administrative interpretation of the law permitting
labor and business organizations to administer voluntary donations from members and employees for
political campaigns. Uncertainty over the future of this interpretation was a motive behind legislation
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critical to successful campaigns, however, as television began to capture
the political market. Television was undeniably effective. It was also as-
tronomically costly, as were its associated market-research and polling op-
erations. In 1974, Congress responded to these pressures by establishing a
mechanism for public funding of presidential campaigns; other federal
campaigns were made subject to limits on contributions by individuals,
campaign committees and the candidates themselves.'" In 1976, the Su-
preme Court declared the core of these limitations unconstitutional.665
The effect was to lift the ceiling from private campaign financing.66
The results were dramatic. In 1974, the average cost of campaigning
for a seat in the House of Representatives was $50,000.117 By 1982, races
costing $500,000 were common.668 Congressional candidates spent an esti-
mated $300 million on the 1982 elections, up more than twenty-five per-
cent from 1980.66' The ten Republican Senators re-elected in 1982 spent
an average of almost $1.7 million to hold their seats, over five times more
than their expenditures in 1976.70 The eighteen Democrats re-elected to
the Senate spent $1.4 million each.67 1 An assistant to the President of the
United States made the following comment on these elections:
I've got to think that the money and all the other resources combined
will be worth about two percentage points for about thirty candi-
dates. I think the story of this off election is that we've marshalled
in 1972 permitting the creation of PACs with voluntary contributions. Drew, supra note 660, at
59-60.
664. Congressional investigations into campaign financing revealed, inter alia, that the Committee
to Re-elect the President had received almost $17 million from only 124 contributors, and over $1.7
million from individuals who were subsequently appointed as United States ambassadors. Drew,
supra note 660, at 54, 59. The congressional response was the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 18 U.S.C. §§ 614-17 (repealed by Pub. L. 94-283, 90 Stat.
946).
665. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The provisions struck down included those placing
ceilings on total campaign spending, personal expenditures by candidates, expenditures by a candi-
date's campaign committee, and those by independent groups and committees on behalf of candidates.
666. The Court may be about to lift the lid yet higher if not remove it altogether. It has accepted
two appeals challenging the remaining limitations on PAC spending. Federal Election Comm. v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Comm., 627 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 52
U.S.L.W. 3756 (Apr. 16, 1984), and Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983), prob. juris noted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3756 (Apr. 16, 1984).
667. Running with the PACs, TiME, Oct. 25, 1983, at 21-22.
668. Id.
669. Slinging Mud and Money, TIME, Nov. 15, 1982, at 43.
670. Id.
671. Id. The sums are no less impressive for gubernatorial and presidential races. In 1983, the
winning candidate for Governor of the State of Louisiana reported campaign contributions exceeding
$14 million. See "Edwards Had Healthy Help Filling War Chest," New Orleans Times Picayune/
States Item, Nov. 25, 1983, at § 1-19. As of March 1984, the reelection committee for President
Reagan had raised nearly $9 million and spent $6 million for a nomination which would be uncon-
tested. Reagan's Committee Is Spending Millions, New Orleans Times Picayune/States Item, Apr.
22, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
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our resources and bought one or two Senate seats and fifteen to
twenty House seats, and that's really good."72
The primary source of these monies was political action committees
("PACs"), the great majority representing American business interests.
PAC funding for the 1982 elections reached $85 million. 7 3 Another esti-
mated $160 million went to local races and related advertising and admin-
istration.674 There were 113 political action committees in 1972; there
were 3,149 by July 1982. 175 However dissimilar their points of view,
these groups have two features in common. They give money to political
candidates; they expect to get something in return.
They apparently get it. At the minimum, they are buying special access
to decisionmaking. In the words of Justin Dart of Dart Industries (which
has supported one of the largest business PACs), dialogue with politicians
"is a fine thing, but with a little money they hear you better. ' 67 6 Others
are more candid. In the words of a Congressman on the receiving end:
"You can't buy a Congressman for $5,000. But you can buy his vote. It's
done on a regular basis.'"67
672. Drew, supra note 660, at 68 (quoting Lee Atwater, deputy assistant to President Reagan in
1982).
673. Running with the PACs, supra note 667, at 20. PAC funding is projected at over $100
million in 1984. PAC Donations Reaching a Record, New Orleans Times Picayune/States Item, Oct.
8, 1983, at 5, col. 1. The National Association of Home Builders, for example, is creating a $4.7
million fund or "Build-PAC" in order "to elect a pro-housing, pro-business Senate and House." Id.
674. Running with the PACs, supra 660, at 20.
675. Id. By numbers, business PACs lead with 1497 committees; trade associations (such as the
National Association of Realtors) accounted for 658 PACs; labor unions followed with 350 PACs.
There are also over 600 single interest groups ranging from the Ukranian American PAC to the
Ocala (Florida) Firefighters. Id. at 21. By contributions, corporate PACs and trade associations ac-
counted for $54 million; labor for $20 million; the remaining interest groups $6 million. Id.
676. Drew, supra note 660, at 130. See also Running With the PACs, supra note 667, at 21
("There is no reason they [PACs] give money except in the expectation of votes.") (remarks of former
U.S. Representative William Brodhead of Michigan). The Grumman PAC Chairman is quoted as
saying: "We don't expect contracts because we gave someone $5000. But the likelihood of us getting in
to see the Congressman is much higher." Id. at 24. The business community is itself of two minds in
describing what it is buying through political contributions. While a BIPAC representative is quoted
as claiming that BIPAC has "changed the faces of a lot of members of Congress," the same represen-
tative also adds, without apparent irony, that "we of the business community are very upset about the
charge that members of Congress sell their votes. We of the business community have a very high
regard for members of Congress. We're appalled by that sort of talk." Drew, supra note 660, at 72.
One enterprising congressman has established a Speakers Club for which the membership cost is
$5000 a year per individual, $15,000 a year per PAC; when asked what members received in return,
he is reported as stating: "Access. Access. That's the name of the game. . . we sell the opportunity to
be heard." Id. at 94-95.
677. Running with the PACs, supra note 667, at 20 (quoting Rep. Thomas Downey of New
York). The record of special-interest legislation in recent years gives credence to these claims. Votes
have been taken on such wide-ranging subjects-each with its own economic interests and PACs-as
dairy price supports, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, COMMON CAUSE, Aug., 1982, at
11; used car dealers regulation, id.; mortgage interest rates, id.; clear air standards, id.; independent
oil producers, Politics and Money, Drew, supra note 660, at 80-81; regulation of dentists and doctors,
id. at 133; all savers certificates, id. at 87; and the application of antitrust laws to brewers, id. at 138.
The influence of special-interest PACs is not restricted to the U.S. Congress. The Mayor of Fresno,
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The scope of influence-and approaches to limit it-are more properly
studied elsewhere. 678 It is again the fact of this influence which is relevant
to proposals to limit public interest law. The wielders of this influence are
predominantly American corporations and their trade associations, the
same interests which happen to be financing, directing and benefitting
from the business PILFs.6 79 The effect of this influence is to remove non-
moneyed interests further from the political process.68 0 As Senator Robert
Dole has pointed out: "[T]here aren't any Poor PACs or Food Stamp
PACs or Nutrition PACs or Medicare PACs"681 ; if there were, "you
might get a different result. 68 2
In short, this is hardly a time to look with confidence to the non-judicial
branches of government to resolve the particularized challenges which the
traditional PILFs, representing noncorporate interests, are bringing before
the courts. The question is whether financial interests, having captured a
disproportionate share of the other two branches of government, should
now go unopposed in the third. As the Supreme Court observed even
before the rise of money in politics, "under the conditions of modern gov-
ernment, litigation may well be the sole practicable alternative open" to
adjust these grievances.68 '
California, has recently asserted that, "In California, the relationship between campaign contributors
and legislation is frightening and blatant . . . . When we [local officials] go to see legislators, it's
difficult to compete with all the moneyed interests." Panel: Cities Losing Influence, New Orleans
Times Picayune/States Item, Nov. 29, 1983, at 4 col. 2. The Fresno mayor is also reported to have
said that California legislators often admit publicly that their voting records are influenced by corpo-
rate donors to their political campaigns. Id. Yet money does not always prevail. See Epstein, Special-
Interest Bills Are Given Senate Beating," New Orleans Times-Picayune/The States-Item, Dec. 19,
1982, at 9 col. 3. The article begins: "The doctors were lacerated, the beer distributors punctured, the
shipping industry scuttled, the timber companies warped, and the National Football League sacked."
Id.
678. Fuller explanation of these topics can be found in Drew, supra note 660. Among other
conclusions in these sources is the recognition that, because PAC money and influence tends to sup-
port incumbents, there is little optimism that incumbent politicians will be motivated to vote for signif-
icant changes.
679. For example, one of the vice presidents of BIPAC, an influential business political action
committee, is J. Robert Fluor of the Fluor Corporation, who is chairman of the Capital Legal Foun-
dation, and a Director of NLCPI. Corporate interests have not only dominated the PAC arena but
also the more traditional lobbying activity in Washington, D.C. A three-year old organization entitled
the "Free the Eagle National Citizens Lobby" dedicated to "free market, free enterprise" legislation
led all Washington lobby groups in expenditures during 1983. New Conservative Group Was Top-
spending Lobby," New Orleans Times Picayune/States-Item, Nov. 27, 1983, at 4 col. 3.
680. One member of Congress has concluded: "We have a breakdown of constitutional democracy,
which is supposed to be based on citizen and constituency access." Government of, by and for the
PACs, COMMON CAUSE, Aug. 1982, at 16, 18 (quoting Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa). The
breakdown according to Leach, occurs to some extent because PAC money from out-of-state controls
the election, and affects the subsequent decisions, of state-wide candidates. Id.
681. Drew, supra note 660, at 147.
682. At the mercy of the Highest Bidder, Common Cause, Aug. 19, 1982, at 9.
683. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). The statement in full reads:
Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently
turn to the courts. Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal legislation during the
1930's, for example, no less is it true of the Negro minority today. And under the conditions of
modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to
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V. CONCLUSION
Pacific Legal Foundation is a public interest law firm in the same
way catsup is a vegetable under Reagan's new school lunch
guidelines. s
The purpose of this study has been to examine the activities of busi-
ness-sponsored public interest law firms against a background of long-
accepted concepts of charity and more recently developed concepts for the
practice of public interest law. It has not sought to derogate the contribu-
tions of business to American life. It has not denied the right of the Amer-
ican business community to advance its interests individually or collec-
tively, directly or through tax-exempt organizations, in courts of law. It
does suggest, however, that to qualify firms as public charities that are
funded and directed by business interests and that act substantially on
their behalf stretches the concepts of charity and public interest practice
beyond meaningful definition. And beyond the present standards for pub-
lic interest law.
The suggestion is not over-broad. It does not disqualify these firms
from eligibility under favorable tax-exempt categories other than section
501(c)(3). It does not speak to the desirability of tax deductions for litiga-
tion by corporate enterprises as necessary business expenses. Nor does it
question firms established by business interests which are intended to ad-
dress, and which do address in fact, dockets of issues unrelated to those
which affect the supporting corporations. Indeed, the suggestion here is so
narrow in scope as to raise the question: Why bother?
The answer, in this author's view, is one of credibility. It would be a
bit starry-eyed to consider the tax laws of the United States as ones carry-
ing a high degree of public confidence. One area in which the American
public obviously retains its confidence however, if voluntary contributions
are any measure, is the field of charity, an area almost uniquely defined
by our tax laws.6 85 In 1984, George Orwell's famous description of a
totalitarian society, one of the chief devices used to corrupt social values
was the corruption of language. Peace became a state of continuous war.
Truth-speak became lies. The corruption in this case is on less grand a
scale but it affects one of the redeeming values, public charity, of a natu-
rally self-interested world. If the public interest has a meaning, it is as a
petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-30 (footnotes omitted).
684. Gerber, The Pacific Legal Foundation: Its Goal is Deregulation, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1981, at
28 (quoting Robert L. Gnaizda, senior attorney, Public Advocates, Inc. of San Francisco, Cal).
685. Numerous states require registration for the operations of charities, and impose varying
levels of financial and reporting requirements. These states usually accept, however, federal recogni-
tion of charitable status which is, of course, provided under the federal Internal Revenue Code.
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value which transcends the places where private interests go. This is a
meaning worth preserving.
1545
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 1415, 1984
cnI L- I I I
t E- 0' '0 C4 %0 C> 0 -
r- c'q - - - - C'4 c
04 '0o~ M~ C14 - cn c
m- 'Ct cD tn CD r I
'0 0 0























Ln t \o cn I poLn
Public Interest Law Firms
Appendix II
Analysis of the the Business PILFs Under the IRS Guidelines:
An Economic Philosophy Meets the Economic Feasibility Test
The question of this study is whether the organizations described are engaged
in the practice of public interest law. In addressing this question, it was necessary
to consider the perspective of the business PILFs on the public-interest nature of
their litigation, to develop a method for researching their activities, and to develop
another for evaluating their cases (or those of any other PILF) under the policies
of the Internal Revenue Service.
I. RATIONALE FOR THE BUSINESS PILFs: DAVID AGAINST GOATH
The anti-business public interest law firms continually bombard the pub-
lic with the rhetoric that they are in an unequal battle with the robber
barons of "Big Business." They portray themselves as fighting for the poor
against tremendous odds, for obviously their "Big Business" opponent has
the money and power. They are particularly fond of posturing themselves as
David aligned against Goliath. The evaluation of the disparity in force is
correct, only the actors are mislabeled. The anti-business "public interest"
law firms are Goliath. "Business" is the David, but without his trusty sling
shot.
Presentation to the National Association of
Manufacturers by Raymond M. Momboisse, Managing
Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, 1981.1
The business PILFs respond, on one level, to the broadening role of the judici-
ary in American life. The earlier views of Lewis Powell were reflected more
recently by William French Smith, soon after his appointment as Attorney Gen-
eral, in a campaign against "judicial-activism" in such areas as abortion rights,
desegregation, antitrust, employment discrimination, and environmental protec-
tion.' As noted earlier, Attorney General Smith had nonetheless been instrumen-
1. R. Momboisse, Anti-Business Public Interest Law Firms vs. Private Enterprise-The Unequal
Struggle (speech to the National Association of Manufacturers Public Affairs Conference, Boca Ra-
ton, Fla., Jan. 16, 1981).
2. Speech of the Attorney General, (Oct. 29, 1981) reported in New Orleans Times-Picayune/
States-item, Oct. 30, 1982, at 1-3. The Attorney General added that the Justice Department would be
working to identify those key areas in which the courts might be convinced to desist from actual
policy-making so that "errors of the past might be corrected." The courts have assumed "greater
power of review over governmental action" in reaching decisions in these areas which they could avoid
altogether under judicial doctrines of "standing, ripeness, mootness and presence of a political ques-
tion." Conspicuously absent from the Attorney General's list of problem areas, were use of the judici-
ary to limit the employment of minorities, for example, or environmental protection, giving rise to the
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tal in the creation of the Pacific Legal Foundation, the most litigious of the busi-
ness PILFs.' Indeed, the business PILFs met the judicial dragon with a different
sword. Since the courts were involved, and were coming up with the wrong an-
swers, the need was not to remove courts from social questions but rather to use
them to change the answers. The business PILFs continue to decry judicial activ-
ism,4 characterized in their literature by their arch-nemisis, Ralph Nader. In
practice, however, they have enjoyed the frequent characterization as "Ralph
Naders of the Right."5
On another level, the business PILFs respond to the expanding role of govern-
ment in American life, and it is on this ground that they stake their broadest
philosophical claim. An army of government agencies, spawned in the 1930's and
re-activitated in the 1970's, was stifling American enterprise and freedoms. The
mission of the business PILFs is to remove an over-reaching government from the
nation's business.6 This rationale would support several of the more widely-
publicized actions of the business PILFs, including those to lift grazing restric-
tions on public lands,7 and to require administrative search warrants for OSHA
violations.8 Where government involvement will benefit industries with which
suspicion that the problem might not be so much with the concept of using the courts as it is with
what certain plaintiffs have been asking the courts to do.
3. See supra TAN 186.
4. See The Power of Our Judges: Are They Going Too Far? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19,
1976, at 29; Summary of Events in the Southeast Legal Foundation, June 1976 "There is a growing
awareness of the increasingly active role of the Courts in our Nation's affairs.") Consider also the
statements of Michael Horowitz, one of the foremost proponents of the business PILFs and currently
legal advisor to the Office of Management and Budget, reported in a recent interview with The Na-
tional Law Journal:
Mr. Horowitz has also involved himself in specific policy areas, including development of
block-grant proposals, civil rights and, most publicly, the role of attorneys inside and outside of
government. "If there is a fundamental override to what I look to do," he said, noting his
involvement in the debates over the Legal Services Corp. and attorney fees, "it is to get lawyers
out of the policy game." The expansion of legal "rights", he said, has masked an "undemo-
cratic" transfer of power to lawyers. Public interest lawyers, he added, "are not representing
clients, they're representing an ideology-and it happens to be the ideology of lawyers."
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 21.
5. See A Business Brand of Public Interest Law, supra note 455 (statements of Legal Director,
Pacific Legal Foundation); in addition, consider the discussion reported by Flaherty:
There is no more basic disagreement among the conservatives, however, than that of the whole
movement toward conservative public interest law. These conservative lawyers face a conun-
drum: Although they generally disapprove of judicial activism, they-like their liberal counter-
parts-are themselves working the courts for political ends.. . . There is, Mr. Popeo [of the
Washington Legal Foundation] admitted, something of a feeling of "throwing stones and being
in a glass house" in the pursuit of conservative public interest law. But, like Mr. Zumburn, he
takes a realistic position. "It's a fact of life," he said. "Judges are into every aspect of Ameri-
can life. We need a check on the radical left wing."
Flaherty, Right Wing Firms Pick Up Steam, Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1983, at 1, 27.
6. Id.
7. Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
8. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). This same rationale is, of course, also availa-
ble to the great majority of those traditional PILFs which have defended the rights of the poor, racial
minorities, or political extremists, against what they perceived to be an overreaching government, as
well as to those newer firms which have arisen and exist largely to litigate against governmental
highway, water resources, agriculture, and construction development programs. See, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River), 486 F.2d 946 (7th
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they are concerned, however, these firms have not been reluctant to litigate in
support of it. While the anti-big-government rationale is certainly present, there-
fore, it is not necessarily one which uniquely describes the business PILFs pro-
grams. Neither is it one which distinguishes the business PILF positions from
those of their corporate clients in anti-big-government litigation.
The rationale for the business PILFs most frequently offered in their literature
and most consistent with their activities is their role in defense of American busi-
ness itself. If the earlier PILFs had a common denominator, in this view, it was
in their role as the "principle legal adversary" to corporate America.10 They
sought to wrest "business control" from the owners and professional managers
and invest it in "socially conscious non-investors who will stress social ends rather
than efficiency and profits." ' Their litigation raised the price of American prod-
ucts, diverted investment capital to non-productive areas, and increased the cost of
development;" it "stopped development of housing, dams, energy and production
facilities."18 The business PILFs seek to offset these injuries. In so doing, they
are not merely imitating the efforts of their corporate allies. They are providing a
service to a public which the affected corporations cannot provide themselves. 4
Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), affd per curiam, 4 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir.), affd sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F.Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971), remanded sub noma. Sierra Club v. Butz, 3
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 1 20,292 (9th Cir. 1973). The silence of the business PILFs in
these latter, "anti-government" areas of litigation--except as intervenors and amid on behalf of the
government-sponsored development-again raises the suggestion that their opposition to "big govern-
ment" is a selective one, and depends largely upon whether they approve of what the government is
doing: whose ox is getting fed.
9. Consider the remarks of John B. Connally, former United States Secretary of the Treasury and
Governor of Texas, tracing the history of the business PILFs: "[A]nd businessmen became afraid to
stand up for what they believe. And this is a serious question in our country. I say this is a deplorable
state in a free society. But, that really is the genesis of why you have the kind of public interest law
I've been talking about." Remarks at the Second Annual J. Simon Fluor Memorial Award Honoring
the Associated General Contractors of America, Dec. 8, 1977 (brochure on file with author).
10. See M. Horowitz, The Public Interest Law Movement: An Analysis with Special Reference
to the Role and Practices of Conservative Public Interest Law Firms 11 (unpublished report 1980)
(cited with the permission of the author). "Cloaked in a justification of providing greater access to the
judicial system, these earlier firms were in fact movements of the left to socialize America." Id. at
12-14.
11. Momboisse, supra note 401, at 11.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., P. Rubin & E. Jordan, Business Oriented Legal Foundations: Who Needs Them?
An Economic Justification (unpublished manuscript 1981) (on file with author). The authors postu-
late that business PILFs can provide a counter-force to government regulatory attempts that might
prevail over weaker opposition and lead to economic inefficiencies. They offer three case studies in
support: Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), involving the need for an administrative
search warrant for OSHA inspections; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), involving
disclosure of corporate employment records relating to affirmative action; and Monsanto Co. v. Ken-
nedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979), involving the ban of potential carcinogens in plastic beverage
containers, The authors conclude that the participation by business PILFs as amicii curae in these
proceedings, raising issues relating to the impact of these proposals on the business community, led to
the defeat or modification of these proposals with resulting economic benefits to the entire business
community. In their contentions the authors make significant assumptions about the impact of amicus
briefs which are not shared by this writer. More to the point, however, they make no claim that the
business parties in the case were unable to present-or indeed did not present-these same issues.
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This rationale-the provision of representation beyond that available to corporate
America-goes to the heart of the business PILFs' eligibility for exemption under
§ 501(c)(3) and for this reason bears closer examination.
According to one business PILF leader, corporations are at a major disadvan-
tage in litigation against environmental, consumer or civil rights-oriented firms,
whose "uninvestigated" lawsuits are cheap to file and costly to defend. 5 Busi-
nesses are at a similar disadvantage in dealing with government agencies."6 They
cannot afford to monitor regulatory programs as opposing groups can. They can-
not develop expertise in toxics, labor, or the myriad laws which can be used
against them. They are victims of "sweetheart" suits between colluding environ-
mental groups, for example, and sympathetic government agencies which can re-
sult in quick, adverse decisions.
Moreover, corporations suffer tactical handicaps which limit their effectiveness
to represent the greater public interest. One is their bottom line, which is not to
vindicate legal principle but to maximize profits.11 Faced with protracted litiga-
tion or confrontation with an agency, their first instinct will be to compromise the
issue and win what they can. The other handicap is a corollary; everyone knows
that their profits are the bottom line. Everyone knows that it is not the public
interest. Businesses are simply not credible standard bearers for the larger social
issues inherent in their cases. They are at a major psychological disadvantage.
Pausing to reflect on these justifications, each tells but a part of a larger story.
It would be hard not to accept that much of public interest law-particularly that
on behalf of consumers, worker's safety and environmental protection-has been
directed at industry. (It has also been directed at government programs such as
welfare rights and prison reform which have little to do with industry.) The fact
that identified consumer interests inhere in the labeling of dangerous drugs or the
reduction of pollution, however, does not automatically mean that a counter-
vailing public interest, beyond that of the affected industries, lies in reduced label-
ing and increased pollution. Public concerns for consumer protection and clean
air arose because corporate bodies were uninterested in achieving them. Charity,
as it has come to be known, does not support what private business can and
arguably should do.
Turning to the rationales just offered, the question is the extent to which cor-
porations are genuinely at a disadvantage in this type of litigation. That public
The Chrysler and Monsanto Corporations had no difficulty retaining counsel: Barlow's action was
funded from the start by the American Conservative Union's "Stop OSHA" project, itself supported
by industry.
15. In the view of one senior attorney:
All too often the public interest has little or no proof of its charge; indeed, it has not even
bothered to investigate the facts prior to filing a complaint. Its rationale is that it can use
discovery to find the facts it needs, or shift the burden to business to disprove its wild charges
: ..[Business] costs are even greater when the charges it must refute are vague, emotional and
inflamatory-as they always are."
Momboisse, supra note 401, at 2.
16. Id. at 2.
17. This rationale and the one following is taken largely from id. at 3-7, and M. Horowitz, supra
note 10 at 25-30.
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interest lawsuits are inexpensive for plaintiffs, and "uninvestigated" is, at best,
undocumented, and one which ignores the some fundamentals of PILF life. Pub-
lic interest firms survive-absent a steady flow from corporate donors-on credi-
bility with foundations, members, the press, and the public. Few acts lose credi-
bility more quickly than a groundless charge. The reckless, desperate lawsuit is
far more likely to come from an ad hoc group formed to oppose a particular
industrial proposal-or from a competing industry-than it is from a public in-
terest firm. Nothing, furthermore, would scuttle a PILF budget more quickly
than the supposition that lawsuits are cheap. Any claim involving contested facts
will cost thousands of dollars at the trial level alone. For participating business
parties, every dollar is a write-off as a necessary business expense."' For a PILF,
every dollar must be raised. Less than thirty percent of the time of public interest
lawyers is spent on matters relating to administrative hearings and litigation, and
only a small fraction of that in litigation against specific businesses. 19 In two of
the most active areas of public interest litigation, for example-consumer and
environmental protection-it would be hard to find any significant number of
PILF cases filed against corporate defendants;20 complaints are normally filed
instead against government programs, or government regulation of a line of in-
dustry.2 However examined, the spectre of cheap and wilful lawsuits simply does
not conform to the reality of public interest law.
It seems no more persuasive that businesses are at a disadvantage in dealing
with government agencies. The two major industries in Washington, D.C., are
the government and the private bar, and the major industry of the private bar is
to monitor the activities of government. The law firms of Washington do not
monitor these activities for Mexican-American minorities or the proponents of
solar energy. They monitor them for corporate clients and, in so doing, they read
the Federal Register, follow agency rulemakings, and initiate more than a few
actions of their own.22 While it is true that corporate counsel headquartered in
other parts of the country may not be able to specialize in the activities of govern-
ment, that is precisely why the Washington firms flourish, and represent, and
send information alerts out to corporate clients nationwide. That is also why the
section 501(c)(6) trade associations exist, why they have made Washington the
trade association capital of the country, and why they hire counsel to specialize in
the field. As for "sweetheart" litigation, collusion between the government and a
18. See supra note 141.
19. J. Fleishman, The Criticism of Public Interest Law: Some Rebuttals 51 (unpublished manu-
script 1980) (cited with permission of the author).
20. Indeed, some public interest practitioners fault their field for not aggressively pursuing legal
action against individual business, and relying instead on suits to strengthen government regulating
programs. One relatively new organization, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, has been established to
test this premise, and develop theories of civil actions against corporate defendants. See Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice (undated brochure on file with author).
21. This pattern reflects the thesis that cases against individual businesses are the least cost-
effective way of achieving reform.
22. According to a report of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, there is often no non-
industry participation in many federal agency proceedings affecting large segments of the public. 3
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON Gov. AFFAIRS. 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGu-
LATIONS 12-22 (Comm. Print 1977).
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friendly plaintiff, it cannot be seriously maintained that, given the regular in-
terchange of personnel among industries, the government agencies which regulate
them, and the Washington firms which represent them, the chances for "sweet-
heart" decisions are not greatly in favor of business.2" Indeed, the thrust of the
court opinions which first provided public interest access to agency decisionmak-
ing was expressly to break up the "sweetheart" status quo.24
The business PILF rationale then boils down to the alleged handicap of the
corporate image, and its "bottom line." It is possible that a business may compro-
mise where a business PILF would not-more possible in theory, however, than
in practice. Compromise is not a factor, for example, in those cases where a busi-
ness PILF appears as amicus curiae to a case in progress. Should the industry
compromise, the amicus brief is moot; should it go to judgment, the amicus brief
can travel no further. Nor is compromise a factor where the business PILF un-
dertakes to represent directly the business involved. If the client settles, so does
the business PILF. Nor is compromise a major consideration when business
plaintiffs are suing, for example, to challenge pollution control standards or re-
strictions on their access to mineral resources-some of the most common types of
litigation in which the business PILFs are found. There is seldom much room
here for compromise, and in practice the affected industries have stayed the
course. Even where the business is involved as a defendant, a compromise is con-
siderably more likely for a Ma-and-Pa grocery than for the AMAX corporation,
with ample reserves of its own. The compromise rationale, then, appears to be
viable only with respect to those few cases in which a business PILF either takes
a "high road" legal position unavailable to corporate interests, or intervenes to
support a defendant business which lacks the resources or the will to defend its
interest fully. These are not major pieces of the business PILF's universe. Indeed,
one is hard to put to find cases where a business PILF is litigating to uphold a
standard which a corporate ally has abandoned. More often the corporation will
have chosen to stay out entirely, and to let the PILF carry the ball. This posture,
however, is no matter of compromise; it is, simply, corporate litigation through a
tax-exempt surrogate.
Lastly, then, we are left with the "psychological disadvantage" of businesses as
advocates in their dealings with government and the courts. Thus, the argument
runs, the rights of AMAX to mine in a wilderness area would be a proper subject
for its retained counsel, but the broader question of "locking up" this country's
strategic mineral resources is more suited to a business PILF. The strategic min-
erals imperative will not receive as much credence as it would were it to come
from a group less financially-involved than AMAX. This rationale is not offered
23. J. Fleishman, supra note 19, at 21. For an added dimension on "sweetheart" decisionmaking,
see Students in Law School Raise Collusion Issue in Watt Wilderness Decision, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1981, at A22, col. 1. The alleged collusion concerned a Pacific Legal Foundation lawsuit to open a
wilderness area to oil and gas exploration. Pacifies action against the Department of Interior was
allegedly invited by the Department's Solicitor. Pacific reportedly later wrote a "confidential" letter to
the Justice Department complaining of Interior's failure to help Pacific in the case by "building a
record" or by "limiting the intervention of environmental groups."
24. See supra p. 1442.
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without a certain cynicism. As a Pacific Legal Foundation official explained in a
1975 interview, "there isn't a corporation in the U.S. that can effectively advocate
a public interest position. They're discredited as being self-serving. That's part of
why we exist."2 The interviewer continued: "And he [the PLF official] notes
with a smile, as he picks up the phone to solicit another contribution, 'We're
going to have to live with being called the 'front."'
Cynicism aside, the difficulty in accepting this last rationale is that it rational-
izes too much. In the private practice of law, counsel regularly invoke, indeed as
regularly as possible, public policy on behalf of their clients. It is no trick to
characterize the position of virtually any corporation as safeguarding some larger
right-lower prices (if prices will fall), resource conservation (if the prices will
rise instead), free enterprise or "corporate due process.""8 This is not to assert
that business PILFs have not injected original and unrepresented issues into cases
involving business interests. It does suggest that clothing an issue in opposition to
"oppressive government," in the Constitution, or in the folds of the American flag
does not, by itself, require the entry of tax-exempt counsel. If it means anything,
the "public interest" means "not private." It does not mean "private-but-it-
would-sound-better-coming-from-you." The task becomes to identify those cases
where public interest law is adding a non-private point of view.
II. METHODS OF RESEARCH
This study began in August 1981 and continued to January 1984. It incorpo-
rates all relevant information discovered on the business PILF actions. It attempts
to apply the IRS standards to them in the most objective way possible. To appre-
ciate its limitations, however, one should understand the ways in which the infor-
mation was gathered and applied.
A. The Dockets
The threshold difficulty in assembling dockets of the business PILFs was sim-
ply in locating their cases. No business PILF publishes a complete docket of its
legal actions."7 The starting points were their newsletters and annual reports,
which tended to reflect the most current activities. These reports also tended to be
selective, highlighting cases which showed a positive result, and somewhat exag-
25. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 43.
26. The Mountain States Legal Foundation for example has characterized its interest in a law
suit over the division of water between agricultural businesses, with whom MSLF sided, and an
Indian tribe as follows:
Issue-Are individuals subject to the whims of government in the enjoyment of their rights and
may those rights be taken away or reduced whenever the government so decides?
Brief of MSLF as Amicus Curiae before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Truckee Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981), modified, 666
F.2d 351 (1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
27. For some time, the National Legal Center in the Public Interest published a docket and news-
letter featuring the cases of its associated business PILFs. See, e.g., NLCPI, Legal Activities Report-
ers, no. 1, Summer 1981; 5 NLCPI, National Legal Center News; 7 NLCPI, NEwsLETTr no. 1,
Mar. 1981. This service was apparently terminated in 1981.
1553
The Yale Law Journal
gerated, characterizing PILF comments submitted in informal administrative pro-
ceedings, for example, as ones in which the firm "intervened" or won a "legal
victory." 28
Resort was then made to Schedule A of the firm's annual federal income tax
return, IRS Form 990, which should contain a statement of all proceedings en-
tered and the PILF's interest in the matter. Unfortunately, the IRS was not able
to provide complete Schedule A's for several of the business PILFs.2' Those ob-
tained required translation. The Schedule A dockets, like the newsletters, referred
to some events which were simply not legal proceedings. They reflected others on
which no reported decision had been reached, and which therefore could not be
examined without resort to local courts and the pleadings of the parties. In some
instances, no local tribunal could be found. More than a few cases were appar-
ently handled by cooperating counsel in private practice and, when located, bore
no mention of the PILF. Even the fullest Schedule A listings, as those of the
newsletters, were often captioned differently from those in the available case re-
porters. Cases were verified where possible through the Westlaw and Lexis com-
puter systems. Eventually, searches were made for cases in which a PILF was
listed as a litigant, those in which a PILF attorney appeared, and, for some, those
in which a PILF was mentioned in any way.30
Another challenge was to identify the role a firm had taken in an identified
case. Where the PILF was a named plaintiff or intervenor the positions were
plain. A number of opinions however contained no mention of the PILF, al-
though listed in the PILF's literature. Here the PILF's statement of interest on
its Form 990 or newsletter provided the best indication. Amicus briefs presented a
special problem, for it was important to know not only what side a PILF had
taken but also what rationale it was presenting to the court on its interest and the
merits. For cases in which amicus briefs were submitted to the Supreme Court,
briefs were available and provided the best evidence. For lower court appearances
resort was again made to PILF press releases, newsletters, Schedule A's, and on
occasion to attorneys who had participated in the litigation.
In all, a two-year effort was made to identify the full range of business PILF
legal actions. Cases nonetheless may have been missed. Nuances of positions
28. This is not to deny the effectiveness of participating in agency decisionmaking, the backbone
of Washington, D.C., administrative practice. A well-placed word may often avoid an expensive law-
suit. The point here is simply that, in attempting to identify formal adjudicatory proceedings involving
these PILFs, the newsletter was not a fully reliable source.
29. It required more than one year, from the time of filing a request for this information under
the Freedom of Information Act, to receive of Form 990's on the business PILFs examined in this
study. Even then, the forms for recent years for certain of the firms were simply unavailable. I would
like to express my thanks to the IRS Freedom of Information Office in Washington, D.C., which at
last broke the impasse and provided the information available.
30. It should be mentioned, lest it appear that the obvious was overlooked, that while the business
PILFs were, with two exceptions, cooperative in sending copies of their newsletters and reports, they
were less than helpful in responding to requests for more comprehensive dockets or for citations to
cases referred to in their reports which proved difficult to locate. This statement is not made to dero-
gate these firms, whose confidentiality beyond that required by the IRS is fully their privilege, but
only to explain the need to look to secondary sources. The Pacific Legal Foundation did, however,
provide specific citations upon request, which the author would like to acknowledge with appreciation.
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within cases may have been missed. None were missed intentionally, however,
and it is as likely that an overlooked proceeding, or financial interest behind it,
would have reflected unfavorably on a firm as favorably. As a matter of statistics,
these omissions may well have worked in a firm's favor.
B. Inside Interest
A central tenet of charitable activity is that it not inure to the private benefit of
major donors or decisionmakers.3 ' Private donors to a public interest law firm,
like donors to any § 501(c)(3) charity, are not a matter of public record.3 2 Refer-
ence was made to quoted statements by PILF leaders on their major contributors,
and to those rare documents which came to light in which the organization chose
to list its contributors more comprehensively. 3 Corporate donations, even those
involving thousands of dollars, remained, however, substantially undisclosed.
Moreover, corporations may give to a firm in several ways: through a separate
corporate foundation, though individual officers, or through the public informa-
tion or other operating budget categories of the corporation.34 Donations by the
corporate foundation will be publicly available not through the records of a PILF
but rather those of the foundation. The catch here is that one must know which
foundations to look for, and be prepared to sift through haystacks of material for
possible needles. For the other two methods of corporate contribution-through
officers and operating budget categories-there are not even haystacks available.
No full picture can be drawn, then, of direct and continuing subsidies from spe-
cific corporations, their officers, and their foundations.35
Identification of the financial interests represented on business PILF boards
and litigating committees was a somewhat easier task. Newsletters and annual
reports often listed major corporate positions held by members of boards of direc-
tors. As these listings might not reflect additional financial interests, a check was
made through the Standard and Poors' directory3 for other corporate interests of
these same individuals. Litigation committee members were researched through
31. See supra p. 1427.
32. I.R.C. § 6033 (1982) requires an annual return from most § 501(c)(3) organizations, includ-
ing public interest law firms. Form 990, "Return Of Organization Exempt From Income Tax," im-
plements this section. Contributors of less than two percent of an organization's gross revenue are not
required to be disclosed. Under I.R.C. § 6104(b), Form 990 information is generally made available
for public inspection. The same section, however, does not authorize the Secretary to disclose the
names of contributors, other than private foundations, to an exempt organization. I.R.C. § 6104(b)
(1982). Thus, while the IRS has limited access to the names of individual donors contributing more
than two percent of a PILF's annual revenue (a rather high threshold for determining the possibility
of influence), this information is not publicly available.
33. For example, in 1978, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, in seeking a grant from a
private foundation, provided a lengthy list of "contributors of $250 or more." See supra TAN 306.
This application provided insight to the nature of funding for this PILF, and of the business interests
which could influence its case selection.
34. These alternative methods of providing corporate money to a business PILF may render even
the information disclosed only to the IRS-donors above 2% of the gross income-substantially in-
complete. See supra note 34.
35. See Colwell Report, supra note 171.
36. STANDARD & PooRs, REGISTER (1982).
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Martindale-Hubbell3 7 for illustrative clients. As is apparent, neither source gave
complete information. Major stock interests of board members and their corporate
subsidiaries, for example, remained unidentified, as did the investment interest of
their banks and insurance companies. Major clients, perhaps the exclusive clients,
of litigation committee decision-makers were doubtless missed.38
It remained to divine the connection between an insider interest, once identi-
fied, and a PILF lawsuit. Without being privy to the actual circumstances of
major contributions to these PILs, or to the actual decisions through which cases
were selected, no conclusions could be reached with certainty that improper influ-
ence had indeed taken place. On the other hand, the circumstances of some cases
were so suggestive of influence that they could not be ignored. Where a specific
corporation could be identified as a major donor, or as managed or directed by a
PILF board member, or as a client of a litigation committee member, and that
same corporation was involved in the PILF case in question, the assumption was
made that the occurrenc was more than coincidental, that a relationship existed
between the corporation and the case of exactly the type the IRS seeks to prevent.
The firm's action was rated invalid on this ground. Where the interests of a more
general business community were involved in a given case, and representatives of
those interests were found among donors or decisionmakers, a question of less
direct inurement arose and the entry was, without more, rated questionable.
When all is said and done, the picture of the inside interests potentially affect-
ing the decisions of the business PILFs remains largely incomplete, and in all
likelihood understated. It should be noted that where such a close connection to a
private interest could be traced, the PILF cases would have likely failed the ade-
quate-representation-by-the-private-bar criterion as well. The private inurement
inquiry, then, added few new instances of deviations from the IRS guidelines.
Rather it provided a hard core of those which were most flagrant. In this category
particularly, the incompleteness of the information available can only have fa-
vored the examined firm.
C. Evaluation
The findings on private inurement and adequacy-of-private-representation
were captured on a matrix for each case, for each firm. The matrix identified the
parties and counsel in a case, the financial interests in it or benefitting directly
from it, and the issues raised. Where there were no financial interests directly at
stake, the inquiry went no further; the appearance was assumed valid. Where the
37. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, LAW DIRECrORY (1983).
38. Additionally, no attempt was made to trace fully the financial interests in these cases to the
Boards of companion PILFs in the NLCPI group. PLF, for example, has intervened on the side of
Monsanto and the American Can Company, see supra p. 1469; Monsanto has been well represented
in GPLF, see supra p. 1492; while American Can has been represented on the Board of NELF.
MATLF has appeared in support of ELI Lilly and Co., see supra p. 1496; the Lilly Foundation has
been a major donor to other business PILFs, see supra note 418. The suspicion that these NLCPI
firms talk to each other seems a permissable one. Were they treated collectively-which, given the
NLCPI umbrella, would not be unreasonable-the number of identifiable "insider beneficiaries"
would greatly increase.
1556
Vol. 93: 1415, 1984
Public Interest Law Firms
case involved direct financial beneficiaries, and the PILF's offerings paralleled
those represented by, or available to, counsel for those interests, the entry was
rated invalid. Calls too close to make, or which raised substantial doubts un-
resolvable on the basis of the information available, were rated as questionable.
Cases with insufficient information even to identify the issues were simply not
included in the ratings. As an internal check on the rating process, each case was
dicussed and rated by the author and at least two student researchers involved.
Any difference of opinion led to the selection of the more favorable rating, i.e.,
from "invalid" to "questionable," or from "questionable" to valid." The intention
throughout this process-the development of objective criteria, their application in
a disclosed fashion, and the resolution of differences among researchers in favor of
a PILF-was to reduce subjectivity to a minimum. It is the same approach one
would expect an IRS examiner to adopt in evaluating these same actions under
its principles of public interest law.
III. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION
Evaluation of the PILF dockets relied on two IRS policies for charitable activ-
ity and the practice of public interest law: that PILF cases not inure to the bene-
fit of insiders, and that their issues not be feasible for representation by the pri-
vate bar. The inurement standard is straight forward; its difficulty lies in
uncovering the interests inside. The commercial feasibility standard is more com-
plex. Questions arise over how large the commercial stakes must be, how well-
organized, and how directly involved in the subject of the case.
Consider, for example, a suit challenging EPA water quality standards for the
mining industry. Assume that the "Central States Legal Foundation" ("CSLF")
brings action on behalf of several named mining corporations. The financial in-
terests are identified. The guidelines seem clearly to require-if they are to re-
quire anything at all-that these companies retain their own private counsel.
Would it have made a difference, however, had CSLF sued initially on its own
behalf, and been subsequently joined by the mining companies as plaintiff-
intervenors?
Suppose, to broaden the picture, that the mining companies had sued directly
and it is CSLF which intervenes as party-plaintiff. Does it make a difference
whether CSLF intervenes (a) on behalf of other mining companies, (b) on behalf
of one small enterprise on the verge of bankruptcy, (c) on behalf of a non-profit
business league in which mining interests are members, or (d) on behalf of itself
and its "members"?
Suppose once more, for an even fuller picture, that the suit is brought by an
environmental group challenging the water quality standard as unlawfully lax.
CSLF intervenes on the side of EPA. Is CSLF's position already represented in
the lawsuit, within the meaning of the guidelines? Does it matter on whose be-
half CSLF is intervening? Does it matter that the legal issues CSLF raises are
identical to, or distinctly different from, those already in the case?
These questions go to the heart of public interest law because, unless they can
be answered in a rational and objective way, there is in effect no operational test
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for the practice at all. The IRS guidelines do not reach this level of detail. From
the philosophy behind them and the specifics they do offer, however, an approach
can be developed for answering these questions with fair consistency on a case-
by-case basis.
To recapitulate, the Internal Revenue Service rejected years ago, and after an
intensive examination of the subject, attempts to judge public interest litigation on
the basis of a "public" goal.3 9 Excepting those extraordinary (and thus far imagi-
nary) programs which might be directed towards disrupting the legal system it-
self, the purposes of the action are irrelevant.4 0 Access, bringing an otherwise
unrepresented position before the courts, is the good. Access is, at bottom, a finan-
cial test."' Does anyone have "a sufficient economic interest to warrant his bear-
ing the cost of retaining private counsel"? The answer for any given case requires
a more finely-tuned consideration of this interest.'
2
A. The Economic Inteiest
Whether "anyone can pay" depends often on how far one looks, or does not
look, to find him. The guidelines could be said in this regard to look either to:
1. The interests of a PILF's clients in the case, such as one where
CSLF represents the individual mining companies; or
2. The interests of other parties in the case, such as those same compa-
nies in the role of original plaintiffs or plaintiff-intervenors; or
3. Those economic interests benefitted directly by CSLF's position in
the case although not parties to the litigation.
While the first class is the one most clearly implicated, the guidelines should be
interpreted to include all three. 3 Economic interests in mining or any other busi-
39. See supra pp. 1443-51.
40. See Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153 (charitability rests not upon particular positions
advocated by firm, but upon provision of facility for resolution of issues of broad public importance).
41.
In the typical public interest case, no individual plaintiff has a sufficient economic interest to
warrant his bearing the cost of retaining private counsel .... This lack of economic feasibility
in public interest cases is an essential characteristic distinguishing the work of public interest
law firms from that of private firms and is a prerequisite of charitable recognition.
Id.
42. Important to this answer is the evolution of the IRS guidance itself. The original guidelines,
read narrowly and literally, could be interpreted to prohibit only PILF direct representation of liti-
gants in actions between private persons "where their financial interests at stake would warrant rep-
resentation from private legal sources." Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576 (emphasis added).
The subsequent revenue rulings substantially expand upon this requirement however, and do not
restrict the "economic interest" on which they focus to actual litigants in a proceeding.
43. The discussion which follows treats "interests" as issues presented in a case under considera-
tion. It does not make a distinction between a PILF which is raising the issue on its own behalf and
one raising the issue on behalf of a group of "clients." The discovery of a live body or a group of
individuals concerned with a problem will be persuasive for purposes of standing, and perhaps per-
suasive on the merits in a tactical sense, but it has little bearing on the public law question: whether
this stated interest is necessarily different from those of persons who are financing, or who obviously
could be financing, the case. Finding a poverty candidate for a lead plaintiff is a sound tactical ma-
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ness are no less able to conduct litigation on their own behalf because by good
fortune, or by design, someone else sued first. Their ability to litigate has not
changed. When CSLF sues to invalidate water quality standards for mining oper-
ations, or the Mountain States Legal Foundation sues to open wilderness areas
for mineral exploration, who would contend that AMAX could not have found
someone in private practice to do the same? This said, actual participation in a
proceeding by the benefitted interests is indeed a helpful factor. Their very pres-
ence proves the existence of the interests on which the guidelines hinge. Their
absence, however, does not disprove it. The interests may still be there, in some
cases quite plainly, in others too inconclusively to call. The point simply is that
one is required to look for these interests beyond the four corners of the
pleadings.
If an economic interest is present, in the case or in the wings, the next consid-
eration is a rule of reason. How substantial is it? Any potential public interest
action-transportation access for paraplegics, schedules for listing toxic sub-
stances-will have, at some far stretch of the causal chain, entities which may
benefit financially. There are people who make lifts for wheelchairs. There are
people who sell bottled drinking water. These interests are however, it is submit-
ted, on a distinctly different scale from, say, Exxon's interest in off-shore oil ex-
ploration or that of General Electric in nuclear reactor licensing. For purposes of
the guidelines, and to err in favor of the charitable exemption, the economic inter-
est should be major and centralized, not diffuse.4 As a general rule unless such
an interest leaps out from the case, it should not be determinative.
B. The Benefit
A second and closely related inquiry asks how directly or indirectly the eco-
nomic benefit is conferred. Again, the call involves a degree of common sense. An
action participated in by commercial river outfitters for example, seeking to up-
grade federal water quality standards, would flag the outfitters as an economic
interest. Their benefit is indirect at best, however, both because of the generalized
nature of the lawsuit (nationwide standards) and its uncertain profitability to
them (upgraded standards, leading to upgraded water quality, leading to in-
creased public enjoyment of rivers, leading to increased demand for river outfit-
ting generally, leading to increased revenue). The chain of dominoes is simply too
long. Narrow the focus to the quality of a particular river and to litigation by
particular commercial outfitters along it, and the benefit conferred becomes more
direct, although its economic impact may be still open to question. Shift the focus
on that same stretch to outfitters suing for greater commercial access to the river,
and the benefit comes on an inescapably straight line. As a rule of thumb, the
question here is whether the benefit is so direct that it could motivate a reasona-
neuver; it does not necessarily transform private-interest litigation into public-interest litigation. Cf
Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. "Even if the community as a whole has a significant cummulative economic interest, individ-
ual interests are generally so varied and diffused that it is not practical to rely upon collective financ-
ing of such [public interest] cases." Id.
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ble person so situated to sue. If so, and if under the first test the interest is suffi-
ciently "major," then the litigation begins to look quite "feasible" for the private
bar.
C. Hard Cases and the Search for Flexibility
The above approach may be critized as unduly mechanistic, and unreasonably
exclusive. Is it fair to say every time there is a private interest in litigation that a
separate, public interest may not also be present and in need of a voice? Do not
the above steps lead to the removal of public interest law firms from public inter-
est cases of major economic importance?
There is but one way to answer these questions: carefully. There are a range
of interests in all economic litigation. There are, arguably, public interests in
every lawsuit ever filed: the public interest in deterring negligent driving on the
highways (by awarding qne's client a generous recovery), and the converse public
interest in maintaining affordable insurance premiums (by keeping the award in
this case to a minimum). The Service has thrown its hands up in despair, as
would anyone, in sorting out the "real" public interests here on the basis of their
articulated philosophy-and resorted instead to the access-economic feasibility
standard. Any approach that would judge the "public" quality of a PILF's posi-
tion, even as an exception, threatens to erode the standard and with it the very
definition of the exempt class.
There are, this caveat notwithstanding, some hard cases to be faced. Litigation
pregnant with commercial interests may affect the rights of the poor, of minori-
ties, or of even more inchoate societal groups. One corporation may challenge the
siting approval for another's facility on a coastal estuary: Inherent in the case are
issues affecting endangered species which have no major economic base. These
issues are potentially capable of being raised by the corporate private litigants; on
the other hand, neither has a stake in their outcome except as they affect the
decision as to which one gets the site. What is best for the health of the ecosystem,
and what the law may call for (perhaps no siting at that location at all) may be
points neither side is willing to press. Thus the analysis begs for some flexibility
in the economic feasibility test, a "feasible-but-separate-interests" exception.
The challenge in acknowledging such an exception is in limiting it before it
swallows the rule, and in applying it in an objective way. Everyone's interest is
arguably "separate." Which should be allowed for PILFs, even though well-
financed private interests could also have raised them?"
The answer can be more easily approached in reverse: which should not? The
most obvious candidate for disqualification here happens to be one frequently
offered by business PILFs as their "separate" interest in litigation: the values of
the free enterprise system. Throughout this analysis, the value of free enterprise
is taken as a given. The question is whether it is a sufficiently separate rationale
45. The interest required here is similar to that required for intervention of right in the federal
system, FED R. Civ. P. 24(a), but with an important difference. The Federal Rules require only that
the interest not be adequately represented by existing parties; see also infra note 53. The IRS guide-
lines require in addition that the interest not be economically feasible for the private bar.
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to acknowledge as an exception to the rule against undertaking cases which well-
financed interests can handle on their own. In this instance, it would be hard to
find a more identical rationale and one more easily represented by corporate liti-
gants. This is not to say that in a given case raising economic issues, the position
of a PILF might not be sufficiently distinct to be considered an exception. It is to
say that the distinction must be based on more than PILF's statement of economic
philosophy, no matter how genuinely and vigorously held."'
More difficult are the sometimes-encountered rationales of protecting "con-
sumer interests" though alleged lower prices, or the creation of jobs by removing
restraints on mining, or leasing, or pollution, or simply the promotion of business
and industrial growth. 47 These justifications present the same problems of scope
as "free enterprise": They justify support of any economic interest, no matter
how capable it is of obtaining private representation, no matter how well repre-
sented in fact in the case at hand. For the guidelines to draw any line at all, this
type of exception must require that the "consumer" or "jobs" interest be different
in kind from that of the corporations with a stake in the litigation. It is one thing,
and probably a valid public interest undertaking, for consumers to bring suit for a
rebate of a utility over-charge; no business PILF has yet brought such an action.
It is quite another for a PILF to defend the utility on the grounds that the rebate
sought will harm consumers through higher rates. The latter argument is eco-
nomically feasible for the utility.
These untenable rationales noted, it should remain possible for a PILF to
bring or enter litigation alongside economic interests, raising issues distinctly sep-
arate from those who would gain or lose economically from the suit. The impacts
of rate changes on low-income consumers, on the elderly, or the unemployed
would be examples. Public access to an area proposed to be restricted as wilder-
ness might be another.4'8 The possibilities admit of no boundary fixed in advance.
Where identified, they will constitute a relief value to a letter-strict application of
the economic feasibility test. To qualify for such an exception, the burden should
rest fully on the PILF to show that its interest was different on more than philo-
sophical grounds from those who stand to benefit financially from the case, and
was different in more than the class of individuals it claimed to represent. The
PILF must define the difference in the nature of the claim it raised, the relief it
sought, and the concerns it brought to bear on the proceeding. The economic
46. Subject to the same fate come those rationales which depend entirely on the financial success
of the litigating economic interest: safeguarding the rights of Americans to "energy abundance" or to
"low energy prices," for example. The litigating corporations may pass these benefits on to members
of the general public if they prevail in the case, but this does not change their primarily private
character. These are the kinds of arguments which Mobil Oil and General Electric can be expected to
make forcefully on their own. They do not require a public subsidy for another spokesman.
47. This discussion assumes that the PILF may fairly be said to represent the interests of consum-
ers and the unemployed. With the business PILFs this is certainly not a settled proposition.
48. It is one thing to bring or join litigation on such a basis. It is another for a PILF to use it as
for representing commercial access interests. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Dickerson, cited in
MSLF, Income Tax Return for 1981, Form 990, Schedule 6 (firm filed suit for commercial rafting
organizations to open Colorado River through the Grand Canyon to increased commercial use). In
this case, the guidelines lead to a finding that the representation is invalid.
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feasibility test creates an all-but-irrebuttable presumption. For an exception to be
made, it must be clear that here is something significant which otherwise this case
would not have seen.
D. Amicus Appearances: A Looser Standard
Examination of the history of the IRS guidelines shows that entries by PILFs
as amicus curiae were to be given greater latitude. In cases involving economic
interests, it could be appropriate for a PILF to present amicus briefs for other,
unrepresented segments of society.49 Even in cases between purely private parties,
"the organization may serve in the nature of a friend of the court." 50
This latitude notwithstanding, there must be a baseline which gives even these
tax-exempt expenditures a public interest character lest public interest law firms
become amicus mills for the most powerful economic interests in the country. For
purposes of this study, amicus briefs which failed the economic feasibility
test-that is to say presented issues which well-financed interests could have
presented in the same litigation-were examined further to see if the brief
presented the perspective of a genuinely (1) separate and separately affected, (2)
unrepresented segment of the public (3) which the PILF could be fairly said to
represent. Even this screen has its loopholes. Accepting briefs on this basis en-
courages a kind of "client-shopping" for a public-if not an issue-through
which a PILF will appear at industry's side to say, "me too." This risk, however,
all but required by guidelines' distinction in favor of amicus briefs. It also seems
justified by the nature of amicus briefs themselves: given their minimal impact on
litigation generally, it is doubtful that the effort to limit them, or to produce them
for that matter, is worth the candle. 1
E. Government Interests and the Public Interest
Government participation in a lawsuit raises another question for PILFs. It
can be argued that with government counsel before the court there is no need for
additional public interest representation on that side of the case." On the other
hand, the government can be seen to represent many publics, many more than
may be represented by an intervening PILF interested in relief tailored to its
49. Senate Hearings, supra main text note 18, at 26-27.
50. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576.
51. The test for amicus briefs, even expanded in this fashion, did weed out several appearances as
not meeting either the "different issue" or the "different public" test. A business PILF might claim,
in a case involving an industrial challenge to an EPA standard or an OSHA regulation, for example,
that its concern was not that of the automobile maker but rather that of the "industry generally."
Claims of the business community are more properly made by § 501(c)(6) trade associations or chain-
bers of commerce. Similarly, the PILF might identify its special interest as "efficiency in govern-
ment," or the "proper implementation of laws"; neither of these, it is submitted, represent the type of
separate public interest qualified under the Service's philosophy for amicus appearances.
52. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141 (1st Cir. 1982) (environmental
organization may not intervene of right to defend constitutionality of challenged state statute where
state attorney general was already committed to defending statute). It should be noted, however, that
the organization's motion to intervene in this case was untimely filed.
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constituency. 83 The presence of government does not preclude the existence of
public interests." As important, its involvement does not make them private ones.
The most logical approach then for cases involving the government, is to consider
it a neutral factor, and to look to the economic interests in the case separately to
see whether they should or should not have precluded the entry of a PILF. Con-
sider, for example, a case involving governments on both sides, a challenge by the
State of California to an accelerated federal oil-leasing schedule on its coasts.
PILFs intervene on both sides, to support and to oppose the accelerated schedule.
For those in support, there is a fairly obvious financial interest on that side of the
question, made more obvious by the presence, say, of ARCO, Exxon and other oil
corporations as additional intervenors. For those in opposition, the financial inter-
ests are, although arguable (wealthy coastal homeowners, marinas, perhaps), at
best more diffuse. For either side, it is the nature of these private economic inter-
ests, not the government interests, which should determine the validity of the
PILF's involvement.
F. The "Substantiality" Test: The Ultimate Safety Valve
It should be remembered that there is a final relief mechanism to the applica-
tion of any such criteria at the end of the process, in the Service's "substantially"
test.5 5 As earlier described, no single case or group of cases for any PILF with a
sizable docket will lead to its disqualification as a section 501(c) (3) charity.
There is too much play in the system and its implementing regulations. A PILF
will have to have led a notably private parade before the Service will call it to a
halt. If then.
53. Cf Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). There, the National
Audubon Society was allowed to intervene on the side of the Secretary of Interior in defending against
a suit filed to enjoin creation of the Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area in Idaho.
Reversing denial of intervention by the district court, Judge Schroeder stated:
In assessing the adequacy of the Interior Secretary's representation, we consider several fac-
tors, including whether the Secretary will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments,
whether the Secretary is capable of and willing to make such arguments, and whether the
intervenor offers a necessary element to the proceedings that would be neglected. In addition
to having expertise apart from that of the Secretary, the intervenor offers a perspective which
differs materially from that of the present parties to this litigation. Secretary Andrus is no
longer Secretary of the Interior. His successor, Secretary Watt, was previously head of the
Mountain States Legal Foundation, the organization which is representing the plaintiff Sage-
brush Rebellion in this action. These facts support intervention and also give rise to appellant's
sobriquet for the case as Watt v. Wall."
Id. at 528.
54. The distinction between representing commercial interests and representing those of a govern-
ment entity is one with which PILFs of all stripes would probably agree. Agencies of government,
though directed to carry out statutory mandates and certainly capable of presenting issues relating to
these statutes on their own behalf, operate in the context of powerful political pressures which can
lead to overnight changes in argument, issues, and even position in a given case. See generally Cappel-
letti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative
Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 793, 799-800 (1975) (discussing forces affecting attorney general's choice of
suits). Thus, entries on the side of government were, without more, rated as valid.
55. See supra p. 1435.
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